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| <br><br>. | | <br><br>. |
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| <P ALIGN=CENTER><A NAME="ch21"></A><FONT SIZE="+2">CHAPTER XXI</FONT>
| |
|
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| <P ALIGN=CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">THE UNITED STATES AT WAR</FONT>
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|
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| <P ALIGN=CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">I</FONT>
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|
| |
| <br><br>THE United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany
| |
| on February 3, 1917. The occasion was a memorable one in the American
| |
| Embassy in London, not unrelieved by a touch of the ridiculous.
| |
| All day long a nervous and rather weary company had waited in
| |
| the Ambassador's room for the decisive word from Washington. Mr.
| |
| and Mrs. Page, Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin, Mr. Shoecraft, the Ambassador's
| |
| secretary, sat there hour after hour, hardly speaking to one another
| |
| in their tense excitement, waiting for the news that would inform
| |
| them that Bernstorff's course had been run and that their country
| |
| had taken its decision on the side of the Allies. Finally, at
| |
| nine o'clock in the evening, the front door bell rang. Mr. Shoecraft
| |
| excitedly left the room; half way downstairs he met Admiral William
| |
| Reginald Hall, the head of the British Naval Intelligence, who
| |
| was hurrying up to the Ambassador. Admiral Hall, as he spied Mr.
| |
| Shoecraft, stopped abruptly and uttered just two words:
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Thank God!"
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>He then went into the Ambassador's room and read a secret code
| |
| message which he had just received from Captain Gaunt, the British
| |
| naval attaché at Washington. It was as follows:
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Bernstorff has just been given his passports. I shall
| |
| probably get drunk to-night!"
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>It was in this way that Page first learned that the long tension
| |
| had passed.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>Page well understood that the dismissal of Bernstorff at that
| |
| time meant war with the Central Empires. Had this dismissal taken
| |
| place in 1915, after the sinking of the <I>Lusitania, </I>or in
| |
| 1916, after the sinking of the Sussex, Page believed that a simple
| |
| break in relations would in itself have brought the war to an
| |
| early end. But by February, 1917, things had gone too far. For
| |
| Germany had now decided to stake everything upon the chance of
| |
| winning a quick victory with the submarine. Our policy had persuaded
| |
| the Kaiser's advisers that America would not intervene; and the
| |
| likelihood of rapidly starving Great Britain was so great---indeed
| |
| the Germans had reduced the situation to a mathematical calculation
| |
| of success---that an American declaration of war seemed to Berlin
| |
| to be a matter of no particular importance. The American Ambassador
| |
| in London regarded Bernstorff's dismissal much more seriously.
| |
| It justified the interpretations of events which he had been sending
| |
| to Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and others for nearly three years.
| |
| If Page had been inclined to take satisfaction in the fulfilment
| |
| of his own prophecies, Germany's disregard of her promises and
| |
| the American declaration of war would have seemed an ample justification
| |
| of his course as ambassador.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br><CENTER><TABLE BORDER="0" CELLSPACING="1" CELLPADDING="5"
| |
| WIDTH="301">
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| <TR>
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| <TD WIDTH="31%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page19tn.jpg" WIDTH="96"
| |
| HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="69%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page20tn.jpg" WIDTH="112"
| |
| HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
| |
| </TR>
| |
| <TR>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="31%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
| |
| 19.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> Walter
| |
| H. Page, at the time of America's entry into the war, April,
| |
| 1917</FONT></TD>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="69%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
| |
| 20.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> Resolution
| |
| passed by the two Houses of Parliament, April 18, 1917, on America's
| |
| entry into the war</FONT></TD>
| |
| </TR>
| |
| </TABLE></CENTER>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br><FONT FACE="Times">But Page had little time for such vain communings.
| |
| "All that water," as he now wrote, "has flowed
| |
| over the dam." Occasionally his mind would revert to the
| |
| dreadful period of "neutrality," but in the main his
| |
| activities, mental and physical, were devoted to the future. A
| |
| letter addressed to his son Arthur shows how quickly and how sympathetically
| |
| he was adjusting himself to the new prospect. His mind was now
| |
| occupied with ships, food, armies, warfare on submarines, and
| |
| the approaching resettlement of the world. How completely he foresaw
| |
| the part that the United States must play in the actual waging
| |
| of hostilities, and to what an extent he himself was responsible
| |
| for the policies that ultimately prevailed, appears in this letter:</FONT>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Arthur W. Page</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>25 March, 1917, London.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR ARTHUR:
| |
| <br><br>It's very hard, not to say impossible, to write in these swiftly
| |
| moving days. Anything written to-day is out of date to-morrow---even
| |
| if it be not wrong to start with. The impression becomes stronger
| |
| here every day that we shall go into the war "with both
| |
| feet"---that the people have pushed the President over in
| |
| spite of his vision of the Great Peacemaker, and that, being
| |
| pushed over, his idea now will be to show how he led them into
| |
| a glorious war in defense of democracy. That's my reading of
| |
| the situation, and I hope I am not wrong. At any rate, ever since
| |
| the call of Congress for April 2nd, I have been telegraphing
| |
| tons of information and plans that can be of use only if we go
| |
| to war. Habitually they never acknowledge the receipt of anything
| |
| at Washington. I don't know, therefore, whether they like these
| |
| pieces of information or not. I have my staff of twenty-five
| |
| good men getting all sorts of warlike information; and I have
| |
| just organized twenty-five or thirty more---the best business
| |
| Americans in London---who are also at work. I am trying to get
| |
| the Government at Washington to send over a committee of conference---a
| |
| General, an Admiral, a Reserve Board man, etc., etc. If they
| |
| do half the things that I recommend we'll be in at the final
| |
| lickin' big, and will save our souls yet.
| |
| <br><br>There's lots of human nature in this world. A note is now
| |
| sometimes heard here in undertone (Northcliffe strikes it)---that
| |
| they don't want the Americans in the war. This means that if
| |
| we come in just as the Allies finish the job we'll get credit,
| |
| in part, for the victory, which we did little to win! But that's
| |
| a minor note. The great mass of people do want us in, quick,
| |
| hard, and strong---our money and our guns and our ships.
| |
| <br><br>A gift of a billion dollars(<A NAME="n165"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#165">165</A>)
| |
| to France will fix Franco-American history all right for several
| |
| centuries. Push it through. Such a gift could come to this Kingdom
| |
| also but for the British stupidity about the Irish for three
| |
| hundred years. A big loan to Great Britain at a low rate of interest
| |
| will do the work here.
| |
| <br><br>My mind keeps constantly on the effect of the war and especially
| |
| of our action on our own country. Of course that is the most
| |
| important end of the thing for us. I hope that
| |
| <br><br>1. It will break up and tear away our isolation;
| |
| <br><br>2. It will unhorse our cranks and soft-brains.
| |
| <br><br>3. It will make us less promiscuously hospitable to every
| |
| kind of immigrant;
| |
| <br><br>4. It will reestablish in our minds and conscience and policy
| |
| our true historic genesis, background, kindred, and destiny---i.
| |
| e., kill the Irish and the German influence.
| |
| <br><br>5. It will revive our real manhood---put the mollycoddles
| |
| in disgrace, as idiots and dandies are;
| |
| <br><br>6. It will make our politics frank and manly by restoring
| |
| our true nationality;
| |
| <br><br>7. It will make us again a great sea-faring people. It is
| |
| this that has given Great Britain its long lead in the world;
| |
| <br><br>8. Break up our feminized education---make a boy a vigorous
| |
| animal and make our education rest on a wholesome physical basis;
| |
| <br><br>9. Bring men of a higher type into our political life.
| |
| <br><br>We need waking up and shaking up and invigorating as much
| |
| as the Germans need taking down.
| |
| <br><br>There is no danger of "militarism" in any harmful
| |
| sense among any English race or in any democracy.
| |
| <br><br>By George! all these things open an interesting outlook and
| |
| series of tasks---don't they?
| |
| <br><br>My staff and I are asking everybody what the Americans can
| |
| best do to help the cause along. The views are not startling,
| |
| but they are interesting.
| |
| <br><br><I>Jellicoe: </I>More ships, merchant ships, any kind of ships,
| |
| and take over the patrol of the American side of the Atlantic
| |
| and release the British cruisers there.
| |
| <br><br><I>Balfour: </I>American credits in the United States, big
| |
| enough to keep up the rate of exchange.
| |
| <br><br><I>Bonar Law: </I>Same thing.
| |
| <br><br><I>The military men: </I>An expeditionary force, no matter
| |
| how small, for the effect of the American Flag in Europe., If
| |
| one regiment marched through London and Paris and took the Flag
| |
| to the front, that would be worth the winning of a battle.
| |
| <br><br>Think of the vast increase of territory and power Great Britain
| |
| will have---her colonies drawn closer than ever, the German colonies,
| |
| or most of them, taken over by her, Bagdad hers---what a way
| |
| Germany chose to lessen the British Empire! And these gains of
| |
| territory will be made, as most of her gains have been, not by
| |
| any prearranged, set plan, but as by-products of action for some
| |
| other purpose. The only people who have made a deliberate plan
| |
| to conquer the earth---now living---are the Germans. And from
| |
| first to last the additions to the British Empire have been made
| |
| because she has been a first-class maritime power.
| |
| <br><br>And that's the way she has made her trade and her money, too.
| |
| <br><br>On top of this the President speculates about the danger of
| |
| the white man losing his supremacy because a few million men
| |
| get killed! The truth is every country that is playing a big
| |
| part in the war was overpopulated. There will be a considerable
| |
| productive loss because the killed men were, as a rule, the best
| |
| men; but the white man's control of the world hasn't depended
| |
| on any few million of males. This speculation is far up in the
| |
| clouds. If Russia and Germany really be liberated from social
| |
| and political and industrial autocracy, this liberation will
| |
| bring into play far more power than all the men killed in the
| |
| war could have had under the pre-war régime. I observe
| |
| this with every year of my observation---there's no substitute
| |
| for common-sense.
| |
| <br><br>The big results of the war will, after all, be the freedom
| |
| and the stimulation of men in these weary Old-World lands---in
| |
| Russia, Germany itself, and in England. In five or ten years
| |
| (or sooner, alas!) the dead will be forgotten.
| |
| <br><br>If you wish to make a picture of the world as it will be when
| |
| the war ends, you must conjure up such scenes as these---human
| |
| bones along the Russian highways where the great retreat took
| |
| place and all that such a sight denotes; Poland literally starved;
| |
| Serbia, blasted and burned and starved; Armenia butchered; the
| |
| horrible tragedy of Gallipoli, where the best soldiers in the
| |
| world were sacrificed to politicians' policies; Austria and Germany
| |
| starved and whipped but liberalized---perhaps no king in either
| |
| country; Belgium---belgiumized; northern France the same and
| |
| worse; more productive Frenchmen killed in proportion to the
| |
| population perhaps than any other country will have lost; Great
| |
| Britain---most of her best men gone or maimed; colossal debts;
| |
| several Teutonic countries bankrupt; every atrocity conceivable
| |
| committed somewhere---a hell-swept great continent having endured
| |
| more suffering in three years than in the preceding three hundred.
