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<h2>British Imperial Connexions to the Arab National Movement, 1912-1914; Lord Kitchener, the
Emir Abdullah, Sir Louis Mallet -- the Case of Aziz Ali, 1914</h2>

<h3>From: Volume X, Part II: <i>The Last Years of Peace (British Documents on the Origins of the
War, 1898-1914</i>, GP Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds. with the assistance of Lillian M. Penson,
PhD, 1938), pps 824-838.   </h3><br>
<h5>(By permission of HMSO)</h5>
Appendix III<br>
<b>I.             <br>
<i>Preliminaries.</i>   Lord John Russell's refusal to favour independence of the Caliph (1860).<br>
<br>        First stirrings of Arab Secret Societies (1865-1880).<br><br>
II.<br>
<i>  Arab Secret Societies. From the Young Turk Revolution to 1912.</i><br>
<br>        French Comments.
<br>        Syrian delegation to Lord Kitchener, 1912.<br><br>
III.<br>
<i>  Arab Syrian Congress in Paris and Franco-Syrian Committee in Paris, June, 1913.</i><br><br>
IV.<br>
<i>  Lord Kitchener's conversation with Emir Abdullah, February 1914, and its aftermath.</i><br>
<br>      (A) Lord Kitchener's account and views of Sir Louis Mallet.
<br>      (B) Emir Abdullah s account of his conversation with Lord Kitchener, transmitted with notes
by Mr. G. Antonius.<br><br>
           
V.<br>
<i> Aziz Bey and the Arab Movement, 1914.</i>
</b>  <hr>

<b>I.<br>
The origins of the Arab National Movement.</b><br><br>
                
[<i>ED. NOTE. --</i> The Arab national movement has its roots in the literary revival which
began in Syria in the fifties of the XlXth century. This revival ultimately gave birth to Arab
national consciousness in the Arab-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and to a
movement for the political emancipation of those provinces from the Turkish yoke.<br><br>

The project of using the Grand Sheriff as a kind of Caliph to counteract French influence
in Egypt was actually discussed in 1860. It was decisively vetoed by Lord John Russell
(F.O. 78/1514 of December 12, 1860). <i> v.</i>  Temperley: <i>England and the Near East--the
Crimea,</i> (1936), p. 422. There is no real evidence of Arab support of the idea.<br><br>

The first stirrings appear to have taken place between the years 1865 and 1880, when
secret societies were formed in Beyrouth and Damascus.  The celebrated Midhat Pasha,
Governor of Syria in the late seventies, is known to have lent some encouragement to the
movement.]<br><br>

<b> II.<br>
Arab Secret Societies.<br><br>
</b>                        
[<i>ED. NOTE.</i>-- )  Renewed activity, on a much larger scale, manifested itself in the years
following the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908. Arab literary societies,
political clubs and other organisations for the promotion of racial interests were formed in
various centres in the years 1909 to 1914. The majority of these were established in Constantinople,
but they had branches in Cairo, Beyrouth, Damascus and (in some cases) Bagdad and
Basra. A good many of them were secret societies in the sense that the members, while
carrying on patriotic activities openly) were pledged never to disclose the existence of the
organisation which directed their activities.<br><br>

The group composed principally of Druse and Muslims of the Lebanon and of Damascus,
who since the massacres of 1860 had looked to Great Britain as their protector, approached
the British Consul General in Beyrouth with the request that the British Government should
assist the Arabs in their struggle against the Turks.(l) A delegation of Syrian Muslim notables
also visited Lord Kitchener, High Commissioner in Egypt, petitioning Great Britain to annex
Syria to Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration.(2)<br><br>

Lord Kitchener, no less than His Majesty's Government, was aware of the importance of
extending British influence in western Arabia as well as on the coast of the Persian Gulf and
with lbn Saud. Such influence was essential if a Khalifat independent of Ottoman control
and of German influence were to be created(3) and if the still nebulous project of a Trans-Arabia
railway from Akaba to the Persian Gulf were to be realised. The advances of the Syrians and of the
Arab Nationalists were, therefore, tactfully received.]<br><br>

(1) [<i>Figaro</i> and <i>le Temps</i>, November 18, 1912; <i>L'Eclair</i>, December 2,
1912.]<br>
(2) [<i>Le Temps,</i> November 18, 1912; <i>L'&Eacute;cho de Paris</i>, February 28, 1913;
also Najib Azuri to Quai d'Orsay, March 16, 1913, cited by E. Jung:<i> La Revolte Arabe</i>, Vol. I
(Paris, 1924), pp. 60-1.]<br>
(3) [For an indication of the influence of this policy on war-time negotiations <i>v.</i> E. Adamov:
<i>Die Europ&auml;ischen M&auml;chte und die T&uuml;rkei w&auml;hrend des Weltkrieges. 
Aufteilung der Asiatischen T&uuml;rkei</i>. (Dresden, 1932), especially p. 30, No. 32, Sir A.
Nicolson to M. Sazonov, March 20, 1915.]<br><br>

<b>III.<br>
Arab-Syrian Congress in Paris, June 1913.<br><br>
</b>                
[<i>ED. NOTE</i>.-In June 1913, as a result of preparations made by one of these Societies,
an Arab-Syrian Congress was publicly held in Paris. It sat from the 18th to the 23rd June.]<br><br>

<b>  Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey<br>
F.O. 26655/253/13/44<br>
(No. 504.)           <br>
Constantinople, D. June 7, 1913.<br>
R. June 11, 1913.<br><br>
</b>
Sir,<br>
With reference to my despatch No. 409 of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to forward
herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting on the departure
of the reform delegates for Paris and London.<br><br>

I have, etc.<br>
GERARD LOWTHER.<br><br>

<b>  Enclosure.<br>
Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.<br>
(No. 47 )<br>
Beirout, May 30, 1913.<br><br>
</b>Sir,<br>
With reference to my despatch No. 36 of the 28th ultimo, reporting the departure of two
members of the Beirout Reform Committee for Cairo and the capitals of Europe, I have the
honour to report that three others left on the 26th instant to join them in Cairo and proceed
to Paris together.<br><br>

The names of the men composing this special commission or "delegation" are-<br>
1. Ahmed Bey Moukhtar Beyhoum (Moslem), member of the most influential Moslem family
of Beirout.<br><br>
      
2. Khalil Effendi Zeynich (not Selim Taiarah, as mentioned in my above-quoted despatch),
a Greek Catholic journalist.<br><br>
      
3. Selim Effendi Selam, a Moslem merchant of very high standing of Beirout.<br><br>
  
4. Ahmed Effendi Tabbarah, a prominent Moslem journalist of Beirout.<br><br>
  
5. Dr. Ayoub Tabet, Maronite of Beirout. Highly respectable medical practitioner.<br><br>
  
6. Albert J. Sursoek, a member of one of the leading Greek orthodox families of Beirout
(this gentleman has not left yet).<br><br>
      
The mission of these gentlemen, whose expenses are being defrayed by a public subscription,
is to plead the cause of reforms and to lay special stress on the admission of Arabic as the
official language along with Turkish in Syria, the extension of the powers of the General
Provincial Councils but not those of the valis, the appointment only of officials who speak
Arabic, and last, but not least, the employment of foreign advisers.<br><br>

They hold no written mandate, but have letters of recommendation from some of the heads
of religions at Beirout to the "Franco-Syrian" Committee in Paris, which is composed of a
dozen Frenchmen interested in the affairs of Syria and a few natives of Syria residing in
France.<br><br>

They have no connection with the "Arab-Syrian" Congress Committee though they will
no doubt meet and discuss matters with them.<br><br>
     
