At the Paris Peace Conference
James T. Shotwell
At the Paris Peace Conference
New York: MacMillan Company, 1937.
Difficulties In Treaty-Making
2, 1919, Under the journalistic caption, " 'Shall' or 'May': How We Handled Verbal Dynamite Making the Peace Treaty."]</small>
The Treaty of Paris may be either worse or better than what people think about it now. It is hardly ever possible to anticipate the judgments of history, but one thing is certain-that just as the War which it brings to a close was the most difficult of all the wars that have ever been fought, so the Treaty of Paris is the most difficult of Treaties that has ever been made.
The Treaty has about 80,000 words and over 400 Articles. It deals with almost every kind of problem in international affairs. About a thousand specialists drawn from all parts of the world worked at it, and they were not all there to help-some were there to block it, most were there to change it from whatever else it might have been. There is hardly a clause in the whole long document that has not been the object of controversy and debate. It is difficult now when looking at the clauses as a whole to realize how many other alternatives were examined and discarded before the final wording was agreed upon.
It is especially the difficulties of detail which are likely to escape attention; yet the Treaty is a mass of details. Principles may be agreed upon but they can seldom be applied without conflicting with other principles which in themselves have perhaps an equal claim to consideration. And yet, a single decision must be reached and a single formula must be found which will embody that decision.
In this finding of formula a single instance may furnish an indication of the final difficulties even after general plans have been agreed upon. Article 409 deals with the problem of erecting an International Labor Office with a right of supervision over the carrying out of International Labor Legislation. It states that a Governing Body "may communicate" the criticisms concerning Labor Legislation to the government involved, "and may invite that government to make such statement on the subject as it thinks fit." The question arose whether the verb "may" was strong enough, and "shall" was suggested as a substitute. Between the two verbs "may" and "shall" lie whole worlds of discussion, and back of them the accumulated forces of national histories, institutions and interests of the industrial nations of the world. Representatives of some of the nations at the Conference felt that the Governing Body of the International Labor Office should not be a mere agency for registering pious resolutions. On the other hand, representatives of other governments felt that if "shall" were used it might be interpreted as giving power to send impertinent notes to the governments of the world, or else, on the other hand, would lessen the discretion of the Governing Body by forcing it to subscribe to complaints with which it would be unwise to be identified.
There is many a point in the Treaty in which a single word contains the explosive power of these divergent principles of "shall" and "may." It is hardly too much to say that there are hundreds of instances where the choice of words opens up as many possibilities as this. Indeed, the art of drafting is only second in importance to the determination of the principles themselves.
Take another instance from the same general section of the Treaty: In Article 405, which was formerly Article 19 of the International Labor Proposals, a paragraph is inserted stating that in the framing of International Labor Legislation "the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different." It was, to say the least, somewhat difficult to suggest to the State which particularly profited by this clause (Japan) that its industrial organization was below the standards of the great European powers-yet the admission had to be secured in order to include the exception in a way satisfactory to the more advanced nations.
Still another instance: That same important Article has another clause which refers almost by name to the United States-"In the case of a federal State, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of that government to treat a draft convention . . . as a recommendation only." This sentence proved to be a formula to which the other nations could not take exception, for in noting the privileged position of the United States it did so by simply describing its government. In the earlier stages of the drafting the exception was stated in an adverbial rather than an adjectival form and other nations objected to its inclusion.
These are simple instances of the difficulties of finding a satisfactory expression to items upon which there could in the last instance be little disagreement, and they illustrate the difficulties of reaching a statement even where the points at issue were relatively beyond dispute.
When one turns from this set of difficulties to the subject-matter itself we reach at once a set of most interesting and difficult problems. In the first place there is the question of boundary making. Under the spell of the map most people think of boundaries as something almost as real as the rivers, mountains or seas along which they may run, with some one definite principle determining them, almost like a law of nature. This is true, perhaps, of districts like Alsace-Lorraine; but from the Rhine east there is hardly a single boundary which can be drawn that does not do violation to some important principle to which from one angle or another the Conference was pledged.