| |
| Then, ten years later, most of this suffering a mere memory;
| |
| governments reorganized and liberalized; men made more efficient
| |
| by this strenuous three years' work; the fields got back their
| |
| bloom, and life going on much as it did before---with this chief
| |
| difference---some kings have gone and many privileges have been
| |
| abolished. The lessons are two---(1) that no government can successfully
| |
| set out and conquer the world; and (2) that the hold that privilege
| |
| holders acquire costs more to dislodge than any one could ever
| |
| have guessed. That's the sum of it. Kings and privilege mongers,
| |
| of course, have held the parts of the world separate from one
| |
| another. They fatten on provincialism, which is mistaken for
| |
| patriotism.. As they lose their grip, human sympathy has its
| |
| natural play between nations, and civilization has a chance.
| |
| With any Emperor of Germany left the war will have been half
| |
| in vain.
| |
| <br><br>If we (the U. S. A.) cultivate the manly qualities and throw
| |
| off our cranks and read our own history and be true to our traditions
| |
| and blood and get some political vigour; then if we emancipate
| |
| ourselves from the isolation theory and from the landlubber theory---get
| |
| into the world and build ships, ships, ships, ships, and run
| |
| them to the ends of the seas, we can dominate the world in trade
| |
| and in political thought.
| |
| <br><br>You know I have moments when it occurs to me that perhaps
| |
| I'd better give whatever working years I may have to telling
| |
| this story---the story of the larger meaning of the war. There's
| |
| no bigger theme---never was one so big.
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Affectionately,
| |
| <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| </BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>On April 1st, the day before President Wilson made his great
| |
| address before Congress requesting that body to declare the existence
| |
| of a state of war with Germany, Page committed to paper a few
| |
| paragraphs which summed up his final judgment of President Wilson's
| |
| foreign policy for the preceding two and a half years.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
| |
| April 1, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>In these last days, before the United States is forced into
| |
| war---by the people's insistence---the preceding course of events
| |
| becomes even clearer than it was before; and it has been as clear
| |
| all the time as the nose on a man's face.
| |
| <br><br>The President began by refusing to understand the meaning
| |
| of the war. To him it seemed a quarrel to settle economic rivalries
| |
| between Germany and England. He said to me last September(<A
| |
| NAME="n166"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#166">166</A>) that there
| |
| were many causes why Germany went to war. He showed a great degree
| |
| of toleration for Germany; and he was, during the whole morning
| |
| that I talked with him, complaining of England. The controversies
| |
| we had with England were, of course, mere by-products of the
| |
| conflict. But to him they seemed as important as the controversy
| |
| we had with Germany. In the beginning he had made---as far as
| |
| it was possible---neutrality a positive quality of mind. He would
| |
| not move from that position.
| |
| <br><br>That was his first error of judgment. And by insisting on
| |
| this he soothed the people---sat them down in comfortable chairs
| |
| and said, "Now stay there." He really suppressed speech
| |
| and thought.
| |
| <br><br>The second error he made was in thinking that he could play
| |
| a great part as peacemaker---come and give a blessing to these
| |
| erring children. This was strong in his hopes and ambitions.
| |
| There was a condescension in this attitude that was offensive.
| |
| <br><br>He shut himself up with these two ideas and engaged in what
| |
| he called "thought." The air currents of the world
| |
| never ventilated his mind.
| |
| <br><br>This inactive position he has kept as long as public sentiment
| |
| permitted. He seems no longer to regard himself nor to speak
| |
| as a leader---only as the mouthpiece of public opinion after
| |
| opinion has run over him.
| |
| <br><br>He has not breathed a spirit into the people: he has encouraged
| |
| them to supineness. He is <I>not </I>a leader, but rather a stubborn
| |
| phrasemaker.
| |
| <br><br>And now events and the aroused people seem to have brought
| |
| the President to the necessary point of action; and even now
| |
| he may act timidly.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"One thing pleases me," Page wrote to his son Arthur,
| |
| I never lost faith in the American people. It is now clear that
| |
| I was right in feeling that they would have gladly come in any
| |
| time after the <I>Lusitania </I>crime, Middle West in the front,
| |
| and that the German hasn't made any real impression on the American
| |
| nation. He was made a bug-a-boo and worked for all he was worth
| |
| by Bernstorff; and that's the whole story. We are as Anglo-Saxon
| |
| as we ever were. If Hughes had had sense and courage enough to
| |
| say: 'I'm for war, war to save our honour and to save democracy,'
| |
| he would now be President. If Wilson had said that, Hughes would
| |
| have carried no important states in the Union. The suppressed
| |
| people would have risen to either of them. That's God's truth
| |
| as I believe it. The real United States is made up of you and
| |
| Frank and the Page boys at Aberdeen and of the 10,000,000 other
| |
| young fellows who are ready to do the job and who instinctively
| |
| see the whole truth of the situation. But of course what the people
| |
| would not have done under certain conditions---that water also
| |
| has flowed over the dam; and I mention it only because I have
| |
| resolutely kept my faith in the people and there has been nothing
| |
| in recent events that has shaken it."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>Two letters which Page wrote on this same April 1st are interesting
| |
| in that they outline almost completely the war policy that was
| |
| finally carried out:
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Frank N. Doubleday</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
| |
| April 1, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR EFFENDI:
| |
| <br><br>Here's the programme:
| |
| <br><br>(1) Our navy in immediate action in whatever way a conference
| |
| with the British shows we can best help.
| |
| <br><br>(2) A small expeditionary force to France immediately---as
| |
| large as we can quickly make ready, if only 10,000 men---as proof
| |
| that we are ready to do some fighting.
| |
| <br><br>(3) A large expeditionary force as soon as the men can be
| |
| organized and equipped. They can be trained into an effective
| |
| army in France in about one fourth of the time that they could
| |
| be trained anywhere else.
| |
| <br><br>(4) A large loan to the Allies at a low rate of interest.
| |
| <br><br>(5) Ships, ships, ships---troop ships, food ships, munition
| |
| ships, auxiliary ships to the navy, wooden ships, steel ships,
| |
| little ships, big ships, ships, ships, ships without number or
| |
| end.
| |
| <br><br>(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue involved in
| |
| the war. Every social and political ideal that we stand for is
| |
| at stake. If we value democracy in the world, this is the chance
| |
| to further it or---to bring it into utter disrepute. After Russia
| |
| must come Germany and Austria; and then the King-business will
| |
| pretty nearly be put out of commission.
| |
| <br><br>(7) We must go to war in dead earnest. We must sign the Allies'
| |
| agreement not to make a separate peace, and we must stay in to
| |
| the end. Then the end will be very greatly hastened.
| |
| <br><br>It's been four years ago to-day since I was first asked to
| |
| come here. God knows I've done my poor best to save our country
| |
| and to help. It'll be four years in the middle of May since I
| |
| sailed. I shall still do my best. I'll not be able to start back
| |
| by May 15th, but I have a feeling, if we do our whole duty in
| |
| the United States, that the end may not be very many months off.
| |
| And how long off it may be may depend to a considerable degree
| |
| on our action.
| |
| <br><br>We are faring very well on army rations. None of us will live
| |
| to see another time when so many big things are at stake nor
| |
| another time when our country can play so large or important
| |
| a part in saying the world. Hold up your end. I'm doing my best
| |
| here.
| |
| <br><br>I think of you engaged in the peaceful work of instructing
| |
| the people, and I think of the garden and crocuses and the smell
| |
| of early spring in the air and the earth and push on; I'll be
| |
| with you before we grow much older or get much grayer; and a
| |
| great and prosperous and peaceful time will lie before us. Pity
| |
| me and hold up your end for real American participation. Get
| |
| together? Yes; but the way to get together is to get in!
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Affectionately,
| |
| <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To David F. Houston</FONT></I>(<A
| |
| NAME="n167"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#167">167</A>)
| |
| <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
| |
| April 1, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR HOUSTON:
| |
| <br><br>The Administration can save itself from becoming a black blot
| |
| on American history only by vigorous action---acts such as these:
| |
| <br><br>Putting our navy to work---vigorous work---wherever and however
| |
| is wisest. I have received the Government's promise to send an
| |
| Admiral here at once for a conference. We must work out with
| |
| the British Navy a programme whereby we can best help; and we
| |
| must carry it without hesitancy or delay.
| |
| <br><br>Sending over an expeditionary military force immediately---a
| |
| small one, but as large as we can, as an earnest of a larger
| |
| one to come. This immediate small one will have a good moral
| |
| effect; and we need all the moral reinstatement that we can get
| |
| in the estimation of the world; our moral stock is lower than,
| |
| I fear, any of you at home can possibly realize. As for a larger
| |
| expeditionary force later---even that ought to be sent quite
| |
| early. It can and must spend some time in training in France,
| |
| whatever its training beforehand may have been. All the military
| |
| men agree that soldiers in France back of the line can be trained
| |
| in at least half the time that they can be trained anywhere else.
| |
| The officers at once take their turn in the trenches, and the
| |
| progress that they and their men make in close proximity to the
| |
| fighting is one of the remarkable discoveries of the war. The
| |
| British Army was so trained and all the colonial forces. Two
| |
| or three or four hundred thousand Americans could be sent over
| |
| as soon almost as they are organized and equipped---provided
| |
| transports and a continuous supply of food and munition ships
| |
| can be got. They can be trained into fighting men---into an effective
| |
| army---in about one third of the time that would be required
| |
| at home.
| |
| <br><br>I suppose, of course, we shall make at once a large loan to
| |
| the Allies at a low rate of interest. That is most important,
| |
| but that alone will not save us. We must also <I>fight.</I>
| |
| <br><br>All the ships we can get---build, requisition, or confiscate---are
| |
| needed immediately
| |
| <br><br>Navy, army, money, ships---these are the first things, but
| |
| by no means all. We must make some expression of a conviction
| |
| that there is a moral question of right and wrong involved in
| |
| this war---a question of humanity, a question of democracy. So
| |
| far we have (officially) spoken only of the wrongs done to our
| |
| ships and citizens. Deep wrongs have been done to all our moral
| |
| ideas, to our ideals. We have sunk very low in European opinion
| |
| because we do not seem to know even yet that a German victory
| |
| would be less desirable than (say) a Zulu victory of the world.
| |
| <br><br>We must go in with the Allies, not begin a mere single fight
| |
| against submarines. We must sign the pact of London---not make
| |
| a separate peace.
| |
| <br><br>We mustn't longer spin dreams about peace, nor leagues to
| |
| enforce peace, nor the Freedom of the Seas. These things are
| |
| mere intellectual diversions of minds out of contact with realities.
| |
| Every political and social ideal we have is at stake. If we make
| |
| them secure, we'll save Europe from destruction and save ourselves,
| |
| too.
| |
| <br><br>I pray for vigour and decision and clear-cut resolute action.
| |
| <br><br>(1) The Navy-full strength, no "grapejuice" action.
| |
| <br><br>(2) An immediate expeditionary force.
| |
| <br><br>(3) A larger expeditionary force very soon.
| |
| <br><br>(4) A large loan at a low interest.
| |
| <br><br>(5) Ships, ships, ships.
| |
| <br><br>(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue. Thus (and only
| |
| thus) can we swing into a new era, with a world born again.