They will first present themselves at the Ottoman Embassy in Paris to make the object of
their mission known, and, after approaching such French statesmen as they can, they will
proceed to London, and possibly to the other European capitals, to awaken interest and 
sympathy in their efforts on behalf of their country.<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.<br><br>

<b>Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
F.O. 29037/29037/ 13/44.<br>
(No. 339.)<br>
Paris, June 24, 1913.<br><br>
</b>
Sir,<br>

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the resolutions voted at an Arab-Syrian
Congress in Paris, which have been forwarded to me by the officers of the Congress with
a request that they should be communicated to your Department.<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
L. D. CARNEGIE.<br><br>

<b> Enclosure.<br>
Resolutions vot&eacute;es par le Congr&egrave;s Arabe-Syrien.<br><br>
</b>               
Le Congres arabe-syrien, reuni &agrave; Paris, 184, Boulevard Saint-Germain, &agrave;
adopt&eacute; dans
<i>sa seance </i>du 21 Juin 1913 les r&eacute;solutions suivantes:<br><br>

1. Des r&eacute;formes radicales et urgentes sont n&eacute;cessaires dans l'Empire Ottoman.<br><br>
    
2.  Il importe d'assurer aux arabes ottomans l'exercice de leurs droits politiques en rendant
effective leur participation &agrave; l'administration centrale de l'Empire.<br><br>

3.  Il importe d'&eacute;tablir dans chacun des vilayets syriens et arabes un r&eacute;gime
d&eacute;centralisateur approprie &agrave; ses besoins et &agrave; ses aptitudes.<br><br>

4. Le vilayet de Beyrouth, avant formul&eacute; ses revendications dans un projet sp&eacute;cial
vot&eacute; le
31 Janvier 1913 par une Assembl&eacute;e g&eacute;n&eacute;rale ad hoc et bas&eacute; sur le
double principe de l'extension
des pouvoirs du conseil g&eacute;n&eacute;ral du vilayet et de la nomination de conseillers
&eacute;trangers, le
Congres demande le mise en application du susdit projet.<br><br>

5. La langue arabe doit &ecirc;tre reconnue au Parlement Ottoman et consider&eacute;e comme
officielle
dans les pays syriens et arabes.<br><br>

6. Le service militaire sera r&eacute;gional dans les vilayets syriens et arabes, en dehors des cas
d'extreme n&eacute;cessit&eacute;.<br><br>

7. Le Congr&egrave;s &eacute;met le voeu de voir le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman assurer au
Mutessariflik du Liban les moyens d'ameliorer sa situation financi&egrave;re.<br><br>

8. Le Congres affirme sa sympathie pour les demandes r&eacute;formistes et decentralisatrices des
armeniens ottomans.<br><br>

9. Les pr&eacute;sentes r&eacute;solutions seront communiquees au Gouvernement Imperial
Ottoman.<br><br>
  
10.  ll sera fait &eacute;galement communieation des m&ecirc;mes r&eacute;solutions aus puissances
amies de l'Empire Ottoman.<br><br>

11.  Le Congres exprime ses chaleureux remerciements au Gouvernement de la R&eacute;publique
pour sa g&eacute;neureuse hospitalit&eacute;.<br><br>

Le President: <br>
[Illegible.]  <br>    
FEHRAVIN.    <br><br>           
Le Vice-President:<br>
CHUKRI GANEM.<br><br>
       
Le Secretaire:<br>
CHARLES DEBBAS.<br><br>
  
<b>IV.<br>
                             
Lord Kitchener's conversation Emir Abdullah on February 5, 1914, and its aftermath.<br>
(A) Lord Kitchener's account and views of Sir Louis Mallet.<br><br>
</b>          
<i>[ED. NOTE</i>.- Lord Kitchener's meeting with the Emir Abdullah, the son of the Grand 
Sheriff of Mecca Hussein, in February, 1914, has been the subject of much discussion.<br><br>

It has been suggested by Captain Liddell Hart (<i>v.</i> "<i> T. E. Lawrence,"</i> (1934), p.
61) and by other authorities, that some acquiescence in a possible Arab revolt was winked at by Lord
Kitchener, and these hints have been magnified into positive assertions in the Arab press, but 
no authentic evidence has hitherto been produced.<br><br>

The Editors were unable to trace the official letters relating thereto in the Egyptian correspondence,
but eventually found the relevant materials in the Turkish files, the matter
having been referred to Sir Louis Mallet at Constantinople. All the relevant official evidence
is here reproduced, and in addition there is a most important private letter from Lord Kitchener
to Sir William [Lord] Tyrrell, of April 26, 1914, which sums up the whole affair. The Emir's
own statement will be found in part (B) of this section.]<br><br>

<b>Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
F.O.  6672/6672/14/44.<br>
(No. 22.) Secret. <br>
Cairo, D. February 6, 1914.<br>
R. February 14, 1914.<br><br>
</b> 
The Sherif Abdullah, son of the Sherif of Mecca, is now staying in Cairo on a short visit
called upon me yesterday.<br><br>
  
He begged me to convey to you his father's compliments, and said that affairs in the Hedjaz
not going on as well as could be wished owing to the recent appointment of a new Turkish Vali
who combined civil and military functions and who is not in sympathy with the people
and does not act harmoniously with his father in the conduct of the internal affairs of the holy
places as well as for the comfort and security of the Moslem pilgrims from all parts of the world
which his father as Sherif has been so long responsible.<br><br>
   
He wished me to ask you whether in case this friction became acute and an attempt was
made by the Turkish Government to dismiss his father from the hereditary office of Sherif of the
holy places, you would use your good offices with the Sublime Porte to prevent any such
attempt. He pointed out that his father had always done his best to assist Indian Moslem
pilgrims amongst whom he had many friends. He stated very decidedly that in case the
Turkish Government dismissed his father the Arab tribes of the Hedjaz would fight for the
Sherif and a state of war against the Turkish troops would ensue. He hoped in such circumstances that
the British Government would not allow reinforcements to be sent by sea for the
purpose of preventing the Arabs from exercising the rights which they have enjoyed from time
immemorial in their own country round the holy places.<br><br>
  
He wished his remarks to be kept very secret and on no account to be known in Constantinople, and
he also asked me whether you would send his father some message. I said I thought
would be improbable that you would do so.<br><br>
 
I have, &c.<br>
KITCHENER.<br><br>

<b>
Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Cairo, February 14, 1914,<br>
F.O.  6795/6672/14/44.<br>
D. 11.35 a.m.<br>
R. 10.30 a.m.<br>
Tel.   (No. 7)  <br><br>
</b> 
Confidential. My despatch No. 22. Secret.(l)<br><br>
I now hear that the difficulties between the Turks and the Sherif of Mecca have been
amicably settled. <br><br>
(1)  [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]<br><br>

<b>  Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
F.O. 13871/4688/14/44.<br>
(No.193)<br>
Constantinople, D. March 18, 1914<br>
R. March 30, 1914.<br><br>
</b>
Sir,<br>

