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<p align="right"> [[Main_Page | WWI Document Archive ]] > [[1917 Documents]] > '''History of Intelligence (B), British Expeditionary Force in France''' </p><hr>

<font size =4>From January 1917 To April 1919</font>
<hr>

R.J. Drake, Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.  5 May 1919<br><br>

PART 1 <br>
THE SECRET SERVICE<br><br>

GENERAL ORGANISATION<br>

1. At the opening of the above period the Secret Service was organised
into two offices under GHQ, the one situated at FOLKESTONE under Major A.C.
CAMERON, the other in LONDON under Major B.A. WALLINGER. At the same time there
was a branch office, attached to Major Cameron's FOLKESTONE office, working in
PARIS under Captain Hon. G.J.G. BRUCE whose chief function was the recruitment
of agents amongst Belgians and French in unoccupied France.
<br><br>
SYSTEM OF OBTAINING INFORMATION<br>

2. Both these organisations operated through Holland and maintained
their own system of head-men, couriers, passeurs and agents as well as separate
offices. They were, in fact, not only in actual if unconscious competition with
each other, but also with parallel systems controlled by the War Office and our
French and Belgian Allies.
<br><br>
3. French and Belgian organisations were also established at FOLKESTONE
and worked in liaison with our FOLKESTONE office. In the case of the Belgians
this liaison was slight.
<br><br>
4. In addition, a nebulous Russian organisation was at work, with the
secrecy which one might expect, in PARIS, and it is believed in Holland. Beyond
the fact that the officers in charge themselves later became suspected, and so
attracted the attention of the Contre-Espionage section of the 1 (b)
organisation, no relations were at my time established.
<br><br>
5. Whether the suspicions against them had any foundation or not, the
possibility of their entering the field in Belgium and Holland as bidders for
our own and other Allied services is not excluded. Nor is it possible to say in
whose interests these services, if purchased, were bought; or how much such
purchase, if it occurred, contributed to the dislocation of our Secret Service
organisations.
<br><br>
UNHEALTHY COMPETITION BETWEEN SERVICES<br>

6. The competition between services referred to in para 2 was unhealthy
and is apt to lead to the downfall of one or other of the many systems working
under the head organisations. It is unfair to the agents and other personnel,
and in some cases, led to their destruction, owing to the jealousies of the
higher subordinates, who, naturally, worked in the keenest competition one with
the other, but often without regard to the interests of the agents concerned.
Such conduct on the part of unscrupulous persons is bound to lead to disastrous
results, as far as the agents themselves are concerned, and the service as a
whole suffers. It is only necessary to instance PUTTMAN, ARCHAIN and the courier
GEORGE, amongst others in the G.H.Q. services alone.<br><br>

RESULTS OF ABOVE<br>

6A. In spite of the excellent results produced, there is little doubt
that denunciations, buying up of other services' agents, duplication of reports,
and collaborations between agents of the various Allied systems were not
uncommon, so that the information arrived at the various Headquarters in a
manner which was not only confusing but sometimes unreliable and apt to be
dangerous. This was due to the fact that there was an apparent confirmation of
news, really originating from the same source, owing to its being received at
Allied Headquarters from what appeared to be different and independent places of
origin.
<br><br>
ATTEMPTED REMEDIES<br>

6B. The chief remedy which had been applied to this state of things had
been the erection of an artificial delimitation in the areas allotted to the
various British services: that is to say, the War Office had reserved to
themselves the right to operate east of the line drawn roughly southwards from
ANTWERP through BRUSSELS to NAMUR, the remaining portion of Belgium and occupied
territory being allocated to the G.H.Q. services.
<br><br>
Germany itself was a barred zone as far as G.H.Q. services were
concerned. The consequences of this particular delimitation are referred to
later.
<br><br>
COMPETITION STILL CONTINUED<br>

6C. This attempt at finding a modus vivendi did not entirely remove the
competition between the three British services, nor did it affect the situation
as between them and our French and Belgian Allies.
<br><br>
7. It is hardly necessary to point out that the artificial delimitation
of territory for Secret Service purposes is fundamentally unsound, both in
theory and in practice. Not only does it prevent, in many cases, the natural
overflow of an existing sound system, operating on the border of the delimited
zone on the other side of the border, and so deprive the forces in the field of
useful information from certain portions of the forbidden territory, owing to
the fact that individuals who are capable of setting up systems in that
territory are unwilling to work for the head-men and other chiefs to whom their
territory has been allotted.
<br><br>
SYSTEM OF TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION TO G.H.Q. <br>

8. At this period, all reports were sent over at intervals to the G.H.Q.
offices in Folkestone and London after having been previously reduced to a
concise telegraphic report by the head-men of the systems concerned, which were
known for convenience as C.F. and W.L. Later this was done by officers in
Holland, especially in the W.L. Service.
<br><br>
9. The original practice has a double disadvantage. In the first place,
as was proved subsequently by the capture of the SS BRUSSELS, the transmission
of agents' reports in original is a danger to the lives of those agents which it
is unfair to ask them to incur. In the second place, the reduction of purely
military reports to concise telegrams by civilians, however able, who are not
cognisant of the exact military situation, is apt to lead to the omission of
important items of information which may be of the highest value to a commander
in the field.
<br><br>
ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE MATTERS<br>

10. All efforts were therefore concentrated to remove these objections,
and after consultation with the Military Attaché at THE HAGUE and the various
officers concerned in the War Office and elsewhere, a system was arrived at
which removed some of them.
<br><br>
MILITARY ATTACHÉ THE HAGUE PUT IN CHARGE<br>