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Yours in strictest confidence,
| |
| <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| </BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>A memorandum, written on April 3rd, the day after President
| |
| Wilson advised Congress to declare a state of war with Germany:
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">The Day</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>When I went to see Mr. Balfour to-day he shook my hand warmly
| |
| and said: "It's a great day for the world." And so
| |
| has everybody said, in one way or another, that I have met to-day.
| |
| <br><br>The President's speech did not appear in the morning papers---only
| |
| a very brief summary in one or two of them; but the meaning of
| |
| it was clear. The fact that the House of Representatives organized
| |
| itself in one day and that the President addressed Congress on
| |
| the evening of that day told the story. The noon papers had the
| |
| President's speech in full; and everybody applauds.
| |
| <br><br>My "Cabinet" meeting this morning was unusually
| |
| interesting; and the whole group has never before been so delighted.
| |
| I spoke of the suggestive, constructive work we have already
| |
| done in making reports on various war preparations and activities
| |
| of this kingdom. "Now we have greater need than ever, every
| |
| man to do constructive work---to think of plans to serve. We
| |
| are in this excellent strategical position in the capital of
| |
| the greatest belligerent---a position which I thank my stars,
| |
| the President, and all the powers that be for giving us. We can
| |
| each strive to justify our existence."
| |
| <br><br>Few visitors called; but enthusiastic letters have begun to
| |
| come in.
| |
| <br><br>Nearly the whole afternoon was spent with Mr. Balfour and
| |
| Lord Robert Cecil. Mr. Balfour had a long list of subjects. Could
| |
| we help in (1)---(2)---(3)?--- Every once m a while he stopped
| |
| his enumeration of subjects long enough to tell me how the action
| |
| of the United States had moved him.
| |
| <br><br>To Lord Robert I said: "I pray you, give the Black List
| |
| a decent burial: It's dead now, but through no act of yours.
| |
| It insulted every American because you did not see that it was
| |
| insulting: that's the discouraging fact to me." He thanked
| |
| me earnestly. He'll think about that.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">II</FONT>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>These jottings give only a faint impression of the change which
| |
| the American action wrought in Page. The strain which he had undergone
| |
| for twenty-nine months had been intense; it had had the most unfortunate
| |
| effect upon his health; and the sudden lifting might have produced
| |
| that reaction for the worse which is not unusual after critical
| |
| experiences of this kind. But the gratification which Page felt
| |
| in the fact that the American spirit had justified his confidence
| |
| gave him almost a certain exuberance of contentment. Londoners
| |
| who saw him at that time describe him as acting like a man from
| |
| whose shoulders a tremendous weight had suddenly been removed.
| |
| For more than two years Page had been compelled, officially at
| |
| least, to assume a "neutrality" with which he had never
| |
| had the slightest sympathy, but the necessity for this mask now
| |
| no longer existed. A well-known Englishman happened to meet Page
| |
| leaving his house in Grosvenor Square the day after the Declaration
| |
| of War. He stopped and shook the Ambassador's hand.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Thank God," the Englishman said, "that there
| |
| is one hypocrite less in London to-day."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"What do you mean?" asked Page.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"I mean you. Pretending all this time that you were neutral!
| |
| That isn't necessary any longer."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"You are right!" the Ambassador answered as he walked
| |
| on with a laugh and a wave of the hand.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>A few days after the Washington Declaration, the American Luncheon
| |
| Club held a feast in honour of the event. This organization had
| |
| a membership of representative American business men in London,
| |
| but its behaviour during the war had not been based upon Mr. Wilson's
| |
| idea of neutrality. Indeed its tables had so constantly rung with
| |
| denunciations of the <I>Lusitania </I>notes that all members of
| |
| the American Embassy, from Page down, had found it necessary to
| |
| refrain from attending its proceedings. When Page arose to address
| |
| his compatriots on this occasion, therefore, he began with the
| |
| significant words, "I am glad to be back with you<I> again,"
| |
| </I>and the mingled laughter and cheers with which this remark
| |
| was received indicated that his hearers had caught the point.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>The change took place not only in Page, but in London and the
| |
| whole of Great Britain. An England that had been saying harsh
| |
| things of the United States for nearly two years now suddenly
| |
| changed its attitude. Both houses of Parliament held commemorative
| |
| sessions in honour of America's participation; in the Commons
| |
| Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, and other leaders welcomed their
| |
| new allies, and in the Upper Chamber Lord Curzon, Lord Bryce,
| |
| the Archbishop of Canterbury, and others similarly voiced their
| |
| admiration. The Stars and Stripes almost instantaneously broke
| |
| out on private dwellings, shops, hotels, and theatres; street
| |
| hucksters did a thriving business selling rosettes of the American
| |
| colours, which even the most stodgy Englishmen did not disdain
| |
| to wear in their buttonholes; wherever there was a band or an
| |
| orchestra, the Star Spangled Banner acquired a sudden popularity;
| |
| and the day even came when the American and the British flags
| |
| flew side by side over the Houses of Parliament---the first occasion
| |
| in history that any other than the British standard had received
| |
| this honour. The editorial outgivings of the British press on
| |
| America's entrance form a literature all their own. The theatres
| |
| and the music halls, which had found in "notes" and
| |
| "nootrality" an endless theme of entertainment for their
| |
| patrons, now sounded Americanism as their most popular refrain.
| |
| Churches and cathedrals gave special services in honour of American
| |
| intervention, and the King and the President began to figure side
| |
| by the side in the prayer book. The estimation in which President
| |
| Wilson was held changed overnight. All the phrases that had so
| |
| grieved Englishmen were instantaneously forgotten. The President's
| |
| address before Congress was praised as one of the most eloquent
| |
| and statesmanlike utterances in history. Special editions of this
| |
| heartening document had a rapid sale; it was read in school houses,
| |
| churches, and at public gatherings, and it became a most influential
| |
| force in uplifting the hopes of the Allies and inspiring them
| |
| to renewed activities. Americans everywhere, in the streets, at
| |
| dinner tables, and in general social intercourse, could feel the
| |
| new atmosphere of respect and admiration which had suddenly become
| |
| their country's portion. The first American troops that passed
| |
| through London---a company of engineers, an especially fine body
| |
| of men---aroused a popular enthusiasm which was almost unprecedented
| |
| in a capital not celebrated for its emotional displays. Page himself
| |
| records one particularly touching indication of the feeling for
| |
| Americans which was now universal. "The increasing number
| |
| of Americans who come through England," he wrote, "most
| |
| of them on their way to France, but some of them also to serve
| |
| in England, give much pleasure to the British public---nurses,
| |
| doctors, railway engineers, sawmill units, etc. The sight of every
| |
| American uniform pleases London. The other morning a group of
| |
| American nurses gathered with the usual crowd in front of Buckingham
| |
| Palace while the Guards band played inside the gates. Man after
| |
| man as they passed them and saw their uniforms lifted their hats."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br><CENTER><TABLE BORDER="0" CELLSPACING="1" CELLPADDING="5"
| |
| WIDTH="370">
| |
| <TR>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="47%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page21tn.jpg" WIDTH="116"
| |
| HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="53%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page22tn.jpg" WIDTH="108"
| |
| HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
| |
| </TR>
| |
| <TR>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="47%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
| |
| 21.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> The
| |
| Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908
| |
| 1915, Minister of Munitions, 1915-1916, Prime Minister of Great
| |
| Britain since 1916.</FONT></TD>
| |
| <TD WIDTH="53%" VALIGN="TOP">
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
| |
| 22.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> The
| |
| Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of Balfour) Secretary
| |
| of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916-1919</FONT></TD>
| |
| </TR>
| |
| </TABLE></CENTER>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br><FONT FACE="Times">The Ambassador's mail likewise underwent
| |
| a complete transformation. His correspondence of the preceding
| |
| two years, enormous in its extent, had contained much that would
| |
| have disturbed a man who could easily get excited over trifles,
| |
| but this aspect of his work never caused Page the slightest unhappiness.
| |
| Almost every crank in England who disliked the American policy
| |
| had seemed to feel it his duty to express his opinions to the
| |
| American Ambassador. These letters, at times sorrowful, at others
| |
| abusive, even occasionally threatening, varying in their style
| |
| from cultivated English to the grossest illiteracy, now written
| |
| in red ink to emphasize their bitterness, now printed in large
| |
| block letters to preserve their anonymity, aroused in Page only
| |
| a temporary amusement. But the letters that began to pour in upon
| |
| him after our Declaration, many of them from the highest placed
| |
| men and women in the Kingdom, brought out more vividly than anything
| |
| else the changed position of his country. Sonnets and verses rained
| |
| upon the Embassy, most of them pretty bad as poetry, but all of
| |
| them commendable for their admiring and friendly spirit. Of all
| |
| these letters those that came from the steadfast friends of America
| |
| perhaps gave Page the greatest satisfaction. "You will have
| |
| been pleased at the universal tribute paid to the spirit as well
| |
| as to the lofty and impressive terms of the President's speech,"
| |
| wrote Lord Bryce. "Nothing finer in our time, few things
| |
| so fine." But probably the letter which gave Page the greatest
| |
| pleasure was that which came from the statesman whose courtesy
| |
| and broad outlook had eased the Ambassador's task in the old neutrality
| |
| days. In 1916, Sir Edward Grey-now become Viscount Grey of Fallodon---had
| |
| resigned office, forced out, Page says in one of his letters,
| |
| mainly because he had refused to push the blockade to a point
| |
| where it might produce a break with the United States. He had
| |
| spent the larger part of the time since that event at his country
| |
| place in Northumberland, along the streams and the forests which
| |
| had always given him his greatest pleasure, attempting to recover
| |
| something of the health that he had lost in the ten years which
| |
| he had spent as head of the British Foreign Office and bearing
| |
| with characteristic cheerfulness and fortitude the tragedy of
| |
| a gradually failing eyesight. The American Declaration of War
| |
| now came to Lord Grey as the complete justification of his policy.
| |
| The mainspring of that policy, as already explained, had been
| |
| a determination to keep the friendship of the United States, and
| |
| so shape events that the support of this country would ultimately
| |
| be cast on the side of the Allies. And now the great occasion
| |
| for which he had prepared had come, and in Grey's mind this signified
| |
| more than a help to England in soldiers and ships; it meant bringing
| |
| together the two branches of a common race for the promotion of
| |
| common ideals.</FONT>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Viscount Grey of Fallodon</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>Rosehall Post Office,<BR>
| |
| Sutherland,<BR>
| |
| April 8, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR MR. PAGE:
| |
| <br><br>This is a line that needs no answer to express my congratulations
| |
| on President Wilson's address. I can't express adequately all
| |
| that I feel. Great gratitude and great hope are in my heart.
| |
| I hope now that some great and abiding good to the world will
| |
| yet be wrought out of all this welter of evil. Recent events
| |
| in Russia, too, stimulate this hope: they are a good in themselves,
| |
| but not the power for good in this war that a great and firmly
| |
| established free country like the United States can be. The President's
| |
| address and the way it has been followed up in your country is
| |
| a splendid instance of great action finely inspired. I glow with
| |
| admiration.