In my despatch No. 1021 of December 20th last,(l) I mentioned a rumour that some leading
Arab chiefs contemplated holding a congress at Koweit or elsewhere, with a view to bringing
pressure to bear on the Turkish Government, which showed some signs of uneasiness at the
attitude of the Ottoman Arab world. In paragraph eleven of his summary of events for the
three months ending January 1914, the Acting British Consul General at Bagdad reproduces
the same rumour with the added detail that among those to be represented at the Congress
were the Grand Sherif of Mecca, lbn Saud of Nejd, lbn Rashid Jebel Shammar, Ajeymi Sheikh
of Muntefik, and Seyyid Talib of Basrah. Although Colonel Erskine goes on to state that the
projected conference is unlikely to be held, the report is significant in view of the dissatisfaction
which prevails among Ottoman Arabs generally; and the list of names given is an indication of
the possibility of the great Chieftains on the Arab fringe of the Empire sinking their personal
differences in order to enforce nationalist aspirations as against the Central Government, which
is directed by the Committee of Union and Progress and which they still regard as pursuing a
Turkifying policy. So far there had been little sign of cohesion, the Grand Sherif having been
at open enmity with Ibn Saud, for instance, and Ajeymi having been until recently an avowed
enemy of Seyyid Talib's.<br><br>

The Grand Sherif's attitude being of special interest in consequence of his recent application to Lord
Kitchener, I enclose a memorandum which I have had prepared concerning him.
As for lbn Saud his occupation of El Hassa last year is an eloquent demonstration both of his
power and of his feelings towards the Central Government. Seyyid Talib's influence in Basrah,
the skill which he has displayed in consolidating it, and the relations which he maintains with
Koweit and Nejib are well known to His Majesty's Government. If these leaders were to
combine either in a constitutional agitation for devolution or autonomy or in an avowedly
separatist movement they could undoubtedly cause much trouble. In this connection I may
refer to that part of my despatch No. 117 of February 24th (2) last which deals with the wider
aspects of the Aziz Ali case.<br><br>

It is still impossible to say what real prospect there may be of any united Arab movement.
That the Central Government is on the alert is perhaps indicated by the fact that energetic
military valis on whom the Committee can rely have been within the last few months appointed
to Bagdad, Basrah and the Hedjaz. Ibn Saud has been negotiating terms of submission to the
Government. The Grand Sherif's son, Abdullah, who is a deputy in the Turkish Parliament,
has come on from Egypt to Constantinople by invitation from them and according to accounts
which I have heard, he appears to be nervous as to what may await him here.<br><br>

I have thought it prudent to abstain from showing any particular interest in the Arab
question in my conversations with the Grand Vizier and other Ministers in view of the suspicion
which it might arouse, as the Turkish Government are probably aware of the inclination of the
Arabs to look to His Majesty's Government for sympathy in their movement and even for
eventual protection if they are successful in achieving their independence. I have reported in
my despatch No. 117 of the 24th ultimo(2) the language which has been held to Arab officers
in the Turkish army who have visited His Majesty's Embassy and have enquired what would
be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in certain eventualities. As I am disposed to see
in the recent outrages at Basrah which are principally directed against British subjects an
attempt on the part of the Arabs to force the hand of His Majesty s Government in the
direction of intervention, I informed Mr. Crow on the 17th ultimo that I could not recommend
the despatch of a British man-of-war to the Shatt-el-Arab.<br><br>

The need for caution is apparent at the present moment, when there is evidence of a
concerted movement on the part of the Arabs. If these projects should mature and if the Arabs
are eventually successful in defeating the Ottoman armies the loss of the Caliphate would
probably follow, where, shorn of a further large portion of territory and of the religious leadership,
Turkish rule, as it exists today, would presumably disappear. Europe might then be
faced with the question of a partition of the Turkish Empire which might easily produce complications
of a serious nature, whilst it is difficult to estimate what might be the effects on
India of a prolonged struggle for the possession of the Caliphate.<br><br>

I should imagine that in view of the great issues at stake the present Government would
do all in their power to avoid bringing matters to a point at the present moment and that
they will probably temporise with the Grand Sherif at any rate until they have either divided
the Arabs and feel that they are in a position to face them with certainty of success.<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
LOUIS MALLET.<br><br>

(1) [Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 1021) D. December 20, 1913, R. December 29, 1913, is not
reproduced  as  the contents  are sufficiently indicated above.    (F.O. 58132/11950/13/44.)]<br><br>
                                                 
<b>  Enclosure.<br>
Memorandum on the position of the Grand Sheriff  of Mecca.<br><br>
</b>           
The position of the Grand Sherif of Mecca differs considerably from that of other Arab
potentates in as much as he is always invested with his authority by the Sultan's firman, and
is in close touch with the capital, where several members of his family ordinarily reside. Any
given Grand Sherif might quite conceivably put himself at the head of an Arab movement, and,
if he wished to do so, his alleged descent from the Prophet, and membership of the Koreish
tribe would doubtless be a valuable asset; but in order to gain any widespread influence he
would have to start almost from the beginning, and, in the case of the present man, I think he
would have to live down a past in which, while working for his own aggrandizement, he has
posed very definitely as the representative of the Central Government. The following is a
sketch of his recent history so far as it is known to me.<br><br>

During the last years of the old regime Sherif Hussein Pasha was a member of the council
of State here. Towards the end of 1908 he was appointed Grand Sherif in the ordinary course
of succession, his predecessor Abdullah (who seems to have been Grand Sherif without proceeding to
Mecca) having died that year. He was then about 56 years of age. On his arrival he created a good
impression, and it was hoped that he would not prove extortionate and would
restore security in the country about Mecca. In reporting his appointment to the Foreign
Office Sir G. Lowther spoke favourably of him, and mentioned that some months before, at a
time when there was no prospect of his becoming Grand Sherif, he had gone out of his way to
express his friendship towards England. Since his appointment it cannot be said that he has
done anything definite to alleviate the pecuniary burdens of the pilgrim. On the other hand,
although insecurity continued to prevail on the roads in 1909, no robberies were reported to
the Embassy in the three following years until nearly the end of 1912, when there was a
recrudescence of brigandage. Meanwhile the Grand Sherif was engaged in consolidating his
own power, and his success in doing so was facilitated by the frequent changes of Valis, most
of the nominees to that post having been men of little account. He and his sons took a
considerable share in military operations, which though undertaken in the name of the
Government, contributed to his own aggrandizement. Thus, in 1910, he conducted an
expedition against the Nejd ruler Ibn Saud, which ended in a paper success for the Turkish
Government, though the promises made by Ibn Saud were never kept and extremely bad
relations subsisted between him and the Grand Sherif throughout the following year. ln 1911
again he (the Grand Sherif) and his sons campaigned in Asir and in July he actually succeeded
in relieving Ebha, which had been besieged by the followers of Idris for many months.<br><br>

By 1912 the position as reported by His Majesty's late Consul was that the improved pilgrimage 
conditions which followed the Constitution had been superseded by a renewed policy
of extortion on the part of the Grand Sherif, and that his authority had grown vastly, while
that of the Vali had sunk to nothing. When in the summer of that year three Indians were
found murdered in the Medina district, the Consul was assured that the guilty parties were
emissaries of the Grand Sherif, who had been ordered by the Government to withdraw has son
and his Bedouins from Asir, and who, so the informant said, was deliberately seeking to create
disturbance in the Medina district so as to convince the Government of the necessity of
bringing it also under his authority. However that may be there was certainly a
recrudescence of  brigandage, as mentioned above, towards the end of 1912.<br><br>