11. Under the new arrangements all transcripts of reports (most of which
were written in code), were handed in to the Military Attaché by the head-men of
the system concerned, accompanied in the case of the C.F. and W.L. Services by a
summarised digest of what the head-men considered to be the essential feature of
the reports, which was to serve as a guide to the Military Attaché in drawing
his own conclusions. At the same time, the latter had access to, and the right
to call for, any original report; so that he could satisfy himself as to the
correctness or otherwise of any particular point.
<br><br>
12. At one sweep two of the major objections to the ancient practice
were removed. The reports were now compiled and collated by one, and that a
trained, mind. The power of calling for the original report, and the composition
of all reports into one telegraphic digest, also afforded the opportunity for
the detection of the sale of information amongst agents, of the provision of
similar information from one source to two organisations, and of other
opportunities for fraud.
<br><br>
13. The Military Attaché was given at the same time the task of
attempting to put an end to the competition which had existed in the past. His
task was by no means an easy one, for although there is no reason to suggest
that the officers concerned did not work with the greatest loyalty in
endeavouring to carry out the new arrangements, it was impossible in some cases
to forget the bitternesses of the past and personal feelings which these had
left behind, especially amongst the subordinate personnel.
<br><br>
14. At G.H.Q., there was no doubt whatever as to the beneficial results
of the new system. The officer to whom had been allotted the task of reducing to
graphic form on a map the movements of enemy divisions was able to report that
it was considerably easier for him to arrive at a really coherent idea of these
movements, that he no longer received so many confusing and contradictory
reports or apparent confirmations of news which really originated from the same
source.
<br><br>
15. The Military Attaché was also made a referee in all cases of dispute
between British services, and had the power to act as the court of first
instance in dealing with claims to either organisations as a whole, or to train
watching posts, and individual couriers and agents.
<br><br>
OBJECTIVE OF THE S.S. SYSTEM<br>

16. It should be stated here that the bulk of the work of Secret Service
in occupied territory was devoted to train watching, with a view to tracing the
movements of enemy constituted units. This information was of vital importance
in drawing up the enemy's order of battle. It had a direct effect on the
operations and movements of our own forces, and became therefore the first
objective of our Secret Service system.
<br><br>
17. Subsidiary efforts were devoted, however, to special tasks allotted
to special agents, such as reports on defensive works, reports on movement of
shipping from Zeebrugge and Ostend, technical details as to artillery, aviation,
aerodromes and similar matters, and the acquisition by theft or purchase of
German military compilations, and all military information generally.
<br><br>
FACTS REVEALED BY LOCAL CONTROL BY M.A. THE HAGUE<br>

18. The erection of the court of first instance at THE HAGUE led to the
discovery that, consciously or unconsciously, certain organisations and
individuals had undoubtedly been working for more than one British service, in
some cases at the same time, in others intermittently or alternately.
<br><br>
19. The introduction of the new system enabled us to prevent disputes
such as had arisen in the past, more especially as full responsibility was
thrown on any officer who decided that he was unable to abide by the decision of
the Military Attaché on the spot. Such cases were to be referred to a higher
court in London, composed of the officers in charge of M.I.1., M.I.1c., and 1(b)
G.H.Q., with subsequent reference, if necessary, to the Director of Military
Intelligence himself.
<br><br>
COMPARATIVE GRAPHS OF VARIOUS SERVICES AND WHAT THEY REVEALED<br>

20. It is difficult after this lapse of time, and almost unnecessary, to
trace the varying fortunes of the various services, but it must be recorded as a
significant fact that charts drawn up showing graphically the number of posts
working for the various services revealed that almost invariably where one
service declined another was on the up grade. This was particularly the case as
between the G.H.Q. "C.F." Service and the War Office "T" Service, between whom,
both as services and as between individual officers in charge, it is necessary
to record that the greatest competition and some bitterness had existed.
<br><br>
ARGUMENTS BASED ON THEM <br>

21. This compensatory movement between the services has been used as an
argument against putting all our eggs from the Secret Service point of view, in
one basket; but the argument is, in my view, unsound, and I am personally
convinced that where one service showed a marked improvement which synchronised
with the decline of another, and where such improvement, as was nearly always
the case, was practically equivalent to the decline of the other, such
improvement was probably due to the fact that service and posts had been
"jumped" by the successful concern.
<br><br>
REASONS FOR BELIEVING THESE TO BE INCORRECT<br>

22. This is not intended as any reflection on the officers in charge of
these services; such action where deliberate, was due to their subordinates. In
other cases services were no doubt taken on in good faith by the officers in
charge of the organisations as new services and quite distinct from any which
had previously operated.
<br><br>
THE IDEAL TO BE AIMED AT<br>

23. This system was continued until March 1918, and throughout that time
no effort had been spared by propaganda and conversation with all  persons
concerned, to advocate the erection of what could be the only sound system - one
Allied Secret Service system in Holland. With Switzerland at that time G.H.Q.
had nothing to do, but any argument which is applicable to Holland applies
equally to Switzerland, or any other country. At the same time, in saying, "one
Allied Service" there was no intention to put out of court any arrangements by
which Holland might be handed over to the British, or Switzerland, for instance,
to the French. This amounts in effect to the same thing.
<br><br>
SEPARATION OF THE PARIS OFFICE<br>

24. In September 1917, it was found that the use made of the Paris
office by Major Cameron did not justify the continuance of that office as an
annex to his organisation, and, of the two alternatives of closing down or
allowing Captain Bruce to endeavour to justify the continued existence of that
office by successful operations in another direction, the latter was chosen.
This decision was thoroughly justified by subsequent events.
<br><br>
25. The previous situation, partly again owing to the personalities of
persons engaged, had become unworkable. This was also due chiefly, however, to
the fact that long-range control of Secret Service organisations is, in nearly
every case, ineffective. Secret Service is not a matter which can be organised
or controlled entirely by correspondence; in this work above all other the
personal touch and inspiration are what are most required.
<br><br>
NEW FUNCTIONS OF THE PARIS OFFICE<br>