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Yours sincerely,
| |
| <br><br>GREY OF FALLODON</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| </BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>One Englishman who was especially touched by the action of
| |
| the United States was His Majesty the King. Few men had watched
| |
| the course of America during the war with more intelligent interest
| |
| than the head of the British royal house. Page had had many interviews
| |
| with King George at Buckingham Palace and at Windsor, and his
| |
| notes contain many appreciative remarks on the King's high character
| |
| and conscientious devotion to his duties. That Page in general
| |
| did not believe in kings and emperors as institutions his letters
| |
| reveal; yet even so profound a Republican as he recognized sterling
| |
| character, whether in a crowned head or in a humble citizen, and
| |
| he had seen enough of King George to respect him.. Moreover, the
| |
| peculiar limitations of the British monarchy certainly gave it
| |
| an unusual position and even saved it from much of the criticism
| |
| that was fairly lavished upon such nations as Germany and Austria.
| |
| Page especially admired King George's frankness in recognizing
| |
| these limitations and his readiness to accommodate himself to
| |
| the British Constitution. On most occasions, when these two men
| |
| met, their intercourse was certainly friendly or at least not
| |
| formidable. After all formalities had been exchanged, the King
| |
| would frequently draw the Ambassador aside; the two would retire
| |
| to the smoking room, and there, over their cigars, discuss a variety
| |
| of matters---submarines, international politics, the Irish question
| |
| and the like. His Majesty was not averse even to bringing up the
| |
| advantages of the democratic and the monarchical system. The King
| |
| and Ambassador would chat, as Page himself would say, like "two
| |
| human beings"; King George is an emphatic and vivacious talker,
| |
| fond of emphasizing his remarks by pounding the table; he has
| |
| the liveliest sense of humour, and enjoys nothing quite so much
| |
| as a good story. Page found that, on the subject of the Germans,
| |
| the King entertained especially robust views. "They are my
| |
| kinsmen," he would say, "but I am ashamed of them."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>Probably most Englishmen, in the early days of the war, preferred
| |
| that the United States should not engage in hostilities; even
| |
| after the <I>Lusitania, </I>the majority in all likelihood held
| |
| this view. There are indications, however, that King George favoured
| |
| American participation. A few days after the <I>Lusitania </I>sinking,
| |
| Page had an audience for the purpose of presenting a medal sent
| |
| by certain societies in New Orleans. Neither man was thinking
| |
| much about medals that morning. The thoughts uppermost in their
| |
| minds, as in the minds of most Americans and Englishmen, were
| |
| the <I>Lusitania </I>and the action that the United States was
| |
| likely to take concerning it. After the formalities of presentation,
| |
| the King asked Page to sit down and talked with him for more than
| |
| half an hour. "He said that Germany was evidently trying
| |
| to force the United States into the war; that he had no doubt
| |
| we would soon be in it and that, for his part, he would welcome
| |
| us heartily. The King also said he had reliable information from
| |
| Germany, that the Emperor had wished to return a conciliatory
| |
| answer to our <I>Lusitania </I>note, but that Admiral von Tirpitz
| |
| had prevented it, even going so far as to 'threaten' the Kaiser.
| |
| It appears that the Admiral insisted that the submarine was the
| |
| only weapon the Germans could use with effect against England
| |
| and that they could not afford to give it up. He was violent and
| |
| the Kaiser finally yielded."(<A NAME="n168"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#168">168</A>)
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>The statement from the King at that crisis, that he would "heartily
| |
| welcome the United States into the war," was interpreted
| |
| by the Ambassador as amounting practically to an invitation---and
| |
| certainly as expressing a wish that such an intervention should
| |
| take place.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>That the American participation would rejoice King George could
| |
| therefore be taken for granted. Soon after this event, the Ambassador
| |
| and Mrs. Page were invited to spend the night at Windsor.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"I arrived during the middle of the afternoon," writes
| |
| Page, "and he sent for me to talk with him in his office.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"'I've a good story on you,' said he. 'You Americans have
| |
| a queer use of the word "some," to express mere bigness
| |
| or emphasis. We are taking that use of the word from you over
| |
| here. Well, an American and an Englishman were riding in the same
| |
| railway compartment. The American read his paper diligently---all
| |
| the details of a big battle. When he got done, he put the paper
| |
| down and said:
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"'Some fight!' 'And some don't!' said the Englishman.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"And the King roared. 'A good one on you!'
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"'The trouble with that joke, sir,' I ventured to reply,
| |
| 'is that it's out of date.'
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"He was in a very gay mood, surely because of our entry
| |
| into the war. After the dinner---there were no guests except Mrs.
| |
| Page and me, the members of his household, of course, being present---he
| |
| became even familiar in the smoking room. He talked about himself
| |
| and his position as king. 'Knowing the difficulties of a limited
| |
| monarch, I thank heaven I am spared being an absolute one.'
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"He went on to enumerate the large number of things he
| |
| was obliged to do, for example, to sign the death warrant of every
| |
| condemned man---and the little real power that he had---not at
| |
| all in a tone of complaint, but as a merely impersonal explanation.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Just how much power---perhaps 'influence' is a better,
| |
| word---the King has, depends on his personality. The influence
| |
| of the throne---and of him on the throne, being a wholly thoughtful,
| |
| industrious, and conscientious man---is very great---greatest
| |
| of all in keeping the vested interests of the aristocratic social
| |
| structure secure.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Earlier than this visit to Windsor he sent for me to
| |
| go to Buckingham Palace very soon after we declared war. He went
| |
| over the whole course of events---and asked me many questions.
| |
| After I had risen and said 'good-bye' and was about to bow myself
| |
| out the door, he ran toward me and waving his hand cried out,
| |
| 'Ah!---Ah!---we knew where you stood all the time.'
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"When General Pershing came along on his way to France,
| |
| the King summoned us to luncheon. The luncheon was eaten (here,
| |
| as everywhere, strict war rations are observed) to a flow of general
| |
| talk, with the Queen, Princess Mary, and one of the young Princes.
| |
| When they had gone from the luncheon room, the King, General Pershing,
| |
| and I stood smoking by the window; and the King at once launched
| |
| into talk about guns, rifles, ammunition, and the American place
| |
| in the battle line. Would our place be with the British or with
| |
| the French or between the two?
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"General Pershing made a diplomatic reply. So far as he
| |
| knew the President hadn't yet made a final decision, but there
| |
| was a feeling that, since we were helping the British at sea,
| |
| perhaps we ought to help the French on land.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Then the King expressed the earnest hope that our guns
| |
| and ammunition would match either the British or the French. Else
| |
| if we happened to run out of ammunition we could not borrow from
| |
| anybody. He thought it most unfortunate that the British and French
| |
| guns and rifles were of different calibres."
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Arthur W. Page</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>Brighton, England,<BR>
| |
| April 28, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR ARTHUR:
| |
| <br><br>. . . Well, the British have given us a very good welcome
| |
| into the war. They are not very skillful at such a task: they
| |
| do not know how to say "Welcome" very vociferously.
| |
| But they have said it to the very best of their ability. My speeches
| |
| (which I send you, with some comment) were very well received
| |
| indeed. Simple and obvious as they were, they meant a good deal
| |
| of work.
| |
| <br><br>I cannot conceal nor can I express my gratification that we
| |
| are in the war. I shall always wonder but never find out what
| |
| influence I had in driving the President over. All I know is
| |
| that my letters and telegrams for nearly two years---especially
| |
| for the last twelve months---have put before him every reason
| |
| that anybody has expressed why we should come in---in season
| |
| and out of season. And there is no new reason---only more reason
| |
| of the same old sort---why we should have come in now than there
| |
| was why we should have come in a year ago. I suspect that the
| |
| pressure of the press and of public opinion really became too
| |
| strong for him. And, of course, the Peace-Dream blew up---was
| |
| torpedoed, mined, shot, captured, and killed. I trust, too, much
| |
| enlightenment will be furnished by the two Commissions now in
| |
| Washington.(<A NAME="n169"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#169">169</A>)
| |
| Yet it's comical to think of the attitude of the poor old Department
| |
| last September and its attitude now. But thank God for it! Every
| |
| day now brings a confession of the blank idiocy of its former
| |
| course and its long argument! Never mind that, so long as we
| |
| are now right.
| |
| <br><br>I have such a sense of relief that I almost feel that my job
| |
| is now done. Yet, I dare say, my most important work is still
| |
| to come.
| |
| <br><br>The more I try to reach some sort of rational judgment about
| |
| the war, the more I find myself at sea. It does look as if the
| |
| very crisis is near. And there can be no doubt now---not even,
| |
| I hope, in the United States---about the necessity of a clear
| |
| and decisive victory, nor about punishment. All the devastation
| |
| of Northern France, which outbarbarizes barbarism, all the ships
| |
| sunk, including hospital ships, must be paid for; that's all.
| |
| There'll be famine in Europe whenever it end. Not only must these
| |
| destructions be paid for, but the Hohenzollerns and all they
| |
| stand for must go. Trust your Frenchman for that, if nobody else!
| |
| <br><br>If Europe had the food wasted in the United States, it would
| |
| make the difference between sustenance and famine. By the way,
| |
| the submarine has made every nation a danger zone except those
| |
| few that have self-feeding continents, such as ours. It can bring
| |
| famine to any other kind of a country.
| |
| <br><br>You are now out in the country again---good. Give Mollie my
| |
| love and help her with the garden. I envy you the fresh green
| |
| things to eat. Little Mollie, kiss her for granddaddy. The Ambassador,
| |
| I suppose, waxes even sturdier, and I'm glad to hear that A.
| |
| W. P., Jr., is picking up. Get him fed right at all costs. If
| |
| Frank stays at home and Ralph and his family come up, you'll
| |
| all have a fine summer. We've the very first hint of summer we've
| |
| had, and it's cheerful to see the sky and to feel the sunshine.