The new nations in the east of Europe unfortunately do not live on different sides of any clearly defined line. They fringe out into each other over a wide borderland through which it is possible to draw several lines each one of which would have a distinct justification. Still harder is the problem of dealing with islands of people set in the midst of other races.
The City of Lemberg is solid Polish, but is surrounded by Ruthenians who form the majority of the country population of that part of Galicia. Add to this fact the further complication that many of the Poles are Jewish, while on the other hand much of the land in the country of the Ruthenians is owned by Polish nobles. The people themselves cannot decide the question and are at war. What is to be done?
Take again the case of Greece. The real center of Greek civilization is the Aegean Sea with a fringe of Greek settlements all around it. Shall one consider that here we have a new form of state essentially maritime with its frontiers fringing the land rather than the sea? Most states run their frontiers from the land to the sea. This would reverse the process. The Greeks, as traders, may claim the ports along the Aegean as definitely as the American may claim the outlets for his railroads and compare the water rights of the Aegean to the overland rights of a continental country. It is a new point of view in political theory, but not without a good deal of weight. Shall one, therefore, consider the Aegean civilization as a unit and turn over to it the ports which are claimed as essential to its trade? Or shall one regard the hinterland as of more importance since they may claim that the Greeks shut them off from their own natural outlets to the sea? One thing is clear-whichever way one decides, one is both right and wrong.
Boundary making on the basis of statistics of population is difficult enough in itself, but is doubly difficult when measured up against the claims of culture and of history. It is possible for a small section of the population to give the tone culturally to the whole and to dominate the country politically. The Italians, for instance, claim that they have the cultural domination in the Adriatic, and visitors to the Dalmatian Coast are struck with the outer marks, at least, of this old Venetian quality of the maritime towns-while the Czechoslovaks claim that the steady pressure of racial movement offers a dynamic counterclaim less visible but more powerful. Magyars admit the statistical claims of Rumanians in Transylvania and of Slovaks in Slovakia, but cherish the proud memory of centuries of domination among these people since the Turks were driven out. Should one count heads and decide upon the basis of population, the result might lead to a distinct decline in the standards of civilization.
Again, the sentimental claims of history are often just as real as the demands of nationality. The fact that Upper Silesia had never belonged to Poland since the rise of modern states is as real a fact in its way as the national history of Bohemia. The century-long submission of the Slovenes to the Hapsburgs makes difficult a correct reading of plebiscites in that section of the new kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In planning for the future one cannot ignore the bearing of these historic factors in the erection of new states.
From more than one point of view there could be no settlement of these problems that was not wrong, and when one adds to racial claims the legitimate demands of economics, the need for provisions for transit and for markets, the rival claims for territories with supplies of raw material, the geographical and strategical elements in boundaries that would overrun cross-country railroad lines, and a dozen other considerations varying with each new boundary, one realizes that the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, no matter what they were, would leave the door open to further controversy.
It is quite possible, of course, that the actual boundaries drawn in the Treaty are open to objection, but it should be remembered that no boundaries can be drawn which will meet the approval of all parties concerned. This being the case, it would surely be well for liberal minded people the world over to concentrate a little less upon the map itself and more upon the international policies of the new States which have been erected.
The question of policies is of course even more difficult than that of boundary making. The one fact which stands out from history and geography as well as from a study of the present situation is, that the whole Danube Valley is intrinsically one and that the erection of new states with intensified national feelings along that great international waterway may result in retrogression rather than in progress, unless some means is found to unite them to some degree in common policies. Their boundaries must not be rigid barriers to trade or they will mutually suffer, and yet the one great solvent for their difficulties is impossible- namely, Free Trade. Even a Zollverein or Customs Union is perhaps beyond the limits of immediate possibility. How can they be brought together, suffering still, as they do, from the antagonisms of the War, to face the future constructively and in a co-operative spirit? Obviously, the League of Nations cannot go too far in assuming the supervision of this relatively incoherent mass of peoples. It is in no position to succeed at a single step to an enlarged Hapsburg Monarchy. And yet, the constructive scheme proposed must be elastic enough to include these possibilities, or at least suggest ways for meeting them in the future.