26. By mutual arrangement with the War Office and Admiralty Captain
Bruce was allowed to enter into two fields hitherto barred to G.H.Q. activities,
namely, Switzerland and Spain, the former of which had been reserved entirely
for the War Office for operations in Germany, and the latter to the Admiralty on
account of the immense importance from a naval point of view of the information
they were enabled to acquire in this country.
<br><br>
27. Every assurance was given that, wherever steps were taken, nothing
would be done to imperil existing sources of information, and that no steps
would be taken to erect Secret Service organisation or to recruit agents in
these territories without reference to the authorities concerned. In the case of
Spain some difficulty was experienced, owing to a former unhappy
misunderstanding as to the question of the recruiting of agents by G.H.Q. in
this country.
<br><br>
28. With regard to Spain, it is sufficient to say that no very great
results were obtained, and that after a certain period, the officer sent to this
country was recalled and paid off. He had, however, done useful work and had
been of assistance to the Contre-Espionage Service and the Admiralty
organisations; so that it can be said that the expenditure of effort in this
direction was not entirely wasted.
<br><br>
29. In January 1918, Major Cameron reported that he was anxious to
undertake other work, being actuated to this step chiefly by the strain which he
had undergone of some 3 years work in this field.
<br><br>
His train watching services were at a low ebb and practically
non-existent, and he felt himself incapable, owing to his state of health, of
reviving them on a satisfactory footing.
<br><br>
I must place on record my appreciation of the loyalty and ability with
which this officer carried on this difficult work under trying conditions.
<br><br>       
In the earlier part of the period under review and before that the
results produced by his services had been excellent. Although they do not come
within that period I understand that the inception and initiation of
train-watching services were largely his. Great credit is therefore due to him
for the success which is his won, and other services, achieved in this field.
<br><br>
29A. Any references which have been made to competition and the
resulting bitterness in no way detract from either his success or from that of
the War Office 'T' organisation. Competition and bitternesses were the natural
outcome of the system then in force, and of the vital necessity, coupled with
keenness, to obtain information for the Armies in the field.
<br><br>
AMALGAMATION OF THE TWO G.H.Q. SERVICES<br>

30. The situation thus created gave the opportunity for an improvement
of the organisation for which I had been working, and the two G.H.Q. Services in
Holland then became one under Major Wallinger. We were thus a step nearer our
goal of one Allied service in Holland. Captain Bruce's organisation remained
separate and working directly under the orders of G.H.Q.
<br><br>
JUSTIFICATION FOR ERECTION OF G.H.Q. SERVICE VIA SWITZERLAND

31. The criticism may be made that it is inconsistent on the part of one
who was preaching the erection of one single service in Holland, to set up a
second and competing service in apparent opposition to the War Office Service in
Switzerland.<br><br>
At first sight this would appear to be a fair criticism, but the
circumstances were not analogous and the step can be easily justified.
<br><br>
32. The whole aim and object of this G.H.Q. Service was to establish
posts in Luxembourg, an important railway centre, with a view to reporting train
movements in that territory, by means of intermediaries in Switzerland. Up to
this time no organisation had succeeded in establishing any service in
Luxembourg which had proved itself capable of forwarding reports from this
territory, either adequate in the ground they covered or in the movements they
reported, or useful in the sense of rapidity of their transmission. Owing to
certain relations which Captain Bruce had formed in Paris, it was felt that he
and he only had particular facilities for the erection of this organisation, and
subsequent events proved this to be the case.
<br><br>
ATTEMPTS TO SET UP ONE ALLIED S.S.

33. The goal of one Allied service in Holland had still to be kept in
view by all concerned, and eventually a full representative meeting was called
in London on the 31st August 1918, presided over by Major-General Sir G.
Macdonogh, Director of Military Intelligence, and attended by:
<blockquote>
        General Boucabeille, French Military Attaché at The Hague<br>
        Lt.Col P. Wallner, 2eme Bureau, Ministere de Guerre, Paris<br>
        Commandant Smets, Belgian G.Q.G.<br>
        Col. R.Van Deman, American Army<br>
        Captain Mansfield Cumming, C.B., M.I.1c., War Office<br>
        Lt. Col. R.J.Drake, 1 (b), G.H.Q.<br>
</blockquote>
Considerable progress was made, after a lunch given in honour of these
gentlemen, towards the desired end.
<br><br>
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED<br>

34. As was expected, and as had proved in the past, the chief difficulty
in correcting a faulty organisation of the Secret Service arose from the fact
that agents who are working and have been working for some time past for one
service, the chiefs of which are known to and trusted by them, are unwilling to
change over to the tutelage of another, in the personnel of which they may have
no confidence.
<br><br>
INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION IN HOLLAND SET UP<br>

35. This and other considerations made it impossible, therefore, to set
up the ideal, but considerable progress was made towards it in the erection of
an Inter-Allied Commission, of which General Boucabeille was nominated as
President. This Commission was to exercise the same functions with regard to all
the services as those hitherto allotted to the British Military Attaché with
regard to the British services; that is to say, it was to receive a digest of
all reports received by all services; it was to have access to and power to call
for the originals of any reports, and was to be the court of first instance to
adjudicate on all questions of dispute. The object of the allocation of these
powers to this Commission was, of course, the same, and there is no question
that this step formed a considerable advance in Secret Service organisation.
<br><br>
RESULT OF ITS ERECTION<br>

36. It had, however, undoubtedly the curious result that the field was
left practically clear in occupied Belgium and France for the British Secret
Service, for the services of our Allies diminished to a very inconsiderable
organisation. We had, in fact, received no reports from these services worthy of
much consideration since October 1917.
<br><br>
REDUCTION OF TRAIN WATCHING POSTS<br>