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Affectionately,
| |
| <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Frank N. Doubleday</FONT></I>
| |
| <br><br>American Embassy,<BR>
| |
| London, May 3, 1917.
| |
| <br><br>DEAR EFFENDI:
| |
| <br><br>I aim this at you. It may hit a German submarine. But we've
| |
| got to take our chances in these days of risk. Your letter from
| |
| the tropics---a letter from you from any place is as scarce as
| |
| peace !---gave me a pleasant thrill and reminder of a previous
| |
| state of existence, a long way back in the past. I wonder if,
| |
| on your side the ocean you are living at the rate of a century
| |
| a year, as we are here? Here in bountiful England we are living
| |
| on rations. I spent a night with the King a fortnight ago, and
| |
| he gave us only so much bread, one egg apiece, and---lemonade.
| |
| We are to begin bread tickets next week. All this is perfectly
| |
| healthful and wholesome and as much as I ever eat. But the hard
| |
| part of it is that it's necessary. We haven't more than six weeks'
| |
| food supply and the submarines sunk eighty-eight ships---237,000
| |
| tons-last week. These English do not publish these harrowing
| |
| facts, and nobody knows them but a few official people. And they
| |
| are destroying the submarines at a most beggarly slow rate. They
| |
| work far out at sea---100 to 200 miles---and it's as hard to
| |
| find them as it would be to find whales. The simple truth is
| |
| we are in a dangerous plight. If they could stop this submarine
| |
| warfare, the war would pretty quickly be won, for the Germans
| |
| are in a far worse plight for food and materials and they are
| |
| getting much the worst of it on land. The war would be won this
| |
| summer or autumn if the submarine could be put out of business.
| |
| If it isn't, the Germans may use this success to keep their spirits
| |
| up and go on till next year.
| |
| <br><br>We (the United States) have about 40 destroyers. We are sending
| |
| over 6! I'm doing my best to persuade the Government at Washington
| |
| to send every one we have. But, since the British conceal the
| |
| facts from their own press and the people and from all the world,
| |
| the full pressure of the situation is hard to exert on Washington.
| |
| Our Admiral (Sims) and I are trying our best, and we are spending
| |
| enough on cables to build a destroyer. All this, you must, of
| |
| course, regard as a dark secret; but it's a devilish black secret.
| |
| <br><br>I don't mean that there's any danger of losing the war. Even
| |
| if the British armies have to have their food cut down and people
| |
| here go hungry, they'll win; but the winning may be a long time
| |
| off. Nothing but their continued success can keep the Germans
| |
| going. Their people are war-weary and hungry. Austria is knocked
| |
| out and is starving. Turkey is done up but can go on living on
| |
| nothing, but not fighting much more. When peace comes, there'll
| |
| be a general famine, on the continent at least, and no ships
| |
| to haul food. This side of the world will have to start life
| |
| all over again---with insufficient men to carry things on and
| |
| innumerable maimed men who'll have (more or less) to be cared
| |
| for. The horror of the whole thing nobody realizes. We've all
| |
| got used to it here; and nobody clearly remembers just what the
| |
| world was like in peace times; those times were so far away.
| |
| All this I write not to fill you with horrors but to prove that
| |
| I speak the literal truth when I say that it seems a hundred
| |
| years since I had before heard from you.
| |
| <br><br>Just how all this affects a man, no man can accurately tell.
| |
| Of how much use I'll be when I can get home, I don't know. Sometimes
| |
| I think that I shall be of vastly greater use than ever. Plans
| |
| and publishing ambitions pop up in my mind at times which look
| |
| good and promising. I see books and series of books. I see most
| |
| useful magazine stuff. Then, before I can think anything out
| |
| to a clear plan or conclusion, the ever-increasing official duties
| |
| and responsibilities here knock everything else out of my head,
| |
| perhaps for a whole month. It's a literal fact that many a month
| |
| I do not have an hour to do with as I please nor to think about
| |
| what I please, from the time I wake up till I go to bed. In spite
| |
| of twenty-four secretaries (the best fellows that ever were and
| |
| the best staff that my Embassy ever had in the world) more and
| |
| more work comes to me. I thank Heaven we no longer have the interests
| |
| of Germany, Austria, and Turkey to look after; but with our coming
| |
| into the war, work in general has increased enormously. I have
| |
| to spend very much more time with the different departments of
| |
| the British Government on war plans and such like things. They
| |
| have welcomed us in very handsomely; and one form of their welcome
| |
| is consulting with me about---navy plans, war plans, loans of
| |
| billions, ships, censorship, secret service---everything you
| |
| ever heard of. At first it seemed a little comical for the admirals
| |
| and generals and the Governor of the Bank of England to come
| |
| and ask for advice. But when I gave it and it worked out well,
| |
| I went on and, after all, the thing's easier than it looks. With
| |
| a little practice you can give these fellows several points in
| |
| the game and play a pretty good hand. They don't know half as
| |
| much as you might suppose they'd know. All these years of lecturing
| |
| the State Department and the President got my hand in! The whole
| |
| game is far easier than any small business. You always play with
| |
| blue chips better than you play with white ones.
| |
| <br><br>This country and these people are not the country and the
| |
| people they were three years ago. They are very different. They
| |
| are much more democratic, far less cocksure, far less haughty,
| |
| far humbler. The man at the head of the army rose from the ranks.
| |
| The Prime Minister is a poor Welsh schoolteacher's son, without
| |
| early education. The man who controls all British shipping began
| |
| life as a shipping "clark," at ten shillings a week.
| |
| Yet the Lords and Ladies, too, have shown that they were made
| |
| of the real stuff. This experience is making England over again.
| |
| There never was a more interesting thing to watch and to be part
| |
| of.
| |
| <br><br>There are about twenty American organizations here---big,
| |
| little, rag-tag, and bobtail. When we declared war, every one
| |
| of 'em proceeded to prepare for some sort of celebration. There
| |
| would have been an epidemic of Fourth-of-July oratory all over
| |
| the town-before we'd done anything---Americans spouting over
| |
| the edges and killing Kruger with their mouths. I got representatives
| |
| of 'em all together and proposed that we hold our tongues till
| |
| we'd won the war---then we can take London. And to give one occasion
| |
| when we might all assemble and dedicate ourselves to this present
| |
| grim business, I arranged for an American Dedicatory Service
| |
| at St. Paul's Cathedral. The royal family came, the Government
| |
| came, the Allied diplomats came, my Lords and Ladies came, one
| |
| hundred wounded American (Canadian) soldiers came---the pick
| |
| of the Kingdom; my Navy and Army staff went in full uniform,
| |
| the Stars and Stripes hung before the altar, a double brass band
| |
| played the Star Spangled Banner and the Battle Hymn of the Republic,
| |
| and an American bishop (Brent) preached a red-hot American sermon,
| |
| the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered the benediction; and (for
| |
| the first time in English history) a foreign flag (the Stars
| |
| and Stripes) flew over the Houses of Parliament. It was the biggest
| |
| occasion, so they say, that St. Paul's ever had. And there's
| |
| been no spilling of American oratory since! If you had published
| |
| a shilling edition of the words and music of the Star Spangled
| |
| Banner and the Battle Hymn you could have sent a cargo of 'em
| |
| here and sold them. There isn't paper enough in this Kingdom
| |
| to get out an edition here.
| |
| <br><br>Give my love to all the Doubledays and to all the fellows
| |
| in the shop, and (I wonder if you will) try your hand at another
| |
| letter. You write very legibly these days!
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br>Sincerely yours,
| |
| <br><br>WALTER H. PAGE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| </BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Curiously enough," Page wrote about this time, "these
| |
| most exciting days of the war are among the most barren of exciting
| |
| topics for private correspondence. The 'atmosphere' here is unchanging---to
| |
| us---and the British are turning their best side to us continuously.
| |
| They are increasingly appreciative, and they see more and more
| |
| clearly that our coming into the war is all that saved them from
| |
| a virtual defeat---I mean the public sees this more and more clearly,
| |
| for, of course, the Government has known it from the beginning.
| |
| I even find a sort of morbid fear lest they do not sufficiently
| |
| show their appreciation. The Archbishop last night asked me in
| |
| an apprehensive tone whether the American Government and public
| |
| felt that the British did not sufficiently show their gratitude.
| |
| I told him that we did not come into the war to win compliments
| |
| but to whip the enemy, and that we wanted all the help the British
| |
| can give: that's the main thing; and that thereafter of course
| |
| we liked appreciation, but that expressions of appreciation had
| |
| not been lacking. Mr. Balfour and Sir Edward Carson also spoke
| |
| to me yesterday much in the same tone as the Archbishop of Canterbury.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Try to think out any line of action that one will, or
| |
| any future sequence or events or any plan touching the war, one
| |
| runs into the question whether the British are doing the best
| |
| that could be done or are merely plugging away. They are, as a
| |
| people, slow and unimaginative, given to over-much self-criticism;
| |
| but they eternally hold on to a task or to a policy. Yet the question
| |
| forever arises whether they show imagination, to say nothing of
| |
| genius, and whether the waste of a slow, plodding policy is the
| |
| necessary price of victory.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Of course such a question is easy to ask and it is easy
| |
| to give dogmatic answers. But it isn't easy to give an answer
| |
| based on facts. Our General Lassiter,(<A NAME="n170"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#170">170</A>)
| |
| for instance---a man of sound judgment---has in general been less
| |
| hopeful of the military situation in France than most of the British
| |
| officers. But he is just now returned from the front, much cheered
| |
| and encouraged. 'Lassiter,' I asked, 'have the British in France
| |
| or has any man among them what we call genius, or even wide vision;
| |
| or are they merely plodding along at a mechanical task?' His answer
| |
| was, 'We don't see genius till it has done its job. It is a mechanical
| |
| task---yes, that's the nature of the struggle---and they surely
| |
| do it with intelligence and spirit. There is waste. There is waste
| |
| in all wars. But I come back much more encouraged.'
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"The same sort of questions and answers are asked and
| |
| given continuously about naval action. Every discussion of the
| |
| possibility of attacking the German naval bases ends without a
| |
| plan. So also with preventing the submarines from coming out.
| |
| These subjects have been continuously under discussion by a long
| |
| series of men who have studied them; and the total effect so far
| |
| has been to leave them among the impossible tasks. So far as I
| |
| can ascertain all naval men among the Allies agree that these
| |
| things can't be done.