While the Grand Sherif has stood for the authority of the Turkish Government, as above
described, vis-&agrave;-vis chiefs like lbn Saud and Idris, he has not been well disposed towards the
Committee of  Union and Progress. His own son Sherif Abdullah sat for Mecca in the first
parliament, and in the packed Committee Parliament of 1912 he was able to put in one son
for Mecca and the other, Faizal, for Jeddah. They played no prominent part in Parliamentary
life here but it is significant that in 1911, some months before the second election, the
Committee Clubs in Mecca and Jeddah "died a natural death." It is also interesting to note
that the two best known Sherifs resident in Constantinople, Ali Haidar and Jafer, are close
allies of the Committee, the former having been for a time Minister of Evkaf and being now
Vice-President of the Senate, while Jafer toured Syria in the Committee interest at the time
of the 1912 elections. Now these brothers are reported to be bitterly hostile to the present
Grand Sherif. Ali Haidar is the head of the dispossessed Motallib branch of the Sherifian
family and is said to cherish the ambition of becoming Grand Sherif himself.<br><br>

Under all these circumstances it is easy to understand how anxiously Hussein Pasha must
have viewed the advent of a young and possibly energetic Vali. This doubtless explains his
sending Abdullah Bey to Lord Kitchener. As for the subsequent report of an amicable settlement of his
differences with the Turks, it is difficult to form an opinion as to the sincerity of
either side. It is conceivable that statesmen here may have thought it best not to seek for
trouble and the Grand Sherif may not think his position sufficiently menaced to make it worth
his while to risk everything on open defiance of the Central Government. On the other hand
Constantinople may feel that his aggrandizement has gone too far, and the Grand Sherif may
think that the existence of a rival, friendly to the Committee and already a candidate for the
post increases very considerably the danger of his position. In that case the reconciliation
would be merely a form of temporising and the Grand Sherif might still be tempted to
associate himself with Arab adventures. Evidently he has no desire to precipitate matters for
his son Abdullah has just come from Egypt to Constantinople at the invitation of the Central
Government, accompanied by the Grand Sherif's brother, Sherif Nassir, also a Senator, who, I
understand, went to Egypt to fetch him.  Sir W. Garstin has told Your Excellency in what a nervous
frame of mind the young man was as to his reception here.<br><br>

(2) [Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 117) D. February 24, 1914,  R. March 2, 1914, is not reproduced 
as  the contents are sufficiently indicated above.    (F.O. 9033/7963/14/44.)]<br><br>

<b> MINUTES.<br>
</b>                           

A very delicate situation. I have always felt that the policy we are pursuing towards
Ibn Saud is fraught with grave danger to the integrity of Turkey, and I was always personally
strongly opposed to the interviews which took place between him and our officials.<br><br>

Qu[ery] telegraph to Sir L. Mallet.<br><br>
  
"Your Excellency's despatches Nos. 193(3) and 205.(4)<br><br>
" I fully appreciate the delicacy of the situation, and the objections to pressing our
mediation about Bin [<i>sic:</i> Ibn] Saud.  On the other hand, if the Ottoman Government do
not reach an amicable settlement shortly by direct negotiation, which seems very uncertain, 
it may be preferable both to them and to us that our mediation should be offered again
rather than that there should be a general outbreak of hostilities with possible consequences  indicated
in penultimate paragraph of your Excellency's despatch No. 193.(3)<br><br>
                              
" If you do offer mediation you should make an emphatic statement in writing to the 
effect that His Majesty's Government adhere strictly to the treaty of July 29, 1913,(5) and
have no intention whatever of undermining Ottoman authority."<br><br>
   
Copy to I[ndia] O[ffice].<br><br>

A. P.<br>
March 31, 1914<br>
E. A. C.<br>
March 31<br>
F. D. A.<br>
A. N.<br><br>

(3) [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]<br>
(4) [Sir L. Mallet's despatch (No. 205) D. March 25, 1914, R. March 30, 1914, is not reproduced; it 
reported a conversation with Talaat Bey on the general Arab question. (F.O.
13883/4588/14/44.)]<br>

(5) [<i>v. supra,</i> pp 183-98, No. 124.]<br><br>

<b>Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Cairo, March 21, 1914.<br>
F.O. 12662/6672/14/44.<br>
D. 2.30 P.M.<br>
R. 2 P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 20.) <br><br>                                                 
</b>

Secret. A messenger from the Sheriff of Mecca to the Khedive reports that the Sheriff
and Vali have fallen out about the extension of the Hedjaz railway and Vali's high-handed
action  ( ? group omitted) Arabs. Messenger says that the Arabs are all with the Sherif and
will not (?) tolerate Vali whose recall they have demanded. He reports the road from Jeddah
to Mecca closed by Arabs.<br><br>

Sent to Constantinople.<br><br>
  
<b> MINUTES.<br>
</b>                           

The amicable settlement has not lasted long.<br><br>
  
If the Turkish Government now attempt to remove tho Sherif, the question whether His
Majesty s Government can profitably support him may arise. Please see Lord Kitchener's
despatch No. 22 (6672).(1)<br><br>

Q[uer]y. Await further information from Cairo or Constantinople before expressing any
opinion to the India Office.<br><br>

C. N.<br>
March 21.<br>
But send them a copy.<br>
E. A. C.<br>
March 21.<br>
A. N.<br>
E. G.<br><br>

(1) [<i>v. supra</i>, p. 827.]<br><br>
                        
<b>  Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
F.O. 15883/4588/14/44.<br>
(No. 58.) Confidential.<br>
Cairo, D. April 4, 1914.<br>

R. April 11, 1914<br><br>
</b>  
Sir, <br>

In the enclosure to Sir Louis Mallet's despatch No. 193(1) of the 18th ultimo of which
His Excellency forwarded me a copy, I notice it is stated that the Sherif of Mecca sent his son,
Abdullah Bey, to me. This does not, however, quite accurately represent what took place, as
Abdullah Bey was actually on a visit to the Khedive and only called on me quite unofficially,
and some time after his arrival in Cairo, when he spoke to me as reported in my despatch
No. 22 Secret,(2) of the 6th of February last. You will remember that he received no sort of
encouragement from me.<br><br>

I quite agree with Sir Louis Mallet in thinking that great care will have to be taken in
dealing with the Arab question, so as not to wound Turkish susceptibilities and arouse their
suspicions. At the same time we cannot afford to lose sight of the interests which Great Britain
must always take in the Holy Places, owing to the annual pilgrimage which is attended by
thousands of Indian Moslems and also by many Egyptians. The welfare and indeed safety of
these pilgrims is intimately bound up with the maintenance of order in the districts in question
and of a good relationship between Turks and Arabs whose animosity has undoubtedly been
roused by the recent Turkish policy of centralization adopted during the last few years and
more especially by the proposal to push forward railway communications which would cause
great pecuniary loss to the Arabs who live on their camel hire.<br><br>

I take this opportunity of saying that the suspicions entertained by the Grand Vizier with
regard to my interest in the case of Aziz Bey el Masri are quite groundless (see Sir Louis
Mallet's Telegram No. 191 of March 27th(3) ). Egyptian public opinion has been genuinely and
sincerely aroused by the arrest and trial of this officer, and so far from taking the initiative in
pressing the matter at Constantinople I have had some difficulty in calming the resentment
caused by the proceedings of the Turkish Government. Nothing is known here of his alleged
intrigues with the Arab leaders in Mesopotamia and his arrest is generally attributed to the
personal animosity and. jealousy of Enver Pasha.<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
KITCHENER.<br><br>

(l) [<i>v. supra</i>,  pp. 827-8.]<br>
(2)[<i>v. supra</i>, p. 827.]<br>
(3) <i>[v. infra</i>, p. 835]<br><br>

<b>Lord Kitchener to Sir W. Tyrrell.<br>
Grey MSS., Vol. 9.<br>
British Agency, Cairo, April 26, 1914.<br><br>
</b>