37. After the amalgamation of the G.H.Q. Services, it was found possible
after consultation with the Military Attaché, to lop off certain redundant posts
and organisations. In an earlier examination of this question, for instance, it
had been discovered that in some cases there were as many as six train watching
posts on quite short lengths of railway line. Apart from the expense involved,
it is obvious that the multiplication of posts in this fashion in a restricted
area adds considerably to the danger of all those engaged. It means the
multiplication of the possibility of capture of original reports. It means also
the multiplication of the risk of capture of the couriers and passeurs employed
in collecting and smuggling reports out of the country. In spite of a natural
unwillingness to obliterate services performing useful functions and so to risk
a possible loss of information it was decided to reduce the redundant posts
considerably, and orders were issued accordingly. No bad effects accrued, in
spite of certain gloomy prognostications in various quarters.<br><br>

GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN RESULTS
EXPENDITURE<br>
        
38. Throughout this period there is no doubt that the general average of
the value and accuracy of the information received showed a progressive upward
tendency. The same remark, however, applies to the expenditure, which may appear
strange in view of the abolition of competition, and the suppression of
redundant posts referred to above.
<br><br>

CAUSES OF INCREASE
<br>
39. It must, however, be remarked that the price of espionage, like
everything else, had appreciated considerably. In the first place, the
patriotism which urged many to undertake this work in the earlier stages of the
war had somewhat cooled down. Persons who had been willing to undertake this
work without pay in the earlier stages of the war had been driven by sheer
necessity and the expense of living, to ask for remuneration. In addition, the
execution and imprisonment of considerable numbers of those engaged in this
service had the natural effect of forcing those who were willing to embark on
these duties to consider the financial future of their relatives and dependant,
as well as to assess at a higher rate the monetary value of the risks they
themselves were about to incur.<br><br>

DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AGENTS<br>

40. Finally for other reasons, agents were very much harder to find.
This can readily be imagined when it is realised that at least six competing
services had been turning over the ground for agents for the greater part of the
war, and had been joined since September 1917 by  a newcomer - the American
Service - who were not only comparative novices, but had been given apparently a
free hand as regards funds as long as they produced information.<br><br>

PENSIONS OF AGENTS AND DEPENDANTS ARRANGED FOR<br>

41. Every effort, however, was directed to keeping down the expenditure
as low as possible. In this connection the question of the pensions for the
dependants of agents shot in our service and of the pensions to be allotted to
agents permanently injured by accident or imprisonment during the course of
their connection with our service, were taken up with the Financial Authorities
at the War Office and decisions obtained.<br><br>

RESULTS OF OUR ADVANCE<br>

42. Matters continued on these lines until the Armistice and for some
time afterwards, though the rapid advance of our armies saw the gradual
absorption of our train watching posts and brought us face to face with another
of the many unsound situations arising from initial faulty organisation.
Luckily, thanks to the Armistice, we were not called upon  to solve this
problem, that is, the acquisition of information in a territory which had
hitherto been completely denied to us and of which we had no knowledge -
Germany.
<br><br>
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ORGANISATION
<br>
43. There is no question, to my mind, that the Secret Service at
home should be organised in such a fashion that, in the event of war in any
country, other than in Asia or Africa, a complete section of it could be
detached to the Commander-in-Chief in the theatre of war. This section should
have not only complete knowledge of the country concerned, but should have been
dealing constantly and for some time past with the control and organisation of
Secret Service in it.
<br><br>
44. Experience shows that it is impossible to expect from Secret Service
sources under war conditions, any information of the nature called for by the
strategical and tactical conditions of this war in less than six months. In a
war of movement, local and tactical information can be obtained, of course, by
agents going through the lines, but their information is bound to be local,
tactical and limited.
<br><br>
This, however, is not the place to develop this argument, which will be
fully exposed in the 1 (b) section of the Intelligence manual.<br><br>

UTILITY OF AGENTS AFTER THE ARMISTICE<br>

45. After the Armistice many of the agents who had worked for us in
occupied territory proved to be of the greatest utility to our Contre-Espionage
Service in the denunciation of suspects and undesirables who  had hitherto been
unknown to that service.<br><br>

THE PARIS OFFICE: ITS OTHER FUNCTIONS<br>

46. With regard to the Paris office, in addition to its work of
endeavouring to establish a system in Luxembourg which would communicate through
Switzerland, Captain Bruce was given the services of a Flying Corps Officer who
had recently escaped from Germany - Lieutenant S.E. Buckley - with a view to
organising the escape of our prisoners of war, in collaboration with the French,
who had already had a very good system working for the escape of their own
prisoners. This officer was put in touch with an officer of M.I. 1.c. who had
been taking some steps in this direction, but it is believed without very much
success.
<br><br>
47. As a result of their efforts, maps, compasses and other necessities
were smuggled into prisoners of war in various camps in Germany as well as
ciphers and codes by which they could communicate with the outside world.
Lectures and instruction were also given to officers of units of the
Expeditionary force, and compasses, maps etc. were served out to them, attention
being paid particularly to the officers of the R.F.C. and the Tank Corps, who,
from the nature of their employment, were more liable to capture than the
average officer, and were, from their small numbers and the expense of their
training, more desirable objects of attention than the average officer of a
fighting unit.
<br><br>
48. It was felt undesirable that instruction in these matters should be
given to these latter officers on account of the possible effect on the 'morale
' of the weaker members who might feel that as they had been given full
instruction and means of escape, it was not so incumbent on them to fight to the
last as might otherwise be the case.
<br><br>
RESULTS OBTAINED<br>