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Here again---Is this a merely routine professional opinion---a
| |
| merely traditional opinion---or is it a lack of imagination? The
| |
| question will not down. Yet it is impossible to get facts to combat
| |
| it. What are the limits of the practicable?
| |
|
| |
| <br><br>"Mr. Balfour told me yesterday his personal conviction
| |
| about the German colonies, which, he said, he had not discussed
| |
| with his associates in the Cabinet. His firm opinion is that they
| |
| ought not to be returned to the Germans, first for the sake of
| |
| humanity. 'The natives---the Africans especially---have been so
| |
| barbarously treated and so immorally that it would be inhuman
| |
| to permit the Germans to rule and degrade them further. But Heaven
| |
| forbid that we should still further enlarge the British Empire.
| |
| As a practical matter I do not care to do that. Besides, we should
| |
| incur the criticism of fighting in order to get more territory,
| |
| and that was not and is not our aim. If the United States will
| |
| help us, my wish is that these German Colonies that we have taken,
| |
| especially in Africa, should be "internationalized."
| |
| There are great difficulties in such a plan, but they are not
| |
| insuperable if the great Powers of the Allies will agree upon
| |
| it.' And much more to the same effect. The parts of Asiatic Turkey
| |
| that the British have taken, he thought, might be treated in the
| |
| same way."
| |
|
| |
| <P ALIGN=CENTER><HR>
| |
|
| |
| <BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
| <br><br><FONT SIZE="+1"><IMG SRC="thumbnails/2b.gif" WIDTH="25" HEIGHT="24"
| |
| ALIGN="MIDDLE" BORDER="0" ><A HREF="Page14.htm">Chapter
| |
| Twenty-Two</A></FONT>
| |
| <br><br><FONT SIZE="+1"><IMG SRC="thumbnails/2b.gif" WIDTH="25" HEIGHT="24"
| |
| ALIGN="MIDDLE" BORDER="0" ><A HREF="PageTC.htm#TC">Table
| |
| of Contents</A></FONT>
| |
| </BLOCKQUOTE>
| |
|
| |
| </BODY>
| |
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<TITLE>Burton J. Hendrick. The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. 1922. Chapters 20-21.</TITLE>
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CHAPTER XX
"PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY "
OF ONE thing I am sure," Page wrote to his wife from Washington,
while waiting to see President Wilson. "We wish to come home
March 4th at midnight and to go about our proper business. There's
nothing here that I would for the world be mixed up with. As soon
as I can escape with dignity I shall make my bow and exit. . .
. But I am not unhappy or hopeless for the long run. They'll find
out the truth some day, paying, I fear, a heavy penalty for delay.
But the visit here has confirmed me in our previous conclusions---that
if we can carry the load until March 4th, midnight, we shall be
grateful that we have pulled through."
Soon after President Wilson's reelection, therefore, Page sent
his resignation to Washington. The above quotation shows that
he intended this to be more than a "courtesy resignation,"
a term traditionally applied to the kind of leave-takings which
Ambassadors usually send on the formation of a new administration,
or at the beginning of a new Presidential term, for the purpose
of giving the President the opportunity of reorganizing his official
family. Page believed that his work in London had been finished,
that he had done everything in his power to make Mr. Wilson see
the situation in its true light and that he had not succeeded.
He therefore wished to give up his post and come home. This explains
the fact that his resignation did not consist of the half dozen
perfunctory fines which most diplomatic officers find sufficient
on such an occasion, but took the form of a review of the reasons
why the United States should align itself on the side of the Allies.
.
To the President
London, November 24, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
We have all known for many years that the rich and populous
and organized states in which the big cities are do not constitute
the political United States. But, I confess, I hardly expected
so soon to see this fact proclaimed at the ballot-box. To me
that's the surprise of the election. And your popular majority
as well as your clear majority in the Electoral College is a
great personal triumph for you. And you have remade the ancient
and demoralized Democratic party. Four years ago it consisted
of a protest and of the wreck wrought by Mr. Bryan's long captaincy.
This rebirth, with a popular majority, is an historical achievement---of
your own.
You have relaid the foundation and reset the pillars of a
party that may enjoy a long supremacy for domestic reasons. Now,
if you will permit me to say so, from my somewhat distant view
(four years make a long period of absence) the big party task
is to build up a clearer and more positive foreign policy. We
are in the world and we've got to choose what active part we
shall play in it---I fear rather quickly, I have the conviction,
as you know, that this whole round globe now hangs as a ripe
apple for our plucking, if we use the right ladder while the
chance lasts. I do not mean that we want or could get the apple
for ourselves, but that we can see to it that it is put to proper
uses. What we have to do, in my judgment, is to go back to our
political fathers for our clue. If my longtime memory be good,
they were sure that their establishment of a great free Republic
would soon be imitated by European peoples---that democracies
would take the place of autocracies in all so-called civilized
countries; for that was the form that the fight took in their
day against organized Privilege. But for one reason or another---in
our life-time partly because we chose so completely to isolate
ourselves---the democratic idea took root in Europe with disappointing
slowness. It is, for instance, now perhaps for the first time,
in a thorough-going way, within sight in this Kingdom. The dream
of the American Fathers, therefore, is not yet come true. They
fought against organized Privilege exerted from over the sea.
In principle it is the same fight that we have made, in our domestic
field, during recent decades. Now the same fight has come on
a far larger scale than men ever dreamed of before.
It isn't, therefore, for merely doctrinal reasons that we
are concerned for the spread of democracy nor merely because
a democracy is the only scheme of organization yet wrought out
that keeps the door of opportunity open and invites all men to
their fullest development. But we are interested in it because
under no other system can the world be made an even reasonably
safe place to live in. For only autocracies wage aggressive wars.
Aggressive autocracies, especially military autocracies, must
be softened down by peace (and they have never been so softened)
or destroyed by war. The All-Highest doctrine of Germany to-day
is the same as the Taxation-without-Representation of George
III---only more virulent, stronger, and farther-reaching. Only
by its end can the German people recover and build up their character
and take the permanent place in the world that they---thus changed---will
be entitled to. They will either reduce Europe to the vassalage
of a military autocracy, which may then overrun the whole world
or drench it in blood, or they must through stages of Liberalism
work their way toward some approach to a democracy; and there
is no doubt which event is impending. The Liberal idea will win
this struggle, and Europe will be out of danger of a general
assault on free institutions till some other autocracy which
has a military caste try the same Napoleonic game. The defeat
of Germany, therefore, will make for the spread of the doctrine
of our Fathers and our doctrine yet.
An interesting book might be made of concrete evidences of
the natural antipathy that the present German autocracy has for
successful democracy and hence for us. A new instance has just
come to me. My son, Arthur, who succeeded to most of my activities
at home, has been over here for a month and he has just come
from a visit to France. In Paris he had a long conversation with
Delcassé, who told him that the Kaiser himself once made
a proposal to him to join in producing "the complete isolation"
of the United States. What the Kaiser meant was that if the great
Powers of Europe would hold off, he would put the Monroe Doctrine
to the test and smash it.
The great tide of the world will, by reason of the war, now
flow toward democracy---at present, alas! a tide of blood. For
a century democracies and Liberal governments have kept themselves
too much isolated, trusting prematurely and too simply to international
law and treaties and Hague conventions. These things have never
been respected, except as springes to catch woodcock, where the
Divine Right held sway. The outgrowing or the overthrow of the
Divine Right is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of
international law and treaties.
It has seemed to me, looking at the subject only with reference
to our country's duty and safety, that somehow and at some early
time our championship of democracy must lead us to redeclare
our faith and to show that we believe in our historic creed.
Then we may escape falling away from the Liberal forces of the
Old World and escape the suspicion of indifference to the great
scheme of government which was set up by our fathers' giving
their blood for it. I see no other way for us to take the best
and biggest opportunity that has ever come to prove true to our
faith as well as to secure our own safety and the safety of the
world. Only some sort of active and open identification with
the Allies can put us in effective protest against the assassins
of the Armenians and the assassins of Belgium, Poland, and Serbia,
and in a friendly attitude to the German people themselves, as
distinguished from their military rulers. This is the attitude
surely that our fathers would have wished us to take---and would
have expected us to take---and that our children will be proud
of us for taking; for it is our proper historic attitude, whether
looked at from the past or looked back at from the future. There
can be no historic approval of neutrality for years, while the
world is bleeding to death.
The complete severance of relations, diplomatic at first and
later possibly economic as well, with the Turks and the Germans,
would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable
treasure; for the moral effect of withdrawing even our formal
approval of their conduct---at least our passive acquiescence---would
be---that the Germans would see that practically all the Liberal
world stands against their system, and the war would end before
we should need to or could put an army in the field. The Liberal
Germans are themselves beginning to see that it is not they,
but the German system, that is the object of attack because it
is the dangerous thing in the world. Maximilian Harden
presents this view, in his Berlin paper. He says in effect that
Germany must get rid of its predatory feudalism. That was all
that was the matter with George III.
Among the practical results of such action by us would, I
believe, be the following:
1. The early ending of the war and the saying of, perhaps,
millions of lives and of incalculable treasure;
2. The establishment in Germany of some form of more liberal
government;
3. A league to enforce peace, ready-made, under our guidance---i.e.,
the Allies and ourselves;
4. The sympathetic cooperation and the moral force of every
Allied Government in dealing with Mexico:
5. The acceptance---and even documentary approval of every
Allied Government of the Monroe Doctrine;
6. The warding off and no doubt the final prevention of danger
from Japan, and, most of all, the impressive and memorable spectacle
of our Great Democracy thus putting an end to this colossal crime,
merely from the impulse and necessity to keep our own ideals
and to lead the world right on. We should do for Europe on a
large scale essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale
and thereby usher in a new era in human history.
I write thus freely, Mr. President, because at no time can
I write in any other way and because I am sure that all these
things can quickly be brought to pass under your strong leadership.
The United States would stand, as no other nation has ever stood
in the world-predominant and unselfish---on the highest ideals
ever reached in human government. It is a vision as splendid
as the Holy Grael. Nor have I a shadow of doubt of the eager
and faithful following of our people, who would thereby reestablish
once for all our weakened nationality. We are made of the stuff
that our Fathers were made of.
And I write this now for the additional reason that I am within
sight of the early end of my service here. When you called me
I answered, not only because you did me great honour and laid
a definite patriotic duty on me, but because also of my personal
loyalty to you and my pride in helping forward the great principles
in which we both believe. But I understood then (and I am sure
the subject lay in your mind in the same way) that my service
would be for four years at the most. I made all my arrangements,
professional and domestic, on this supposition. I shall, therefore,
be ready to lay down my work here on March 4th or as soon thereafter
as meets your pleasure.
I am more than proud of the confidence that you have shown
in me. To it I am indebted for the opportunity I have had to
give such public service to my country as I could, as well as
for the most profitable experience of my life. A proper and sympathetic
understanding between the two English-speaking worlds seems to
me the most important duty of far-seeing men in either country.