It is this question of elasticity which is the most difficult to appraise. If the international agreements of the Conference of Paris were to be made rigid it would seem as though much more were accomplished than to leave them frankly incomplete, but carried along as far as is possible now and fixed so they can be adjusted to changing conditions.
The only institutions which last are living institutions; and the very condition of living is change. It was the problem of constructive statesmanship at the Peace Conference to set going rather than to set up understandings, so that they would keep pace with changing events and secure the future as well as the present. Two parts of the Treaty dealt specially with this constructive planning, the one dealing with the League of Nations and the other with International Labor. In both these sections two schools of thought soon showed themselves even among the most ardent supporters of the general plan. On the one hand there were those who wanted to see something like a Super-State erected to which governments would abdicate some portion of their sovereignty. On the other hand, there were those who felt that true international action lay as much with the governments of the different States as through the congresses which they should set up, and that it was a grave mistake to lessen the authority and prestige of governments even in co-operative enterprises. Upon the whole, the latter view prevailed. The international arrangements in the Treaty are not of a kind to weaken governmental control, but continue to use governments as national organs in the international community. The national line-up on these questions was of great interest. The Continental European Powers feel that in spite of the War which has so divided them, there remains a need for a Continental community of nations. Stimulated by the radical thought, and particularly by certain sections of the syndicalists and socialists, they are prepared to enter into a closer league with closer international guarantees and sanctions than the non-continental Powers could entertain. In questions, for instance, of International Labor Legislation it must not be forgotten that an almost imaginary line ran through the great industrial regions at the north of France setting over some communities into Belgium and some into France, and that different Labor laws will affect the output of these two communities so that they feel obliged to come to an international agreement. The case is far different with the British or the American employers and workmen.
One of the most difficult problems to solve, however, in the League of Nations was the setting in the League of what amounted to a League of Nations in itself-the British Empire. The Dominions demanded to be regarded as nations. They remained at the same time parts of the great imperial League. From almost every standpoint excepting that of allegiance to a common sovereign they were acting as independent nations- much too independent in fact, for the comfort at times of the home government. There was every reason, therefore, from that angle for giving Canada, Australia and South Africa at least as much recognition as Jugoslavia, not to speak of a dozen or more smaller States. The Dominions make their own tariff treaties, and they fought in the War with distinct armies which they raised by their own free will according to their own laws. But if each Dominion were to receive a single vote, that would mean that the British Empire would have five votes in the League of Nations and the United States one, which obviously does not seem fair. If the British were to have only one vote, however, the Dominions would hardly care to enter into the League for they do not wish to give up the independence which they have already acquired, by surrendering to a purely British statesman their participation in international affairs. The League of Nations was, therefore, obliged to choose between the one and the other alternative. It chose to recognize the different Dominions as States members of the League, and America agreed to this, although with some misgivings on the part of some Americans in Paris. That the decision to do so was wise is becoming every day more and more apparent, for as far as the United States is concerned the different Dominions, young democracies so similar in spirit to the American and so analogous in institutions and traditions of liberty, are bound to support in the main lines those policies which America will be supporting. It is, therefore, in this group of young Anglo-Saxon States that America will be likely to find its strongest allies in the councils of the League in the future. If backward countries are to be admitted to the League, as must be done, it is surely essential to have a fairly large proportion of those peoples with the political experience and training which comes from Anglo-Saxon history as a makeweight against the inexperience and theoretic tendencies of the newer states.
It is only by looking far ahead and considering the probable attitudes of the different States when actual questions arise that one can judge the wisdom of such decisions as these.
The more the objections that are raised to the Treaty, the greater the importance grows of the League of Nations as the one means of readjusting solutions and rectifying blunders. Otherwise there is chaos ahead; and chaos means the end of civilization.