49. A considerable number of officers of the R.F.C. especially were got
into touch with, and a gratifying proportion of escapes were effected.
Eventually, as was only to be expected, the Germans discovered the method of
conveyance of maps, compasses, files etc. to our prisoners, and took such
precautions as to render any further attempts most difficult. In addition, they
threatened, at a conference on prisoners of war at THE HAGUE, to forbid entirely
the further despatch of parcels, should our efforts continue. The organisation,
therefore, perforce, ceased then to perform any useful function, and Lieutenant
Buckley's energies were directed to assist Captain Bruce in the general scheme
of secret service, the field of which had by this time considerably developed.
<br><br>
50. A scheme put forward by Lieutenant Buckley by which he himself
should again be taken prisoner with a view to conveying instruction in person as
to the methods of escape to other prisoners of war, was negatived, as this
officer had already suffered 18 months' incarceration in Germany, and had made
five attempts to escape, escaping on the fifth. It was felt that he was already
too well known to the German authorities to justify any such proposal being put
into effect in fairness to him.<br><br>

51. Another scheme put forward by him, by which we should attempt to
obtain information with regard to the movement of constituted units by train in
the interior of Germany, many of which passed along lines in the immediate
vicinity of prisoner of war camps, was also negatived. It was felt that not only
was it not fair to ask our prisoners of war to undertake the risks involved, but
also that the information would deal with matters so far removed from our front
as not to justify these risks.
<br><br>
OPERATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG<br>

52. In the meantime, Captain Bruce's plans for operating Secret Service
in Luxembourg had developed. After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain the
necessary papers, a Madame Rischard was granted by the enemy a permit to proceed
from Switzerland, where she was then living, to her home in Luxembourg. She was
the forerunner of the service, and it was her mission to obtain local persons of
reliability to work in our interests. Her social position, and the official
position of her husband as doctor to the State Railways in Luxembourg justified
every hope of her being able to perform her mission satisfactorily.<br><br>

53. She was successful in obtaining in due course the allegiance, not
only of her husband, but of several of the principal officials of the Luxembourg
State Railways, who in turn engaged such of their subordinates as were reliable.
Madame Rischard also won over to our side the editor and other necessary
personnel of the "Landwirt" a local paper, which was to form the channel of
communication for the message she sent.
<br><br>
54. The ground being thus prepared for the arrival of Lieutenant
Baschwitz-Meau, this officer was put over the lines by free balloon from Verdun
on the night of 18th/19th June 1918. He landed successfully in Luxembourg within
a few miles of his appointed objective within the area selected for this
operation.
<br><br>
55. Thanks to the spade work performed by Madame Rischard and to certain
improvements in the code which past experience in communicating with her had
suggested, Lieutenant Meau was able to set up the best train watching service,
as far as the reporting of results goes, which had up to that time been
established, and this service operated successfully until the conclusion of
hostilities, when Luxembourg was occupied by American troops.
<br><br>
56.  The various persons engaged in this operation contributed in their
several spheres, each one complementary to the other, to the performance of one
of the most successful pieces of intelligence work, from an S.S. point of view,
within my knowledge, and all credit is due to them. <br><br>

CODE EMPLOYED<br>

57. The code, which was constructed by Captain L.G. Campbell, is, I
believe, on a principle entirely new and almost undiscoverable. It is capable of
use in any letter or newspaper article on any subject. The details of it have
been communicated to the responsible authorities in M.I. 1.c. for their future
use.
<br><br>
TIME OF TRANSMISSION<br>

58. As the Germans placed no impediment in the passage of the local
Luxembourg paper to Switzerland, it was possible to receive intelligence from
that territory regularly and within the space of five days, as opposed to a
minimum of three weeks when, as previously, communication came through Holland.
<br><br>
SECRET SERVICE WITH ARMY OF OCCUPATION<br>

59. On the advance of the army to the Rhine and on its formation into
the Army of Occupation, Captain Bruce was despatched with it in order to
inaugurate Secret Service from occupied territory and so supplement the Secret
Service already in existence and working under the aegis of M.I. 1.c. He took
with him Lieutenant Meau who again performed services of a highly meritorious
nature.
<br><br>
60. Although, as stated above, it is our experience that no information
can be obtained under modern conditions from any new service in any time under
six months, or under conditions such as obtaining in occupied territory at that
time in probably under three months, Major Bruce and Lieutenant Meau were able
within the space of one month to unravel the ramifications of an extensive
system of German espionage whose principal object was the promotion of
Bolshevism and Separation amongst the troops of the Allies. They were able to
produce evidence which tended to show that, in spite of the professed departure
of the new Government in Germany from the old conditions and the old regime, it
was the Hoeresleitung which was really in power. It was, in any case, in a
position to continue its espionage and other anti-Allied activities in spite of
its apparent lack of power.
<br><br>
61. Captain R.G. Tangye who succeeded Major Bruce, has since been able
to effect the arrest of several Bolshevik agents operating in our zone of the
occupied territory.
<br><br>
CLOSING OF THE PARIS OFFICE<br>

62. The Paris office having ceased to perform any useful function, was
finally wound up on the 15th March 1919, after all its services had been
liquidated and paid off.<br><br>

SUBSIDIARY EFFORTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY<br>

63. Contemporaneously with the work of what might be called our
established Secret Service organisations, subsidiary operations were constantly
being carried out with a view to obtaining information.<br><br>