My dear Tyrrell,<br>
I do not think it necessary to write a despatch about the Sherif Abdullah having passed
through here on his way back from Constantinople to the Hedjaz, as I did not see him. He
sent for Storrs who under my instructions told him the Arabs of the Hedjaz could expect no
encouragement from us and that our only interest in Arabia was the safety and comfort of
Indian pilgrims. I have written privately to Mallet about what passed. The Sherif seemed to
be disappointed with the result of his visit to Constantinople and with the determination of the
Turkish Gov[ernmen]t to push the railway on to Mecca which he saw would mean the economic
death of the camel-owning population of Arabia.<br><br>

It will be interesting to see developments as the Arabs seem to be much excited.<br><br>

Yours very truly,<br>
KITCHENER .<br><br>
                                                
[<i>ED. NOTE.</i>-References are made in Sir George Arthur, <i>Life of Kitchener</i>, (1920),
Vol. III, p. 153, to an important Sheikh, who is stated to have sent a message, on Turkey's
entry into the war, couched in these terms: " Following for Lord Kitchener. Remember our
conversation at .... the day has come." Sir George Arthur informs the Editors that he can
throw no light on this incident and Sir Ronald Storrs, when he was consulted, was equally
at a loss. Mr. G. Antonius thinks that there was an interview between Sayyid Talib al Nakib
of Basra and Lord Kitchener at Cairo in 1913 or possibly in 1912, but the Editors have found
no evidence relating thereto. Sir Ronald Storrs generally confirms the account given in the
above documents as to the negotiations with Abdullah.]<br><br>
           
<b>(B) Emir Abdullah's account of his conversations Lord Kitchener, transmitted with notes
by Mr. G. Antonius.<br><br>
</b>[<i>ED. NOTE</i>.-The Editors are here able to reproduce, through the kindness of Mr. G.
Antonius, on the authority of the Emir Abdullah, His Highness's account of his conversations
with Lord Kitchener. Some notes have been added by Mr. G. Antonius, based on Arab
information.]<br><br>

Jerusalem,  May 1, 1936.<br><br>
In the course of my researches into the origins and development of the Arab National
Movement, I had occasion to consult His Highness the Emir Abdullah, Ruler of Transjordan,
and was privileged to draw upon his unrivalled knowledge of certain phases of its history.
The following account of His Highness's relations with the late Lord Kitchener in the years
immediately preceding the war, when the Emir was deputy for Mecca in the Ottoman Chamber,
and Kitchener His Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, was drawn up by 
me, at the request of the Editors of <i>British Documents on the Origins of the War</i>, from notes
taken at my numerous conversations with the Emir. I have His Highness's authority to state
that this account is a fair summary of his recollection of the facts and that it is published with
his permission:-<br><br>

"My acquaintance with Lord Kitchener began in the spring of 1912 in Cairo when,
being on my way back from Constantinople to Mecca, I stayed at Abdin Palace as the guest
of the Khedive. Accompanied by Mr. (now Sir Ronald) Storrs, his Oriental Secretary,
Kitchener paid me a visit at the Palace, which I returned two days later at the British
Agency.  The conversation we had during his visit to me had no special political significance,
Kitchener's main contribution being that the British Government had noticed and were gratified to
know that the arrangements made in the Hejaz for the safety and comfort
of the pilgrims had improved since my father had assumed the dignity of Sherif of Mecca.
On the occasion of my visit to him, Kitchener displayed a marked interest in Hejaz affairs
and questioned me as to the form of its administration, the relations between Vali and
Sherif, and the degree to which the Turkish officials tried to exercise control in purely
religious matters. I did not feel at liberty to answer his penetrating questions as fully as
I should have liked, yet tried to give him a general idea of our fears and anxieties. I had
liked him and been greatly impressed with the power of his personality, and we parted on
very cordial terms. It was two years before I was to see him again.<br><br>
   
" Early in 1914, l found myself in Cairo once more, and again staying with the Khedive. One day,
while I was having an audience of His Highness, Lord Kitchener was announced.  I greeted him and
took my leave. Later in the morning when his own audience was over,  Kitchener paid me a visit in my
apartments. I returned  his call two days later. This time, the conversation bore on political topics. ln
the two years that had elapsed, I had kept up friendly relations with Storrs and become infected with
his own  enthusiasm for his chief. Moreover, things had come to such a pass between the Porte and the
Sherif, and indeed between Turks and Arabs in general, that a conflict seemed  inevitable. I decided to
speak openly to Kitchener.  <br><br>
 
"An opening was afforded me by Kitchener remarking that he had heard of the recent
strengthening of the Turkish garrison in the Hejaz. I seized the opportunity to describe
to him, with greater freedom than on the previous occasion, the realities of the situation
in the Hejaz, the delicacy of the Sherif's position, the causes of the disaffection between
Turks and Arabs, and the aims of the Arab movement as a whole. I explained that
although the immediate causes of the trouble lay in the attempts made by the Turks to
curtail the privileges of the Sherifate and to coerce the population of the Hejaz into
accepting a new and unsuitable bureaucratic system, yet our problem was only part of the
main Arab problem and was bound up with that of the future of the other Arab provinces
of the Ottoman Empire. I expressed the view that unless the Turks were to abandon their
dragooning methods the situation in the Hejaz might take a very serious turn.<br><br>
   
"Kitchener appeared to listen carefully to my statement and asked me several
questions in elucidation of it. On my remarking that the Sherif of Mecca was, in the last
analysis, a nominee of the Porte and thus liable to arbitrary dismissal, Kitchener said that
whatever their powers in theory, in practice the Turks would be reluctant to depose the
Sherif. When I asked him to tell me whether, in the event of a rupture, the Sherif could
count upon any support from Great Britain, Kitchener replied negatively, on the plea that
British relations with Turkey were friendly and that, in any case, the dispute was an
internal matter in which it would not be proper for a foreign Power to intervene. I could 
not refrain from pointing out that those friendly relations had not prevented Great Britain
from intervening in the dispute between Turkey and the Sheikh of Kuwait, which was
likewise an internal matter. Kitchener laughed and rose to depart. As he was leaving,
he said that he would make a point of reporting our conversation to his Government.<br><br>
  
" That was my last interview with him. About two months later, I was in Cairo
again, on my way back from Constantinople. I saw Mr. Storrs, with whom I had a long
and cordial conversation, but not Kitchener."<br><br>
  
In order to ascertain the dates of those interviews, I have had recourse to the files of
contemporary newspapers. In its issue of February 6, 1914, <i>al Muqattam</i> (Cairo) records that
the Khedive had, on the preceding day, received the Emir Abdullah and subsequently Lord
Kitchener in audience at Abdin Palace. In its issue of February 9, 1914, the same paper
relates that, two days earlier, Lord Kitchener had paid a visit to the Emir Abdullah.<br><br>

G. ANTONIUS.<br><br>
                                                 
<b>V.<br>
Aziz Bey and the Arab Movement, 1914.<br><br>
</b>                 
[<i>ED. NOTE.</i>-In March 1914, the trial took place in Constantinople of Colonel
Aziz-el-Masri, an Arab officer of the Turkish Army. The ostensible charges on which he was tried
were connected with his alleged misdirection of the campaign in Cyrenaica, but it has been supposed
that. the real reason of his arrest and trial was that he was known (though actual evidence was
lacking) to have been the founder and guiding spirit of a secret political society whose
membership was confined to Arab officers of the Turkish Army. His trial evoked a great deal
of interest and caused effervescence in Egypt and Syria. As will be seen the British
Ambassador in Constantinople (Sir L. Mallet) intervened with the Porte in favour of Aziz.
delight throughout the Arab provinces. There were many loose statements on the subject in  
Arab press at the time and since that date, and the Editors think it best therefore to
reproduce here all that they have been able to find of importance on the subject.]<br><br>
  