The "British Empire" In The League Covenant(1)
The arrangement which I suggested for listing the British Dominions and India under "British Empire" in the signatures of the original Members of the League of Nations turned out to be one of the revolutionary acts of the Paris Peace Conference. Accepted by the various British governments there represented and by all the other States as well, it was an official recognition by all the world that the "British Empire" was a sovereignty among the other sovereign States, a fact neither claimed nor granted in diplomatic dealings before. Strictly speaking, the symbol of that sovereignty has been a royal, not an imperial, Crown, although popular usage and even ceremonial references at coronation employ the more exalted title.
The confusion is not of recent date. Anson has noted that "from Athelstan to Canute imperial styles were used and 'emperor' is applied to Edward I, Richard II, and Henry V."(2) Firth has traced the use of the term "British Empire" through the early modern period, when the new national sovereignties were rising to supplant the traditional claims of the Holy Roman Empire.(3) But, as Keith has pointed out, there never had been a formal legislative definition of it.(4) The King is also Emperor of India but not "British Emperor." The congeries of dependencies and autonomous governments over which he rules are, except India, united under a Kingship. The Covenant was the first treaty with other States in which the designation of Empire was used to cover the whole vast fabric. As a matter of fact, it embraces more than British territory. "In addition to the Indian States, it includes large areas of territory designated as 'Protectorates,' over which the Crown exercises full control, whae attached to it in various degrees of relationship are 'Protected States' and 'Mandated Territories."' (5)
The way in which all this came about has been described in the Diary. The draft of the Covenant was being put together in printed form. It had to be ready for the Commission in the morning. The night was already far spent when the question of signatures came up. The American printing establishment was in a somewhat remote part of Paris. There was no time for consultation, and there was no precedent to follow. The British Members of the League of Nations obviously had to be grouped together. It would not have done to have listed them so that Australia would follow the United States of America, and South Africa come between Salvador and Spain. Moreover there was need of indicating the slightly different status of "States Members of the League" from "Members of the League." Hence the indention in the printed list, marking out this group of Members from the rest.
The term "British Empire" as the name for this group was especially suggested by the presence at the Peace Conference of the "British Empire Delegation." Indeed, this was the deciding factor. The way in which that Delegation functioned has been described in some detail in the Diary. But it, too, had its history. It was largely due to a direct migration from London to Paris of the members of the Imperial War Cabinet, the one organ of an imperial government that had been functioning. The antecedents of this carry us back to Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee in 1887, when the Colonial statesmen inaugurated the periodically recurring Conference, which in 1907 changed its style to Imperial Conference. This slight and infrequent mechanism had given the semblance of political and even of legal reality to the concept of a British Empire, but the term remained somewhat indeterminate, being confined to domestic use within the territories under the Crown. This process of imperial development, slow and hesitant in peace time, had reached its climax in the World War, in the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918 and the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. At the close of the War in which they had played so notable a part, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa could not be denied status at the Peace Conference, and their Prime Ministers made known in no uncertain terms their demand to participate in the settlement. The result was that the Foreign Office was almost snowed under in Paris and at times forced to yield to the vigorous leaders of the Dominions. The descriptions of the scenes in the Hotel Majestic given in the Diary show clearly enough the corporate existence at Paris of a British Empire-puzzling, self-contradictory, but effective. The fact that India was a part of the British Empire Delegation accounted for the inclusion of India, an empire in itself, in the list of States within the British Empire. The reason that this was left untouched was probably the uncertain significance of the indented margin which grouped these states together.
But there could hardly be both a British Empire on the list of States Members of the League and a United Kingdom as well, without giving the appearance of double representation. There was opposition enough already, especially in the United States, to the number of votes that the various British governments could mobilize in the League. That, in a word, was the chief reason for leaving the United Kingdom off the list when inserting in it the new, as yet undefined "British Empire." There was also the additional fact, however, that the non-self-governing colonies were popularly referred to as parts of the Empire, while their relation to the United Kingdom was not always clear. Although governed from Whitehall, they differed in the degree of achievement of autonomy on local rights and privileges.