64. Early in 1917, General Trenchard, then commanding the Royal Flying
Corps, decided that the old practice of depositing agents behind the enemy lines
by the landing of an aeroplane was too expensive in machines and pilots.
Experiments already in progress were pushed forward, and with the aid of the
Inventions Board of the Ministry of Munitions, the "Guardian Angel" parachute
was perfected. The idea was that agents should be dropped from an aeroplane in
flight. Tests having been successfully undertaken in England which proved its
reliability, efforts were made to recruit persons willing to undertake this
hazardous means of reaching occupied territory. Recruiting was actively carried
on by a sub-branch of Major Wallinger's office which was situated at that time
at Bruay under the orders of Captain W.A. Hazeldine.
<br><br>
65. Several agents were put over by this means at varying intervals,
depending, first on the district from which the information was required,
secondly on the recruiting and training of the agent.
<br><br>
66. At first the agents took with them pigeons by which they were to
send back their information, and rendezvous were arranged for at which
subsequent consignments of pigeons were to be dropped to them.<br><br>
It must be recorded, however, that, owing to the difficulties of the
exact identification of localities by night, and possibly also of the agent
attending the appointed rendezvous, no great measure of success resulted from
these operations, although many consignments of pigeons were dropped.
<br><br>
67. The limitations, moreover, imposed on this operation by the chiefs
of the Royal Flying Corps, which restricted its use to approximately fifteen
miles behind the enemy lines and by the fact that flights had to be carried on
during a certain period of the moon, during which again the weather had to
answer all requirements, restricted considerably the number of agents put over.
It therefore became essential to think out some other means of conveying agents
to the desired localities.
<br><br>
68. In view of the practical certainty that a proportion of the agents
so sent would be captured and might divulge the means by which they had arrived,
it was probable that the Germans would shortly be cognisant of the details of
the operation, as was, in fact, proved by enemy orders subsequently captured.
This meant that they would be on the lookout during the favourable moon periods,
that they would be suspicious on hearing behind their lines at night an
aeroplane which did not drop bombs, and that the agent therefore so landed would
have decreased chances of escape.<br><br>

LANDING OF AGENTS BY FREE BALLOON<br>

69. Silence therefore became an essential desideratum and it was
eventually proved after experimental flights conducted by Commander Pollock (in
conjunction with Major Wallinger, whose idea this originally was) the well known
balloon expert working with the Admiralty, that it was a feasible operation to
land agents by means of free balloons, provided weather, wind and other
circumstances were favourable. The recruitment of agents for this operation was
therefore pressed forward, and a gratifying number of candidates were
forthcoming.
<br><br>
ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE METHODS OF COMMUNICATION<br>

70. At the same time, efforts had been directed towards the improvement
of methods of communication, and the aid of Captain Round, chief inventor of
Marconi's, was invoked, for the second time, the necessary permission having
been obtained from Mr Godfrey Isaacs. he had been consulted originally by Major
Cameron on an earlier occasion.
<br><br>
71. Captain Round produced a portable continuous wave set, weight about
60 lbs, which was far ahead of anything in wireless apparatus known at that
time, and was believed to be incapable of detection by any means of position
finding and detective organisation known to wireless experts either on our own
or the German side. Weight being not so strictly limited in a balloon as it
would be in an aeroplane, the chief factor in this respect to be considered was
the weight that an agent could conveniently carry after his landing had been
effected. It was found possible to send with the agents a supply of food,
pigeons etc., which could be dropped from the balloon, shortly before the man
himself landed, in localities where they would be unlikely to be discovered.
<br><br>
72. Considerable success in the landing of the agents at or near the
desired localities was attained, and there is little doubt that attempts were
made by them to communicate within the specified hours, which were laid down for
so many nights in a month and in the special code which had previously been
memorised. It is regrettable to record, however, that, owing to a certain lack
of interest on the part of local technical experts, no intelligible results were
received. Investigation by Captain Round, who was wired for from England for the
purpose, proved that a defective receiving apparatus had been put up. This was a
matter beyond the control of anybody working in 1 (b), as in such technical
affairs one is obviously in the hands of one's experts.
<br><br>
73. One of the agents having had an accident in landing and being
subsequently captured by the Germans and executed, there is little doubt that
they came into the possession of a complete set of wireless apparatus and
further efforts in this direction were therefore negatived.
<br><br>
DESPATCH OF PIGEONS TO INHABITANTS<br>

74. From March 1917 onwards, a system of despatching pigeons broadcast
to the inhabitants of occupied territory had been in operation. These pigeons
were despatched by free balloon to any desired neighbour hood and were dropped
by a clockwork apparatus, after a specified time. This was arrived at according
to the speed of the wind and the distance to be traversed, their point of
departure being again determined by the direction of the wind.
<br><br>
RESULTS OBTAINED <br>

75. When this system was initiated it was calculated that we should be
lucky if 5 per cent of return messages were received. Experience showed,
however, that on the average some 40 per cent of messages were returned and in
some cases even higher. The information in most cases was of a very high order
and had the advantage of being fresh and rapidly transmitted. For instance, the
balloons were usually despatched about 11 o'clock at night and many of the
messages were received at 5 o'clock the next morning.<br><br>

ADAPTATION OF METHODS FOR DESPATCH OF PROPAGANDA<br>

76. Similar balloons were despatched for the Propaganda Section of the
General Staff, who subsequently adopted an adapted form of this system of
conveying material over the enemy's lines on a large scale.
<br><br>
77. The prevalent wind in the Western theatre being of a westerly
nature, this method was capable of use on a high percentage of nights, and no
measures which the enemy thought fit to adopt in occupied territory were capable
of preventing either the despatch of the balloons or the picking up of the
pigeons and subsequent despatch of the information by the inhabitants. Many of
them unfortunately were shot, but this in no way deterred others, although we
were later asked by the French Government to desist for a period from putting
this operation into practice.
<br><br>
SYSTEM ADOPTED BY FRENCH, BELGIANS AND ITALIANS<br>

78. After considerable scepticism on the part of our allies the system
was adopted by the French, Belgian and Italian services of information and used
on several fronts. As regards propaganda, it is of interest to record that a
cabled request has recently been recovered from General Knox on the Vladivostok
front for the necessary apparatus constructed on these lines. 
<br><br>
FURTHER RESEARCHES INTO MEANS OF TRANSMITTING INFORMATION<br>

79. In view of the shortage of pigeons which at one time threatened to
prevail on the Western Front, efforts were directed towards their replacement by
some mechanical means which would permit of the passage of information from
occupied territory over the lines in a westerly direction.
<br><br>
THE "TIN POT" STUNT<br>