<b> Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, February  21, 1914.<br>
                                      
F.O.  7963/7963/14/44. <br>
D. 3-45 P.M.<br>
R. 6.15 P.M.<br>
(No. 117.) <br>
Very Confidential.<br><br>
</b>
Aziz Bey, an ex-officer of Egyptian origin who enjoys great consideration in various
countries, was arrested here about twelve days ago. He has influential connexions in Egypt, and
at Lord Kitchener's request I made friendly unofficial representations to Grand Vizier. Matter
is extremely delicate for reasons which I am reporting fully by bag. I do not propose to take
any further action at present, but I think it well that you should be aware of the matter.<br><br>
 
<b> MINUTES.<br>
</b>                           
Sir L. Mallet apparently thinks we may hear of this from another source. Await report.<br><br>
This is not Aziz Bey who was Military Attach&eacute; in South Africa and elsewhere and later
Chief of Police in Constantinople. He was not of  Egyptian origin.<br><br>
 
C.R.<br>
Feb[ruary] 23.<br>
He is the man who was Enver's second in Tripoli and earned much reputation there.<br>  
G. R. C.<br>
23.ii.14.<br>
E. A. C.<br>
Feb[ruary] 23.<br>
A. N.<br>
E. G<br><br>
  
<b> Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.(l)<br>
F.O. 9033/7963/14/44.<br>
(No. 117.)<br>
Constantinople  <br>
D. February 24, 1914.<br>
R. March 2, 1914.<br><br>
</b>
Sir,<br>
In my telegram No. 117 of the 21st instant(2) I briefly reported the arrest here a couple
of days ago of Aziz Ali Bey, which has attracted much attention in Egypt and elsewhere. Born
in Egypt about thirty-four years ago, Aziz Bey entered the Turkish army in the usual way,
and served in Macedonia under the Hamidian r&eacute;gime. After the Constitution he accompanied
Izzet Pasha to the Yemen, and is said to have had a large part in the negotiations with the
Imam Yahya for the settlement of that region. During the Italian war he took a leading part
in organising resistance to the Italians in Benghazi, and was one of those who continued the
struggle after the Treaty of Lausanne. He returned to Constantinople some months ago, but
was already in disfavour in high places, and his refusal of a post at Allgora eventually led to
his resigning his commission. It is alleged by Aziz Ali's friends that personal dislike on the
part of Enver Pasha, who is said to have played a more conspicuous but in reality less
distinguished part in the Italian War, has had a good deal to do with his arrest; but it
derives its chief importance from the effectiveness of his own personality and the position
which he appears to hold in the esteem of Arabs over a wide area. Immediately after his
arrest l was approached from a variety of sources with requests for intervention, and as one
of these came from the Governor of Cairo, who is Aziz Bey's brother-in-law, through Lord
Kitchener, I addressed friendly and unofficial enquiries to both the Minister of the Interior
and the Grand Vizier.<br><br>

The Grand Vizier gave me to understand that Aziz Ali Bey's arrest was due to his attitude
towards the Government since his return to Constantinople, and it is clear from what I have
since learned from other sources that the matter is really a political one, for there is no doubt
that Aziz Ali Bey has been one of the leading spirits in a group of young Arabs, officers and
others, who are dissatisfied with the present Turkish Government. It is difficult to gauge the
importance of this group, but it has come to my knowledge that some at least of them are
identified with more or less definite schemes for organising a movement which would aim at
releasing the whole region from Mosul to the Persian Gulf from Turkish domination. They
claim to have established communications with various local notabilities, including the Sheikh
of  Koweit, whose sympathy they say they have secured, and one of their plans would appear to
be to attach the tract of country in which they are interested to the Sheikh's dominions. They
profess to be in a position to organise an insurrectionary movement on such a scale as would
enable them to cope with the strong repressive measures which the Turkish Government would,
they realise, take to repress it.<br><br>

Schemes of this kind are of course not new, and I have no reason to believe that the
originators of this one are powerful or competent. As, however, a definite role is attributed to
the Sheikh of Koweit, and in view of the unrest which undoubtedly prevails at Basra, I think
it my duty to bring it to your notice. If the plan of creating an insurrection in Mesopotamia
should take shape, one of the aims of its promoters would be to compel British intervention.
I have caused it to be known to some of the persons concerned that His Majesty's Government
would give no countenance to any such schemes and have no intention of pursuing a policy of
adventure, which could only compromise serious British economic interests in Mesopotamia.<br><br>

In the meanwhile, the fact that Aziz Ali's friends are mixed up in such projects, of which
the Turkish Government have doubtless at least an inkling, makes it a very delicate matter
for me to intervene further on his behalf; and I have told Lord Kitchener that I do not propose
to make any further representations unless his life should appear to be in definite danger.
I enclose for your information copies of the telegrams which have passed between his Lordship
and myself on the subject.(3)<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
LOUIS MALLET.<br><br>
                                                 
P.S.-Since writing the above it has come to my knowledge that Aziz Ali has been more
strictly confined, and that there is some reason to fear that his life may be in danger. I have
therefore mentioned the matter again to Talaat Bey, and have the honour to enclose a further
telegram which I am to-day addressing on the subject to Lord Kitchener.(3)<br>

L. M.<br>                                              
February 25, 1914.<br><br>
                                                 
(l)  [A copy of this despatch was sent to the India Office.]<br>
(2) [<i>v</i>. immediately preceding document.] <br>
(3) [Sir L. Mallet enclosed copies of a considerable correspondence he had had with Lord
Kitchener on this subject since February 12, 1914; not reproduced as the matter is sufficiently
indicated above. (F.O. 9033 / 7963/ 14/ 44.)]<br><br>

<b>Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.<br>
F.O. 9033/7963/14/44.<br>
(No. 135.)<br>
Foreign Office, March 16, 1914.<br><br>

</b>Sir,<br>

I have received your Excellency's despatch No. 117 conf[identia]l of the 24 ult[im]o(l)
rel[ating] to the arrest and imprisonment of Aziz Ali Bey. I approve your action as therein
reported, and I agree that the matter does not seem to call for your Exc[ellenc]y's further
intervention, unless, in your opinion, it should be occasioned on humanitarian grounds.<br><br>

I am, &c.<br>
[E. GREY]<br><br>
                 
(1) [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]<br><br>
                 
<b>Merchants of Cairo to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
F.O.  10444/7963/14/44.  <br>
Cairo, <br>
D.  March 8, 1914.<br>
R. March 9, 1914<br>
Tel.<br><br>
</b>
In the name of humanity We the undersigned beseech your kind intervention in the affair
of Aziz Bey Elmasri who has been lying in prison at Constantinople for a month and who is
completely unaware of the cause of his arrest. We appeal to you to press for his fair trial or
release and in making this appeal we express the sentiments of the entire Egyptian nation.<br><br>

Provost of Cairo Merchants<br>
Abdelkhalek Madkour Pacha <br>
Hassan Radouan Pacha <br>
Sinot Bey <br>
Hanna Deput&eacute; <br>
Nassif Wissa Bey <br>
Sawiris Mikhail Bey <br>
Avocat Mansour Chedid Bey<br>
Docteur Saad Elkhadey <br>
Abdelmagid Elremali Negociant <br>
Mahmoud Elremali Negociant.<br><br>