But does the absence of the United Kingdom from the list of League Members mean that the Mother State is not herself a Member of the League? Strangely enough-or, perhaps, naturally enough-this question was not asked at the time, so far as I know. Years later, however, Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, who was Legal Adviser to the British Delegation and who shared with Mr. David Hunter Miller the editorship of the very draft of the Covenant in question, commented upon the signatures as follows:
If you look at the Covenant, which is the charter or constitution of the League, you will see that a list of the original members of the League is given in an annex. The form in which British membership is provided for satisfies both the two outstanding characteristics of the British Empire: the unity of the whole and the autonomy of the parts.
The names of the states come in alphabetical order. When you reach the words "British Empire," you will see immediately after them, but set back a little so as to show that they constitute part of the British group, the names Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India. The Irish Free State was only admitted as a member of the League at a later date.
Satisfactory though the form is in one respect, in that it recognizes the distinct international personality of the dominions, it is unsatisfactory in another respect, in that it entirely omits Great Britain, and Great Britain is not a wholly negligible part of the Empire. Great Britain only finds herself within the League as an unmentioned element in the British Empire.
How this came about it is a little difficult now to tell. It probably originated in the fact that the plenipotentiaries representing Great Britatn at the Peace Conference were furnished with full powers from the King which contained no words of territorial limitation and enabled them to act on his behalf generally. Their signature to the Peace Treaty was not limited in its operation to Great Britain. Technically it applied to all the King's dominions.
Whatever the purpose of this arrangement in the Annex to the Covenant, it has not worked well in practice. If the object was to lay stress on the unity of the Empire as a political entity, the effect has been the opposite, because in the ordinary work of the League it has tended to render the words "British Empire" synonymous with Great Britain and to create the impression that the dominions were something outside the Empire. If at a meeting of the Assembly the representatives are called upon to come up to the tribune to cast their votes in, let us say, the election of the president, and the South African delegate is seen to vote in the name of South Africa while the delegate of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain is seen to vote in the name of the British Empire, it necessarily suggests that South Africa is no part of the Empire.
Until the terms of the Covenant are amended and account is taken of the existence of Great Britain it is bound to happen that for some purposes the words "British Empire" are taken as meaning Great Britain- for instance, the share of the expenses of the League which falls to the lot of the Empire must be paid by Great Britain.(1)
One utterly unforeseen effect of this use of the term "British Empire" in the list of League signatures has been a modification in the form of treaties generally. At the Imperial Conference of 1916 Lord Balfour's Report raised the issue in these terms:
Some treaties begin with a list of the contracting countries and not with a list of Heads of States. In the case of treaties negotiated under the auspices of the League of Nations, adherence to the wording of the Annex to the Covenant for the purpose of describing the contracting party has led to the use in the preamble of the term "British Empire" with an enumeration of the Dominions and India if parties to the Convention but .without any mention of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Colonies and Protectorates. These are only included by virtue of their being covered by the term "British Empire." This practice, while suggesting that the Dominions and India are not on a footing of equality with Great Britain as participants in the treaties in question, tends to obscurity and misunderstanding and is generally unsatisfactory.
As a means of overcoming this difficulty it is recommended that all treaties (other than agreements between Governments) whether negotiated under the auspices of the League or not should be made in the name of Heads of States, and, if the treaty is signed on behalf of any or all of the Governments of the Empire, the treaty should be made in the name of the King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts of the Empire.(2)
"In the name of the King." This was the only solution for the Imperial Conference which laid the basis for the Statute of Westminster of 1931, by which the "British Commonwealth of Nations" was at last accepted as the proper term for the traditional "British Empire." But the formula also had a counterpart in the practice of the American Government, using the title "The President of the United States of America" instead of the name of the country.
1. See above, February 12.
2. Sir William R. Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution (4th ed., Oxford, 1935), II, Part II, 255 n. "Empire" in such cases was limited to England.