80. Eventually there was devised by major Wallinger and his staff, in
consultation with various experts, a system by which small balloons for use by
the inhabitants in lieu of pigeons, together with small tin canisters containing
the necessary chemicals for the productions of hydrogen or similar gas, were
despatched by our pigeon balloons to the inhabitants with the necessary
instructions.
<br><br>
81. A hundred were dropped as an experimental measure, together with the
usual questionnaire as in the case of the pigeons. Only one message in answer
was received and that was picked up off the German wire by one of our men during
a raid, who had seen it fluttering on the wire for a few days. This was a very
fortunate occurrence for the sender, who had been indiscreet enough, in spite of
definite instructions to the contrary, to sign her full name and address.
<br><br>
PROBABLE REASONS<br>

82. It is probable that the small number received was due to various
causes: firstly, that the system was perhaps too complicated for the
intelligence of the average peasant, and, secondly, that such balloons as were
despatched on an easterly wind either fell on the enemy's side of the line or
somewhere in all that large part of France behind our own lines and were never
discovered. At this time also only light easterly airs prevailed for
considerable consecutive periods.<br><br>

MEANS OF TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION<br>

83. As to the methods of transmission. Our regular transmission of
information from the fixed train watching posts and promeneurs was by courier
over the electrified frontier wire into Holland. The other methods have been
explained.<br><br>

84. From this explanation it is evident that the only promising avenue
of progress lies in the discovery of some improved method of communication,
which is incapable of detection by any means known at present.
<br><br>
FURTHER RESEARCHES FOR IMPROVED METHODS<br>

85. Bearing this in mind, I had approached some time ago various well
known scientists among my acquaintances and invoked their help. The suggestion
was put to them that experiments should be carried out as to the possibilities
of signalling by some such system as radiant heat, sounds above the ordinary
range of audibility, the use of certain strata of the earth's surface as
conductors of some form of electrical or other signalling, of which the adjacent
strata would be non-conductors, and certain other processes which suggested
themselves either to myself or to them.
<br><br>
86. Up to date, however, no success has been attained, but if any
similar work is to be undertaken against any enemy of wide Secret Service
experience and scientific training, I feel sure that this is the only line on
which progress can be made.
<br><br>
87. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that in the present
state of the world's civilisation and trade the absolute restriction of
circulation of the population of a European country is impossible in any war on
any large scale. That being so, and trade and the supply of food being equally
necessary for combatants and non-combatants alike, there is ample field for the
ingenuity of persons engaged in Secret Service in the direction of the
transmission of information, either by code in letter or newspaper, by word of
mouth or by hand in writing. The actual carriage may be if necessary on the
person of an individual, or in goods and merchandise in course of transmission
to other countries.<br><br>
88. Experience in this war has, however, laid bare to all defensive
organisations all but the most subtle of these devices, and, as far as my
experience goes, there is no ordinary invisible ink or means of carriage of
information which is not capable of detection in a high proportion of the number
of cases examined.
<br><br>
THE "SUICIDE" CLUB <br>

89. In addition to the efforts to obtain information outlined above
there was formed from time to time during 1917 a collection of agents known
locally as the "Suicide Club". These were recruited and trained by Captain W.A.
Hazeldine and Interpreter J. Ide, assisted on one or two occasions by captain
M.G. Pearson. Their mission was to accompany the Cavalry in the event of a
breach being made in the line as a result of our various offensives, or even to
penetrate through any opening in advance of that arm. They were present at all
our offensives on our front during 1917 and showed commendable spirit and
readiness to undertake this dangerous task. In no case, however, were we
successful in getting any of these men through the lines until the open fighting
started during our last offensive in August 1918.<br><br>

DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANISING<br>

90. Considerable difficulties had to be surmounted in organising this
body. In the first place, it was impossible to obtain really adequate notice
from the Operations division of the staff, whose policy of secrecy towards even
those sections of the Intelligence charged with the duties of Secret Service was
perhaps on conservative lines. This meant that with offensives undertaken at
short notice on widely separated sectors of the front we had to recruit and
train men for this work in a very short period. They had to be instructed, in
addition to their ordinary instruction as agents, in riding, map reading and the
use of the compass. Special arrangements also had to be made as to their methods
of procedure once they had got through the lines and of conveying any
information they obtained back to our forward troops.
<br><br>
RESULT OF LACK OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF TROOPS <br>

91. In practice it was found difficult to get anyone beyond the
Intelligence staff at the Cavalry Corps and Divisions to take any interest in
these men. They therefore suffered unnecessary hardship, of food and blankets,
in addition to incurring the risk of being taken for enemy agents and shot. It
was also difficult to obtain from the responsible quarter the information that
the time had arrived when the operation for which they were trained had become
feasible, and to this I think must be attributed chiefly the failures of the
scheme. In the opinion of the officers in charge, several opportunities occurred
for the successful use of these men on more than one occasion, but, for lack of
the necessary information and of the word to go, these opportunities were not
taken advantage of.
<br><br>
92. I should, here like to pay a tribute to the excellence of the work
done by the officers in charge and Interpreter Ide, and to the personal courage
and neglect of danger which were shown by them and the agents on more than one
occasion.<br><br>

EFFORTS DURING OPEN FIGHTING<br>
93. In the open fighting which ensued on our offensive from the 21st
August onwards, several successful attempts were made by agents to penetrate the
enemy lines, and information of a useful though not perhaps highly important
nature was obtained. The nature of the operations was such at this phase of the
fighting that civilians were largely mixed up with the combatant troops on
either side, and it is therefore equally probable that the enemy was able to
obtain information from our side with as great a facility as we did from theirs.
We, however, had the advantage that we were operating amongst a friendly
population, every inhabitant of which was potentially an agent working for us. 
<br><br>
94. Throughout the whole of the period under review, Major Wallinger's
service obtained information of a uniformly high level, both during the period
when he was operating independently and subsequent to the amalgamation of the
W.L. and C.F. Services. The class of agent employed in Major Wallinger's service
was very much above the average, and to this must be attributed the fewer number
of casualties and denunciations and the general reliability of the information
supplied. To Major Wallinger and all the officers working under him very great
credit is due for the assiduity and zeal with which they conducted their
labours. I wish here to record my very high appreciation of the work done by all
of them.
<br><br>
NUMBERS EMPLOYED AND CASUALTIES<br>