<b> Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey(1)<br>
                   
F.O. 10697/7963/14/44. Constantinople, <br>
D. March 9, 1914, 9-40 P.M.<br>
R. March 10, 11.50 A.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 153.) <br>
Confidential. <br><br>
</b>

My despatch No. 117.(2)<br><br>
  
I mentioned again to-day to the Grand Vizier unofficially the case of Aziz Ali. The Grand
Vizier told me in confidence that this Officer was suspected of having been in secret correspondence
with the Khedive who had been engaged in intrigues with Italians at the time of the
Mariut railway affair. I was greatly surprised at this information which I said was quite new
to me and did not seem to be borne out by Italian satisfaction at his imprisonment  His
Highness assured me that his trial, which was imminent, would prove the truth of their
suspicions and that the Italians were merely playing a comedy.<br><br>

I said that, even if this were true, it would be better to let the man go back to Cairo under
guarantees from the Governor that he will not be allowed to intrigue with the Arabs because
the case was exciting so much interest and the "Times" had published an article on the subject
which in my opinion was ill-judged and uncalled for but which might leave an unpleasant
impression .<br><br>

I said that I was speaking quite unofficially and without instructions from you, as His
Majesty's Government would not interfere in such a matter.<br><br>

I do not propose to do anything further because there is some (group omitted) that the
man was engaged in intrigues with the Arabs, because, if the story of intrigues with Italians
was found to be baseless, the Italian Government would have good ground for resenting our
active intervention to obtain the release of an Officer of Egyptian origin who fought against
them in Tripoli after peace was concluded and because alienation of Egyptian sympathies from
Turkey would not seem to be disadvantageous for us.<br><br>

Confidential. I am informed on good authority that trial will take place immediately and
that, if found guilty, he will be pardoned and set at liberty.<br><br>

(1) [This telegram was sent to Cairo.]<br>
(2) [<i>v. supra,</i> pp 833-4.]<br><br>

<b>  Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, March 26, 1914.<br>
F.O. 13434/7963/14/44. <br>    
D. 12 50 P.M.<br>
R.. 2.30 P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 189.)   <br><br>
</b> My tel[egram] No. 153 of Mar[ch] 9(1) Following sent to Lord Kitchener.<br><br>
 
"It is reported that Aziz Ali Bey has been condemned to death, but I have reason to
believe that he will be pardoned.<br><br>
 
Confidential. I shall speak to Grand Vizier to-day, but I would rather that this was not
mentioned."<br><br>
 
<b> MINUTE.<br>
</b>                          
At a moment when the Turkish gov[ernmen]t are asking for the pardon of the Turkish
officer(2) who avowedly has engaged in engineering a rebellion in Albania, it would be
singularly inappropriate for them to insist on carrying out this death sentence.<br><br>

E. A. C.<br>
M[ar]ch 26.<br>
A. N.<br>
E. G.<br><br>

(1)  [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]<br>
(2) [Bekir Bey.]<br><br>
                
<b> Sir Louis Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.(1)<br>
                 
Constantinople, <br>
March 27, 1914.<br>
                                      
F.O. 13601/7963/14/44.<br>
D. 2 10 P.M.<br>
R. 4.40 P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 191.)<br><br>
</b>
My tel[egram] No. 189 of Mar[ch] 26.(2)<br><br>

On hearing report that Aziz Ali had been condemned to death, I spoke very seriously to
Grand Vizier, whom I met last night at a party, of probable effect on opinion in England and
Egypt, if sentence were carried out. Grand Vizier was stiffer than on previous occasion, seemed
to  be suspicious of Lord Kitchener's interest in the case, and made light of Egyptian public opinion,
which, he said, had been manufactured and meant very little.<br><br>

If Aziz were to be liberated, there would be no guarantee that he would not intrigue with
Arabs; undertaking on the part of Egyptian Government or of Governor of Cairo would be
worthless. British guarantee would be a different matter.<br><br>

I said that if he made a request of this nature, I would consider whether I would recommend you to
comply, but that it seemed an unusual thing for one Government to ask guarantee from another in
regard to one of their own subjects.<br><br>

I think that visit of Shereef of Mecca's son  to Cairo and London negotiations about
Ibn Soud are causing suspicion of our good faith in regard to Arab movement, and that great
prudence is necessary, especially with regard to the latter question.<br><br>

(l) [This telegram was sent to Cairo. Copies were sent to the India Office; to Sir A. Hirtzel on March
30.]<br>

(2) [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document ]<br><br>

<b> Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, April 1, 1914<br>
F.0.14486/7963/14/44.<br>
D. 8.15 P.M.<br>
R. 10 P.M.<br>
Tel.(No. 209.) Confidential. <br><br>
</b>
My telegram No. 191 of Mar[ch] 27.(1) I spoke to Minister of Interior again last night        about
Aziz Ali. He says that he will be pardoned.   <br><br>       

(1) [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]   <br><br>                             
                                                                      
<b>Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. <br>
F.O.  15520/7963/14/44. <br>
Constantinople,<br>
D. April 7,  1914, 11.30 P.M.<br>
R. April 8, 8 A.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 225.)<br><br>
</b>
Following sent to Cairo to-day;--<br><br>

"(Private.) Your telegram of 6th April. I have no confirmation of Aziz Ali's condemnation. I
have recently made further unofficial representations. (Repeated to Foreign Office.}"<br><br>

<b>Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.(1)<br>                 
F.O. 16768/7963/14/44.  <br>        
Constantinople, D. April 12, 1914<br>
R. April 17, 1914<br>
(No. 249.) <br><br>
</b>
Sir,<br>

A connection by marriage of Aziz Ali, Dr. Khadem Bey by name, who arrived last night
from Cairo, called this morning at the Embassy. He gave me the following account of what
happened in Africa between El Senoussi, Aziz Ali and Enver.<br><br>

El Senoussi had on the 28th Zulkeida 1329 (20th Nov[embe]r, 1911 signed an agreement
with the Italians by which he undertook to cease all resistance on condition of receiving all
an annual subvention and of being recognised as the religious head of the desert Arabs. He
subsequently broke this agreement under pressure from Enver Bey, who promised a larger  
subsidy than the Italians offered and the title of Sultan. When Enver left Cyrenaica he
promised El Senoussi more money and ammunition, which, he said, would be sent through 
Aziz Ali.<br><br>
 
Dr. Khadem stated that he did this without any intention of keeping his promises, merely
to make trouble between El Senoussi and Aziz Ali, of whose influence with the Arabs Enver
was jealous. Whatever Enver's intentions may have been, El Senoussi received nothing and
on two separate occasions El Senoussi wrote to Enver complaining that he had received nothing
from Aziz Ali. In the last letter he said that he intended to come to terms with the Italians
as he had been betrayed by the Turks.<br><br>

Enver, thereupon, sent him some money which he had obtained by putting on an illegal    
tax and said that the former instalments which had been regularly sent had been intercepted
by Aziz Ali for his own uses and that on his return to Constantinople he would have him tried      
by Court Martial and executed.<br><br>

This incriminating letter has been obtained from the Senoussi by the friends of Aziz Ali 
in Egypt and Dr. Khadem has come from Egypt to inform Talaat Bey that, unless Aziz Ali
released, the letter will be published. At his request, I gave Dr. Khadem a card of introduction
to Talaat Bey, which he will use if he finds any difficulty in obtaining admission to        His
Excellency in the ordinary way. <br><br>