3. C. H. Firth, " 'The British Empire,"' Scottish Historical Review, XV, pp. 185-189.
4. A. Berriedale Keith, Constitution, Administration, and Laws of the Empire (New York, 1924), pp. xvii-xviii.
5. Keith, op.cit,. p. xvii. See also his Governments of the British Empire (1935), pp. 118-119.
1. Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, Great Britain and the Dominions, Harris Foundation Lectures, 1927 </I>(Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 91-93.
2. Imperial Conference, 1926. Summary of Proceedings, Cmd. 2768, pp. 22-23.
<P ALIGN=CENTER>Appendix VI
Chronology of the Peace Conference
[Taken from "Chronological Review of the World's Remaking," New York Times, January 4, 1920.]</center>
|Jan. 12.||The Supreme War Council, with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing and
the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy,lays out the procedure of the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
|Jan. 18.||Conference convenes; President Poincaré welcomes it and President
Wilson nominates Premier Clemenceau of France as permanent Chairman; heis unanimously elected by the delegates.
|Jan. 19.||Council of Five-United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan-instituted,
which is to take part in all meetings, hear all commissions, and execute all decisions. Other Powers are to take part in questions which concernthem, the neutrals appearing only on invitation.
|Jan. 22.||Council approves of President Wilson's proposal inviting representatives
of all belligerent Russian groups to meet representatives of the Councilat Princes' Island (Prinkipo), Sea of Marmora.
|Jan. 24.||Council warns belligerent nationals in Southeastern Europe that acquisition of territory by force would prejudice their case at Conference.|
|Jan. 25.||Conference votes for a League of Nations.|
|Jan. 26.||Clemenceau appoints various committees: On Responsibility, Reparation, Labor Legislation, and Regulation of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, etc.|
|Feb. 3.||League of Nations Commission meets at the apartment of Colonel House, President Wilson presiding.|
|Feb. 11.||French member of the League Commission, Léon Bourgeois, proposes
that the League enforce its decision by an international army. On the ground that the United States had recognized the political cohesion of Serbia, Croatia, and Slavonia, on Feb. 7, the Jugoslav delegates ask President Wilsonto judge between them and the Italian delegates on the Adriatic question.
|Feb. 14.||President Wilson expounds the League of Nations Covenant before the Conference.|
|Feb. 18.||Italian delegates decline to accept President Wilson as arbiter in the Adriatic
question on two grounds: The question is not a matter for arbitration andthe Croats and Slovenes, included in Jugoslavia, are still enemy peoples.
|Mar. 10.||Supreme War Council formulates terms for German disarmament-100,000 effectives and a twelve-year enlistment.|
|Mar. 18.||Navigation of the Rhine to be controlled by an international commission and Heligoland forts dismantled.|
|Mar. 21.||Italian delegation threatens to withdraw from Conference unless Fiume be rendered to Italy. (In the Treaty of London, Fiume is given to Croatia, but on Oct. 30, 1918, the people had declared their union with Italy.)|
|April 6.||Report that owing to the military demands of France and Italy President Wilson contemplated an immediate return to the United States.|
|April 8.||Commission of Responsibility for War, presided over by the American Secretary
of State, Lansing, excludes the death penalty from contemplated legal procedureagainst William of Hohenzollern, the former German Emperor.