It has taken such a profound hold on me that I shall, in whatever
way I can, work for its complete realization as long as I can
work for anything.
I am, Mr. President, most faithfully and gratefully yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
.
This letter was written at a time when President Wilson was
exerting his best energies to bring about peace. The Presidential
campaign had caused him to postpone these efforts, for he believed
that neither Germany nor Great Britain could take seriously the
activities of a President whose own political position was insecure.
At the time Page's letter was received, the President was thinking
only of a peace based upon a stalemate; it was then his apparent
conviction that both sides to the struggle were about equally
in the wrong and that a decisive victory of either would not be
a good thing for the world. Yet it is interesting to compare this
letter with the famous speech which the President made six months
afterward when he asked Congress to declare the existence of a
state of war with Germany. Practically all the important reasons
which Mr. Wilson then advanced for this declaration are found
in Page's letter of the preceding November. That autocracies are
a constant menace to world peace, that the United States owes
it to its democratic tradition to take up arms against the enemy
of free government, that in doing this, it was not making war
upon the German people, but upon its imperialistic masters---these
were the arguments which Page laid before the President in his
letter of resignation, and these were the leading ideas in Mr.
Wilson's address of April 2nd. There are even sentences in Page's
communication which seem to foreshadow Mr. Wilson's assertion
that "The world must be made safe for democracy." It
is impossible to read this letter and not conclude that Page's
correspondence, irritating in its later phases as it may have
been, did not strongly influence Mr. Wilson in his thinking.
On one point, indeed, Colonel House afterward called the Ambassador
to account. When America was preparing to raise armies by the
millions and to spend its treasure by the billions, he reminded
Page of his statement that the severance of diplomatic relations
"would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable
treasure." Page's statement in this November letter merely
reiterated a conviction which for more than a year he had been
forcing upon the President and Colonel House---that the dismissal
of Bernstorff would not necessarily imply war with Germany, but
that it would in itself be enough to bring the war to an end.
On this point Page never changed his mind, as is evident from
the letter which he wrote to Colonel House when this matter was
called to his attention:
.
To Edward M. House
London, June 29, 1917.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor
on anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet
I do think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and
a half ago when I said that we could then have ended the war
without any appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:
If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from
reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then
have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:
(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.
(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine
fleet. She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.
(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she
got food and oil; and continues to get it.
(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force
and gave her more time, more armies for France and more supplies.
Russian guns have been sold to the Germans.
If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would
have been over before any of these things happened. This delay
is what will cost us billions and billions and men and men.
And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period
we were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which
were in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are
now eager to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend,
and who was unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged
to, was thrown out of office and his career ended because the
blockade, owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough.
Our delay caused his fall.
But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent
material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were
at work on them all the while and according to the best opinion
here they continue to build them faster than the British destroy
them; and the submarines are destroying more merchant ships than
all the shipbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out.
This is the most serious aspect of the war---by far the most
serious. I am trying to get our Government to send over hundreds
of improvised destroyers---armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral
Sims and the British Admiralty have fears that unless such help
come the full fruits of the war may never be gathered by the
Allies---that some sort of a compromise peace may have to be
made.
It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited
after the Lusitania will prove to be the most costly year
and a half in our history; and for once at least my old prophecy
was quite a good guess. But that water has flowed over the dam
and it is worth mentioning now only because you challenged me.
. . .
.
That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had
a curious history. It was practically a resignation and therefore
called for an immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge
its receipt. For two months the Ambassador was left in the dark
as to the attitude of Washington. Finally, in the latter part
of January, 1917, Page wrote urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him
to bring the matter to the President's attention. On February
5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was received. "The President,"
he said, "under extreme pressure of the present situation,
has been unable to consider your communication in regard to your
resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes that, at
the present time, you will not press to be relieved from service;
that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal sacrifice,
but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in the
crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly
need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought
of resigning your post for the present."
At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the
question. The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was
every likelihood that the country would soon be at war. Page would
have regarded his retirement at this crisis as little less than
the desertion of his post. Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted
the policy which the Ambassador had been urging for nearly two
years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any logical excuse that may
have existed for his resignation existed no longer. Mr. Wilson
had now adopted a course which Page could enthusiastically support.
"I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice"---such
was his reply to Mr. Lansing---"until after the end of the
war, and I am making my arrangements to stay for this period."
The months that intervened between the Presidential election
and the declaration of war were especially difficult for the American
Embassy in London. Page had informed the President, in the course
of his interview of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain
regarded his efforts in the direction of peace; he had in fact
delivered a message from the Foreign Office that any Presidential
attempt to "mediate" would be rejected by the Allies.
Yet his earnest representation on this point had produced no effect
upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was bringing to bear
upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count Bernstorff's
memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed the
intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most startling
fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on
October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words,
that, unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the
German Government "would be forced to regain the freedom
of action which it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th
last."(<A NAME="n162"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#162">162</A>)
It is unlikely that the annals of diplomacy contain many documents
so cool and insolent as this one. It was a notification from the
Kaiser to the President that the so-called "Sussex pledge"
was not regarded as an unconditional one by the Imperial Government;
that it was given merely to furnish Mr. Wilson an opportunity
to bring the war to an end; and that unless the Presidential attempt
to accomplish this were successful, there would be a resumption
of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious developments
of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly because
the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his
proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously
and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign
against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December
6th, and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food
supplies, strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany,
with her characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own
open efforts would lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions.
At any rate, on December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing
to launch his own campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached
her enemies with a proposal for a peace conference. A few days
afterward Page, as the representative of Germany, called at the
Foreign Office to deliver the large white envelope which contained
the Kaiser's "peace proposal." In delivering this to
Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign Secretary in the
temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the fact that
the American Government entirely disassociated itself from its
contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of "German
Ambassador." Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil
Spring Rice, British Ambassador at Washington, tell the story
and also reveal that it was almost impossible for Page, even when
engaged in an official proceeding, to conceal his contempt for
the whole enterprise:
.
Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring
Rice
Foreign Office,
December 18, 1916,
SIR:
The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented
to me the German note containing what is called in it the "offer
of peace." He explained that he did so on instructions of
his Government as representing the German Government, and not
in any way as representing their own opinions. He also explained
that the note must be regarded as coming from the four Central
Powers, and as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who
were represented by the United States.
He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined
to leave me a copy of it. The first part of the telegram explained
that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate
a confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German
note and that they would themselves have certain representations
to make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged
the closest consideration. The telegram went on to explain that
the Government of the United States had had it in mind for some
time past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations
and humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were
prompted by the Governments of the Central Powers. They wished
us to understand that the note of the Central Powers created
a good opportunity for making the American representations, but
was not the cause of such representations being made.
I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such
an important matter without consulting my colleagues.
I am, etc.,
ROBERT CECIL.
.
Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring
Rice
Foreign Office,
19 December, 1916.
SIR:
The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.
I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were
anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of
our response to the German peace note.
He replied that he did not know, but he imagined it was to
enable them to frame the representations of which he had spoken
to me.
I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply,
and that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all
probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the
German note. I thought it probable that we should express our
view that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since
it contained no specific proposals.
He said that he quite understood this, and that we should
in fact reply that it was an offer "to buy a pig in a poke"
which we were not prepared to accept. He added that he thought
his Government would fully anticipate a reply in this sense,
and he himself obviously approved it.
Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard
people in London treating the German offer with derision, but
that no doubt the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.
I said that it was certainly a serious thing, and no doubt
would be treated seriously.
I asked him if he knew what would be contained in the proposed
representations from his government.
He said that he did not; but as he understood that they were
to be made to all the belligerents, he did not think that they
could be much more than a pious aspiration for peace; since that
was the only thing that was equally applicable to the Germans
and to us.
As he was leaving he suggested that the German note might
be published in our press.
I am, etc.,
ROBERT CECIL.
.
This so-called German "peace proposal" began with
the statement that the war "had been forced " upon Germany,
contained the usual reference to the military might of the Central
Powers, and declared that the Fatherland was fighting for "the
honour and liberty of national evolution." It is therefore
not surprising that Lord Robert received it somewhat sardonically,
especially as the communication contained no specific proposals,
but merely a vague suggestion of "negotiations." But
another spectacular performance now drove the German manoeuvre
out of everybody's mind. That President Wilson resented this German
interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop
them, however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated
peace communication to all the warring Powers. His appeal took
the form of asking that they state the objects for which they
were fighting, the Presidential belief evidently being that, if
they did this, a common meeting ground might possibly be found.
The suggestion that the Allied war aims were not public property,
despite the fact that British statesmen had been broadly proclaiming
them for three years, caused a momentary irritation in England,
but this was not a serious matter, especially as the British Cabinet
quickly saw that this request gave them a position of advantage
over Germany, which had always refused to make public the terms
on which it would end the war. The main substance in this Presidential
approach, therefore, would have produced no ill-feeling; as usual,
it was a few parenthetical phrases---phrases which were not essential
to the main argument---which set the allied countries seething
with indignation. The President, this section of his note ran,
"takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that
the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides
have in mind in this war, are virtually the same, as stated in
general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side
desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and
small states as secure against aggression and denial in the future
as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states
now at war." This idea was elaborated in several sentences
of a similar strain, the general purport of the whole passage
being that there was little to choose between the combatants,
inasmuch as both were apparently fighting for about the same things.
Mr. Wilson's purpose in this paragraph is not obscure; he was
making his long expected appearance as a mediator, and he evidently
believed that it was essential to this rôle that he should
not seem to be prejudiced in favour of either side, but should
hold the balance impartially between them.
It is true that a minute reading indicates that Mr. Wilson
was merely quoting, or attempting to paraphrase, the statements
of the leaders of both sides, but there is such a thing as quoting
with approval, and no explanation could convince the British public
that the ruler of the greatest neutral nation had not declared
that the Allies and the Central Powers stood morally upon the
same level. The popular indignation which this caused in Great
Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British authorities.
The publication of this note in the British press was withheld
for several hours, in order to give the Government an opportunity
to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it was
feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that
relations with the United States might be imperilled. The messages
which the London correspondents were permitted to send to the
United States were carefully censored for the same reason. The
dispatch sent by the Associated Press was the product of a long
struggle between the Foreign Office and its London correspondent.
The representatives spent half an hour considering whether the
American correspondents could cable their country that the note
had been received in England with "surprise and irritation."
After much discussion it was decided that "irritation"
could not be used, and the message of the Associated Press, after
undergoing this careful editing by the Foreign Office, was a weak
and ridiculous description of the high state of excitement which
prevailed in Great Britain. The fact that the British Foreign
Office should have given all this trouble over the expressions
sent to American newspapers and should even have spent half an
hour debating whether a particular word should be used, almost
pathetically illustrates the great care taken by the British Government
not to influence American opinion against the Allies.