95.The total number of agents employed by the G.H.Q. Services in the war
was roughly 6,000. As far as is known at present, of these 98(a) were executed
and 600(b) imprisoned.
<br><br>
(a) Includes:<br>

4 died in prison before execution<br>
2 shot and one electrocuted crossing the frontier.
<br>
(b) Includes:<br>

19 sentenced for life<br>
25 sentenced to unknown periods<br>
10 deported<br>
<br>
The aggregate of the sentences inflicted on those persons amounted to 700 years,
and the actual imprisonment undergone to 175 years.
<br><br>
96. With few exceptions, all these persons have worked from motives of
the highest patriotism. Considering the dangers they ran and the value of the
information they provided, the cost of the service was surprisingly low. It must
be remembered that the maintenance of a single railway watching post often
involved the employment of a very large number of persons, and the average rate
of payment of agents was extremely low. Every class of person was employed, from
abbes, high officials of the Gendarmerie, a Marchioness of some 60 years of age,
big industrialists and prominent barristers, down to seamstresses, poachers,
smugglers, bargemen and railway officials.
<br><br>
97. The maintenance of this service of information, unchecked in spite
of the severity of the enemy throughout the whole of Belgium until the
conclusion of hostilities, is the best answer to the often heard opinion that
the Belgians as a race are devoid of courage. My experience if that there are no
risks which they are not ready to undertake, and that the remuneration for which
they are prepared to undertake them is, in most cases, absurdly small.
<br><br>
98. The liquidation of these services has been proceeding since the
early part of 1919, but was much hampered by the failure to meet our repeated
requests for transport for the officers carrying out this liquidation. For a
long time it was impossible to get motors, in spite of our representations that
it was urgently  necessary in the interest of economy that all these persons
should be interviewed, thanked, paid off and rewarded at the earliest possible
moment. Eventually motor cars were provided and the work of liquidation has
proceeded smoothly and rapidly.
<br><br>
99. With few exceptions, the agents employed have accepted the sums
offered them in full liquidation of their claims, few only having shown
themselves grasping or recalcitrant. The presentation of 12 selected agents to
the Commander-in-Chief at Charleroi shortly before his departure for England had
a most gratifying effect on the whole of the services. Recommendations will  be
made in due course for rewards and decorations of selected members of this
personnel and for the distribution of parchment certificates and Mentions in
Despatches on lines already concurred in by D.M.I.
<br><br>
100. To Major E.A. Wallinger and his officers again are due all credit
for the satisfactory manner in which the liquidation has proceeded. Major
Wallinger, as head of the British Military Intelligence Commission in Brussels,
has also been in charge of the liquidation of the War Office Secret Service.
<br><br>
101. In submitting the above report on 1 (b) (Secret Service) work in
France, during the period in which I was in charge of the section, I wish to
protect myself against the imputation of criticising either my predecessors or
my superiors.
<br><br>
Within my knowledge the organisation of Secret Service as set up was so
set up owing to the exigencies of the situation in the early part of the
campaign, and to the urgent necessity of getting information by any means from
behind the enemy lines under novel conditions. This purpose it certainly
successfully achieved, although the organisation, as was shown by the subsequent
attempts on the part of all to improve it, admittedly fell short of the ideal.
<br><br>
102. I would add that all the steps taken to effect any improvement,
whether originating with myself or with others, had the full approval of my
superiors and of all concerned, and were carried out with their complete
knowledge and concurrence.
<br><br>
As far as my share was concerned, I worked under the advantage of
benefiting by my predecessor's and others knowledge of the actual working of the
organisation during the first 2 1/2 years of the campaign, and took over a
working concern which was obtaining good results.
<br><br>
103. Actual experience of Secret Service work is the only real guide to
the attainment of the ideal system to be adopted. The defects outlined are the
natural accompaniment of starting this work on the grand scale under war
conditions, of which neither of which had anyone in this country had previous
experience.<br><br>


R.J. Drake<br>
Lieut. Colonel<br>
General Staff<br>


5 May 1919<br>

<i><small>N.B. According to "A History of British Secret Service" a Captain R.J. Drake was
involved in the organisation of MO5 (later to be known as MI5). He was seconded
to the organisation to help Kell, probably in 1909</small></i>.<br><br>






ORGANISATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (B) 1917 TO 1919<br>
GHQ<br>
M.I.1(B)<br>
<TABLE WIDTH="80%">
<table>

<tr>
<td>FOLKESTONE</td>            
<td>LONDON</td>
<td>PARIS</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>FRENCH INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>BELGIAN INTELLIGENCE</td>

</tr>

<tr>
<td>MAJOR A.C.CAMERON</td>
<td>MAJOR B.A. WALLINGER</td>
<td>CAPT. Hon G.J.G. BRUCE</td>
<td>Admiralty</td>
<td>(formerly War Office directly)</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr><td> left Jan 1918  C.F. system </td>
<td>W.L system</td>
<td>recruitment of agents amongst Belgians and French in unoccupied France (1914? - Sept 1917) - Awarded: Chevalier du Légion d' Honneur, London Gazette, 25.9.17. 9948 Special List. Mentions in Despatches: London Gazette, 4.1.17p -204; 15.5.17p 4745;  20.12.18 - 14924;
5.7.19  - 8488.  Sept 1917 - 1918 -  His future wife was on the staff.
</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>

</table>
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