|April 10.||The League Commission incorporates in the covenant a passage intended to leave the Monroe Doctrine inviolate.|
|April 12.||Claim of France to the Saar Valley accepted by the conference.|
|April 14||President Wilson privately addresses Italian delegates on Fiume.|
|April 16.||Conference agrees to provision Russia under the Nansen Commission, provided the Whites and Reds cease fighting.|
|April 23.||President Wilson, emphasizing his statement of the 14th, tells the Italian people that Fiume must go to Jugoslavia as the only available port for the nations of South Central Europe.|
|April 24.||Premier Orlando, the head of the Italian peace delegation, in a reply to the foregoing, demonstrates Italy's claim to Fiume.|
|April 25.||The council settles Poland's access to the Baltic-a traffic highway is to be opened through East Prussia to Danzig, which will be made a free city under the League.|
|April 26.||As a protest against President Wilson's attitude on the Fiume question Premier Orlando and his colleagues, Sonnino and Salandra, return to Rome to lay the matter before Parliament.|
|April 27.||The text of the labor article in the covenant is made public.|
|April 28.||President Wilson, as Chairman of the League Commission, expounds the revised text of the covenant before the conference.|
|April 30.||In answer to Japan's note verbale promising military and political surrender of Shantung, the Council agrees to the Chinese-Japanese arrangement in regard to the former German lease of Kiao-Chau.|
|May 5.||Sir Eric Drummond takes office as Secretary General of the League, which organizes its first committee.|
|May 6.||The council designates the mandatories for the former German colonies.|
|May 7.||The Italian delegates accept an invitation to return to the Conference, their conduct having, meanwhile, been indorsed by the Italian Parliament and public demonstrations in Italy.|
|May 29.||The German delegates formally protest against the terms of the treaty presented to them at Versailles, May 7.|
|June 12.||Council to give qualified material aid to Admiral Kolchak, head of the All-Russian Government at Omsk.|
|June 15.||Council finishes changes in the Versailles Treaty.|
|June 26.||Council declares it can promise nothing in regard to Turkey.|
|July 18.||Council places General Allenby (British) in charge of the British, French, Italian, and Greek armies of occupation in Asia Minor, the principal fields of operation being the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, the French in Syria, the Italians south of Smyrna, and the Greeks in Smyrna.|
|Aug. 4.||Tokio Government in a statement to the Council ratifies the note verbale given it by its delegates on April 3o.|
|Aug. 15.||Conference informs Rumania that it will make readjustments in Hungary and not Rumania.|
|Aug. 22.||The Council orders the Magyar Archduke Joseph to retire from the head of the new Hungarian Government.|
|Sept. 5.||The Council completes the text of the Bulgarian peace treaty.|
|Sept. 27.||Conference issues a note to Germany demanding evacuation of former Russian Baltic provinces.|
|Oct. 16.||Council invites Germany and Baltic nations to join in a blockade against Soviet Russia.|
|Nov. 7.||Council issues ultimatum to Rumania to withdraw from Hungary.|
|Nov. 21.||Council gives Poland mandate over Galicia for twenty-five years.|
|Dec. 22.||Supreme Council sends Germans ultimatum in regard to acceptance of protocol.|
The Organization Of The American Delegation
Looking back upon the preparations of the Inquiry for the Peace Conference, it seems now that the problem of the organization of the American Delegation and its relation to the Peace Conference as a whole was fundamental, because it affected in a major way not only the procedure of the Peace Conference but even the terms of the Treaty. Yet no adequate study of these problems of organization has yet been made. Something of their nature may be gathered from the short description given in the Retrospect of the way in which they were dealt with by the Inquiry, and in the discussion attached to the entry for January 29, at the time when the organization of the technical experts began to be integrated with that of other similar bodies.
In this connection the following two charts will be found of interest. <a href="Shotwell1.gif">The first one</a> was prepared for the Research Committee of the Inquiry and was discussed at its meeting on September 20, 1918. It is a modification of one submitted to the Committee on September 10. These two plans did not differ with reference to the place of the American Delegation in the Peace Conference, but only with reference to the organization of the technical bodies serving the American Delegation, especially the Inquiry and the Washington "Central," that is, the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, under the chairmanship of Dr. Edwin F. Gay. It is important to note that the Inquiry at that date fully expected that the Peace Conference would include representatives of the Central Powers, and that the American Delegation would be composed of representatives of the Executive and the Senate, a representative at large, and the Secretary of State. An additional blank space indicated some uncertainty as to the size of the Delegation.
<a href="Shotwell2.gif">The second chart</a> reproduced here was drawn at Paris to indicate the actual structure of the American Delegation. As is evident from the narrative in these pages, the relative places occupied by General Churchill's staff and by the Division of "Intelligence" under Dr. Mezes and Dr. Bowman should be reversed.