The Government took the same precautions with its own press
in England. When the note was finally released the Foreign Office
explicitly directed the London newspapers to comment with the
utmost caution and in no case to question the President's sincerity.
Most of them acquiesced in these instructions by maintaining silence.
There was only one London newspaper, the Westminster Gazelle,
which made even a faint-hearted attempt to explain away the
President's statement. From the first day of the war the British
people had declared that President Wilson did not understand the
issues at stake; and they now declared that this note confirmed
their worst forebodings. The comments of the man-in-the-street
were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression
which Mr. Wilson's dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen
who had always been especially friendly to the United States and
who had even defended the President in previous crises. Lord Bryce,
who had accepted philosophically the Presidential statement that
the United States was not "concerned with the causes"
of the war, could not regard so indulgently this latest judgment.
of Great Britain and Germany. "Bryce came to see me in a
state of great depression," wrote Page. "He has sent
Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter." Northcliffe
commanded his newspapers, the Times and the Daily Mail,
to discuss the note in a judicial spirit, but he himself told
Mr. Page that "everybody is as angry as hell." When
someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with Mr. Asquith,
he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture. "Don't
talk to me about it," he said. "It is most disheartening."
But the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was
King George. A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace
on December 21st gave Page a description of the royal distress.
The King, expressing his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should
think that Englishmen were fighting for the same things in this
war as the Germans, broke down.
The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which
was opening before Europe at the moment when this Presidential
note added a new cause for general despondency. Rumania had collapsed,
the first inkling of the Russian revolution had been obtained,
the British well knew that the submarine warfare was to be resumed,
and British finances were also in a desperate plight. More and
more it was becoming evident to the British statesmen that they
needed the intervention of the United States. This is the reason
why they could not destroy the chances of American help by taking
official offense even at what Page, in a communication to the
Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call President Wilson's
"insulting words"; and hence their determination to
silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they
felt. Page's interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th,
while the Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses
the real emotions of Englishmen. Apparently Page's frank cables
concerning the reception of this paragraph had caused a certain
interest in the State Department; at least the Ambassador was
instructed to call at the Foreign Office and explain that the
interpretation which had been commonly put upon the President's
words was not the one which he had intended. At the same time
Page was instructed to request the British Foreign Office, in
case its reply were "favourable," not to publish it,
but to communicate it secretly to the American Government. The
purpose of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the
President's plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany
likewise to display an acquiescent mood. The object of Page's
call was to present this disclaimer.
Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the late Lord Salisbury, ---that
same Lord Salisbury whose combats with Secretary Blaine and Secretary
Olney form piquant chapters in British-American history---is one
of the most able and respected of British statesmen. In his earlier
life Lord Salisbury had been somewhat overbearing in his attitude
toward the United States; in his later years, however, perhaps
owing to the influence of his nephew, Mr. Balfour, his manner
had changed. In his attitude toward the United States Lord Robert
Cecil reflected only the later phases of his father's career.
To this country and to its peaceful ideals he had always been
extremely sympathetic, and to Page especially he had never manifested
anything but cordiality. Yet it was evident, as Page came into
his office this morning, that to Lord Robert, as to every member
of the Government, the President's note, with its equivocal phrases,
had been a terrible shock. His manner was extremely courteous,
as always, but he made no attempt to conceal his feelings. Ordinarily
Lord Robert did not wear his emotions on the surface; but he took
occasion on this visit to tell Page how greatly the President's
communication had grieved him.
"The President," he said, "has seemed to pass
judgment on. the allied cause by putting it on the same level
as the German. I am deeply hurt."
Page conveyed Mr. Lansing's message that no such inference
was justified. But this was not reassuring.
"Moreover," Lord Robert added, "there is one
sentence in the note---that in which the President says that the
position of neutrals is becoming intolerable---that seems almost
a veiled threat."
Page hastened to assure Lord Robert that no threat was intended.
Lord Robert's manner became increasingly serious.
"There is nothing that the American Government or any
other human power can do," he remarked slowly and solemnly,
which will bring this war to a close before the Allies have spent
their utmost force to secure a victory. A failure to secure such
a victory will leave the world at the mercy of the most arrogant
and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been organized. It is
far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny than to
perish under its success."
On any occasion Lord Robert is an impressive or at least a
striking and unusual figure; he is tall, lank, and ungainly, almost
Lincolnesque in the carelessness of his apparel and the exceeding
awkwardness of his postures and manners. His angular features,
sharp nose, pale face, and dark hair suggest the strain of ascetism,
almost of fanaticism, which runs in the present generation of
his family. And the deep sincerity and power of his words on this
occasion made an impression which Page never forgot; they transformed
the British statesman into an eloquent, almost an heroic figure.
If we are to understand the full tragedy of this moment we must
remember that, incredible as it now seems, there was a fear in
British officialdom that the United States might not only not
pursue a course favourable to the Allies, but that it might even
throw its support to Germany. The fear, of course, was baseless;
any suggestion of such a policy in the United States would have
destroyed any official who had brought it forward; but Lord Robert
knew and Page knew that there were insidious influences at work
at that time, both in the United States and in Great Britain,
which looked in this direction. A group of Americans, whom Page
used to refer to as "peace spies," were associated with
English pacifists, for the purpose of bringing about peace on
almost any terms. These "peace spies" had worked out
a programme all their own. The purpose was to compel Great Britain
to accept the German terms for ending the war. Unless she did
accept them, then it was intended that the American Government
should place an embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs and munitions
to the Allies. There is little question that the United States,
by taking such action, could have ended the war almost instantaneously.
Should the food of her people and the great quantities of munitions
which were coming from this country be suddenly cut off, there
is little likelihood that Great Britain could have long survived.
The possibility that an embargo might shut out these supplies
had hung over the heads of British statesmen ever since the war
began; they knew that the possession of this mighty power made
the United States the potential dictator of events; and the fear
that it might be used had never ceased to influence their thoughts
or their actions. Even while this interview was taking place,
certain anti-British forces in the United States, such as Senator
Hoke Smith of Georgia, were urging action of this kind.
"I have always been almost a Pacifist," Lord Robert
continued. "No man has ever hated war worse than I. No man
has ever had a more earnest faith that war can be abolished. But
European civilization has been murderously assaulted and there
is nothing now to do but to defeat this desperate enemy or to
perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United States understood
what is at stake."
Lord Robert went on:
" I will go so far as to say that if the United States
will come into the war it will decide which will win, freedom
or organized tyranny. If the United States shall help the Germans,
civilization will perish and it will be necessary to build it
up slowly again---if indeed it will ever appear again. If the
United States will help the Allies, civilization will triumph."(<A
NAME="n163"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#163">163</A>)
As to the proposal that the British terms should be conveyed
confidentially to Mr. Wilson, Lord Robert said that that would
be a difficult thing to do. The President's note had been published,
and it therefore seemed necessary that the reply should also be
given to the press. This was the procedure that was ultimately
adopted.
Startling as was the sensation caused by the President's December
note, it was mild compared with that which was now to come. Page
naturally sent prompt reports of all these conversations to the
President and likewise kept him completely informed as to the
state of public feeling, but his best exertions apparently did
not immediately affect the Wilson policy. The overwhelming fact
is that the President's mind was fixed on a determination to compel
the warring powers to make peace and in this way to keep the United
States out of the conflict. Even the disturbance caused by his
note of December 18th did not make him pause in this peace campaign.
To that note the British sent a manly and definite reply, drafted
by Mr. Balfour, giving in detail precisely the terms upon which
the Allies would compose their differences with the Central Powers.
The Germans sent a reply consisting of ten or a dozen lines, which
did not give their terms, but merely asked again for a conference.
Events were now moving with the utmost rapidity. On January 9th,
a council of German military chieftains was held at Pless; in
this it was decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.
On January 16th the Zimmermann-Mexico telegram was intercepted;
this informed Bernstorff, among other things, that this decision
had been made. On January 16th, at nine o'clock in the morning,
the American Embassy in London began receiving a long cipher despatch
from Washington. The preamble announced that the despatch contained
a copy of an address which the President proposed to deliver before
the Senate "in a few days." Page was directed to have
copies of the address "secretly prepared" and to hand
them to the British Foreign Office and to newspapers of the type
of the Nation, the Daily News, and the Manchester
Guardian---all three newspapers well known for their Pacifist
tendencies. As the speech approached its end, this sentence appeared:
"It must be a peace without victory." The words greatly
puzzled the secretary in charge, for they seemed almost meaningless.
Suspecting that an error had been made in transmission, the secretary
directed the code room to cable Washington for a verification
of the cipher groups. Very soon the answer was received; there
had been no mistake; the Presidential words were precisely those
which had been first received: "Peace without victory."
The slips were then taken to Page, who read the document, especially
these fateful syllables, with a consternation which he made no
effort to conceal. He immediately wrote a cable to President Wilson,
telling him of the deplorable effect this sentence would produce
and imploring him to cut it out of his speech---with what success
the world now knows.
An astonishing feature of this episode is that Page had recently
explained to the Foreign Office, in obedience to instructions
from Washington, that Mr. Wilson's December note should not be
interpreted as placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the
same moral level. Now Mr. Wilson, in this "peace without
victory" phrase, had repeated practically the same idea in
another form. On the day the speech was received at the Embassy,
about a week before it was delivered in the Senate, Page made
the following memorandum:
.
The President's address to the Senate, which was received
to-day (January 16th),(<A NAME="n164"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#164">164</A>)
shows that he thinks he can play peace-maker. He does not at
all understand, (or, if he do, so much the worse for him) that
the Entente Powers, especially Great Britain and France, cannot
make "peace without victory." If they do, they will
become vassals of Germany. In a word, the President does not
know the Germans; and he is, unconsciously, under their influence
in his thought. His speech plays into their hands.
This address will give great offense in England, since it
puts each side in the war on the same moral level.
I immediately saw the grave danger to our relations with Great
Britain by the Peace-without-Victory plan; and I telegraphed
the President, venturing to advise him to omit that phrase---with
no result.
.
Afterward Page added this to the above:
.
Compare this Senate speech with his speech in April calling
for war: Just when and how did the President come to see the
true nature of the German? What made him change from Peace-Maker
to War-Maker? The Zimmermann telegram, or the February U-boat
renewal of warfare? Had he been so credulous as to believe the
German promise? This promise had been continuously and repeatedly
broken.
Or was it the pressure of public opinion, the growing impatience
of the people that pushed him in?
This distressing peace-move---utterly out of touch with the
facts of the origin of the war or of its conduct or of the mood
and necessities of Great Britain---a remote, academic deliverance,
while Great Britain and France were fighting for their very lives-made
a profoundly dejected feeling; and it made my place and work
more uncomfortable than ever. "Peace without victory"
brought us to the very depths of European disfavour.
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