No judgment has been pronounced in the case in spite of many rumours but Dr. Khadem       has
heard that the sentence will be pronounced to-day.                    <br><br>
I shall take an opportunity of speaking myself to Talaat Bey again to-day. He is, I believe, 
in favour of releasing Aziz Ali and realises the gravity of the position, but Enver Pasha is 
said to be opposing his liberation, an attitude, which, I fear, will not be modified by the
personal attacks upon him in the columns of the " Times " which I do not think well advised 
in openly attributing to him motives of jealousy, as it makes it more difficult for him to give
way without loss of face. <br><br>

I  have, &c.<br>
LOUIS MALLET<br><br>

(1) [A copy of this despatch was sent to Cairo.] <br><br>

<b>
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, April 14, 1914.<br>
F.O. 16306/ 7963 / 14/44.        <br>
D . 11.25 A.M.<br>
R. 1 P.M.<br>
(No. 235.) <br><br>
</b>  
On hearing a rumour last night that Aziz Ali had been condemned to death, I sent to
Talaat Bey who confirmed the news but added that the sentence had been commuted to 15 years
penal servitude and hinted that it will be still further reduced.<br><br>
Repeated to Cairo.<br><br>
 
<b>Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, April 17, 1914.<br>
D. 10.45 A.M.<br>
R. 2.40 P.M.<br>                                     
F.O. 16904 /7963/14/44.   <br>
(No. 243.)<br><br>
 
</b> Following sent to Cairo to-day:-<br><br>
 
"I have spoken to the Grand Vizier and urged His Highness to put a stop to
accusation against Enver Pasha by releasing Aziz Ali: I argued that now was the time to
show that these charges were baseless and that by prompt release the Government would
gain much more morally than they would risk by possible future intrigues on the part of
Aziz Ali."<br><br>
 
"This line of argument seemed to appeal to His Highness and it is my impression
that something will be done."<br><br>
 
<b>Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>            
Constantinople, April 18, 1914.<br>
F.O. 17088/7963/14/44  <br>
D. 7.5 P.M.<br>
R. 10.15 P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 246.) <br><br>
</b> Following sent to Cairo to-day:-<br><br>

" My telegram of yesterday.(1)<br><br>

" Minister referred to in my last telegram tells me that Enver Pasha will ask Sultan
for free pardon for Aziz Ali, and that he will be released very shortly.<br><br>
 
" (Very Confidential.)<br><br>
  
It will be politic, in view of possible future incidents of similar character, if
Enver Pasha is allowed to get the credit of this and if it is assumed that he has acted
spontaneously. I have taken line, in talking to the Grand Vizier, that it will be easy
and natural for Enver Pasha, who was Ali s friend, to appeal for his pardon."<br><br>
 
(1) [<i>v.</i> immediately preceding document.]<br><br>

<b>Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Constantinople, April 20, 1914.<br>                                     
F.O. 17373/7963/14/44.<br>
D. 5-30 P.M.<br>
R. 5.55. P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 251.) <br>
Confidential.<br><br>
</b>
The Grand Vizier has informed me confidentially that on the intervention of Enver Pasha,
Aziz Ali will be liberated, and will probably leave for Egypt tomorrow.<br><br>
(Sent to Cairo.)<br><br>

<b>Ahmed Ali and Others to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
               
F.O.18121/7963/14144 <br>
El Mehalla El Kubra<br>
D. April 16, 1914<br>
R. April 25, 1914<br><br>
</b>
Sir Edward Grey,
<br>
We have the honour to submit you that we, the inhabitants of El-Mehalla, became very
sorry for the evil news of Constantinople which tell of the final judgment of Aziz Bey El-Masry
the Egyptian officer.<br><br>

We cannot express our feelings towards such trial, which proves well that his punishment
was only for some personal deed. Anwar Pash, the Minister of War, is the only man who hates
this honest officer. If someone asks why he was let free for seven months without punishment,
I cannot answer such question. If you visit even the smallest cottage in Egypt you can hear
grief and sorrow for Aziz Bey. All of the persons who accompanied Aziz Bey can tell his noble
deeds. We wonder why Great Britain did not set him at liberty as he is a native of Egypt.
All the Egyptian Papers are not satisfactory towards such bad treatment. You can ask
Lord Kitchener to explain you the feelings of all the inhabitants. The Arabian Nation is
very unhappy to hear of his judgment. You see that all the classes even the Europeans are
surprised towards his treatment. We never forget the Turkish fault, this bad error which
proves that Turkey does what will displease the Egyptians, those persons who assisted her in
time of trouble. We have placed ourselves near cannons in honour of Turkey. We think that
She missed that Aziz Bey is an Egyptian.<br><br>

He did not err, but had done all his best for the sake of rasing the Turkish, those people
who could not know their enemies out of their own friends. The nation is waiting your help.
To you we send our application hoping do your best so as to let all the Egyptians know that
there is a Gov[ernmen]t which look after our own life and property.<br><br>

We are,<br>
Your Most Obed[ient] Servants,<br>
ALI WAHBI.<br>
KAMEL LUTFY.<br>
AHMED ALI<br>
HAS LATIF.<br><br> 

<i>for 400,000 persons</i>.<br><br>
    
<b>Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.<br>
Rome, April 26, 1914<br>
F.O.  18207/7963/14/44.<br>
D. 12 noon<br>
R. 1 P.M.<br>
Tel. (No. 73.)<br><br>               
</b>

The minister for Foreign Affairs has heard that Aziz Ali, who is proceeding to Egypt on
his release, contemplates returning to Cyrenaica to organise opposition to the Italians, and
greatly hopes that means may be found to dissuade him from doing so.
<br><br>


<b>Sir L. Mallet  to Sir Edward Grey<br>
F.O. 22038/7963/14/44.<br>
Pera, D. May 12, 1914<br>
R. May 18, 1914<br>
(No. 331.)<br><br>

</b> 
Sir,<br>
l have the honour to enclose herein copies of an article which has appeared in the recently
published pan-Islamic periodical, the " Jihan-i-Islam," regarding the intervention of this
Embassy in the case of Aziz Ali.<br><br>

It is noticeable that this article is reproduced briefly in the Arab portion of the paper,
and at greater length in the Urdu portion. The frontispiece of this portion is moreover a
large photograph of Enver Pasha which is headed " The Sword of the State and Helper of
the People."<br><br>

I have, &c.<br>
LOUIS MALLET.<br><br>
                                                 
Enclosure in Sir L. Mallet's despatch No. 331.
<i>Translation from the Turkish of article published in Turkish, in the issue of May 7 (April 24) of
the "Jihan-i-Islam."
</i><br><br>

A rumour had been published that the Egyptian Aziz Ali Bey who, after condemnation
by the Court Martial, became the object of the Imperial clemency, owed his pardon to the
intervention of the British Ambassador. Because we knew how exalted is the patriotism of
our Egyptian brethren, we considered it improbable that they should have invited foreign
intervention in connexion with the trial and condemnation of an officer on counts relating to
his military duty. The intervention of one Government in connexion with the condemnation
by another Government of an officer of its own army being completely contrary to the essential
principles of international law, we could not regard such a direct intervention as possible.
However, with a desire to learn the truth, our proprietor visited the Minister of War and
made enquiry. The Minister declared that Aziz Ali Bey's pardon was due to no foreign
intervention, but that the Imperial pardon had been granted solely on his proposition. Hereupon, our
proprietor sent tho following telegram to the Egyptian newspaper, Es-Shaab, on
April 15/28, 1914:<br><br>
" I have had an interview with His Excellency the Minister of War. His Excellency
denied the intervention of the British Ambassador in the question of Aziz Ali, and stated  that the
Imperial clemency had been extended to Aziz Ali owing to his efforts."<br><br>
  
The " Agence Ottomane " afterwards published its d&eacute;menti.
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