View source for British Note of January 13, 1917, amplifying the Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note

<p align="right"> [[Main_Page | WWI Document Archive ]] > [[1916 Documents]] > [[Official Communications and Speeches Relating to Peace Proposals 1916-1917]] > '''British Note of January 13, 1917, amplifying the Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note'''</p><hr>

'''British Note of January 13, 1917, amplifying the Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note<sup>1</sup>'''<br>

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In sending you a translation of the Allied note I desire to make the<br> 
following observations, which you should bring to the notice of the <br>
United States Government. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I gather from the general tenour of the President's note that, while<br> 
he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon and <br>
that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not, for the moment <br>
at least, concern himself with the terms on which it should be ar- <br>
ranged. His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's <br>
ideals ; but they feel strongly that the durability of the peace must <br>
largely depend on its character and that no stable system of interna- <br>
tional relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and <br>
hopelessly defective. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main conditions<br> 
which rendered possible the calamities from which the world is now <br>
suffering. These were the existence of a Great Power consumed with <br>
the lust of domination in the midst of a community of nations ill-<br>
prepared for defence, plentifully supplied, indeed, with international <br>
laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them, and weakened by <br>
the fact that neither the boundaries of the various States nor their <br>
internal constitution harmonized with the aspirations of their con- <br>
stituent races or secured to them just and equal treatment. <br>
That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the Allies secured <br>
the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note is <br>
manifest, and I need not labour the point. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks from <br>
Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The <br>
maintenance of the Turkish Empire was, during many generations, <br>
regarded by statesmen of world-wide authority as essential to the <br>
maintenance of European peace. Why, it is asked, should the cause <br>
of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional <br>
policy? <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is <br>
unnecessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed <br>
Turkey, mediating between hostile races in the Near East, was a <br>
scheme which, had the Sultan been sincere and the Powers united, <br>
could ever have been realized. It certainly can not be realized now. <br>
The Turkey of "Union and Progress" is at least as barbarous and is <br>
far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the <br>
hands of Germany it has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark <br>
of peace, and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under <br>
German officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which <br>
they had long been expelled, and a Turkish Government controlled, <br>
subsidized, and supported by Germany has been guilty of massacres <br>
in Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the history <br>
even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and <br>
the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien <br>
races shall, if possible, be brought to an end ; and we may hope that <br>
the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the <br>
cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of <br>
Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the other territorial changes in- <br>
dicated in the Allied note. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements, though they <br>
may diminish the occasions of war, provide no sufficient security <br>
against its recurrence. If Germany, or rather, those in Germany who <br>
mold its opinions and control its destinies, again set out to dominate <br>
the world, they may find that by the new order of things the adven- <br>
ture is made more difficult, but hardly that it is made impossible. They<br>
may still have ready to their hand a political system organized through <br>
and through on a military basis ; they may still accumulate vast stores <br>
of military equipment; they may still perfect their methods of at- <br>
tack, so that their more pacific neighbours will be struck down before <br>
they can prepare themselves for defence. If so, Europe, when the <br>
war is over, will be far poorer in men, in money, and in mutual good- <br>
will than it was when the war began, but it will not be safer; and the <br>
hopes for the future of the world entertained by the President will be <br>
as far as ever from fulfilment. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are those who think that for this disease international treaties<br> 
and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such per- <br>
sons have ill learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. <br>
While other nations, notably the United States of America and <br>
Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make sure that <br>
no chance quarrel should mar the peace they desired to make perpetual, <br>
Germany stood aloof. Her historians and philosophers preached the <br>
splendors of war; Power was proclaimed as the true end of the State; <br>
the General Staff forged with untiring industry the weapons by <br>
which at the appointed moment Power might be achieved. These <br>
facts proved clearly enough that treaty arrangements for maintaining <br>
peace were not likely to find much favour at Berlin ; they did not prove <br>
that such treaties, once made, would be utterly ineffectual. This <br>
became evident only when war had broken out; though the <br>
demonstration, when it came, was overwhelming. So long as Germany <br>
remains the Germany which, without a shadow of justification, over-ran <br>
and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged to defend, no <br>
State can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection <br>
than a solemn treaty. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The case is made worse by the reflection that these methods of <br>
calculated brutality were designed by the Central Powers, not merely <br>
to crush to the dust those with whom they were at war, but to intimi- <br>
date those with whom they were still at peace. Belgium was not only <br>
a victim — it was an example. Neutrals were intended to note the out- <br>
rages which accompanied its conquest, the reign of terror which fol- <br>
lowed on its occupation, the deportation of a portion of its population, <br>
the cruel oppression of the remainder. And, lest the nations happily <br>
protected, either by British fleets or by their own, from German armies <br>
should suppose themselves safe from German methods, the submarine <br>
has (within its limits) assiduously imitated the barbarous practices of <br>
the sister service. The War Staffs of the Central Powers are well <br>
content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it.<br>
If, then, the Central Powers succeed, it will be to methods like these <br>
that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international <br>
relations be based on a peace thus obtained? Such a peace would <br>
represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and <br>
make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of all the methods on <br>
which civilization relies to eliminate the occasions of international dis- <br>
pute and to mitigate their ferocity. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking<br> 
the rights of one small State, and they gained their initial triumphs <br>
by violating the treaty-guarded territories of another. Are small <br>
States going to find in them their protectors or in treaties made <br>
by them a bulwark against aggression? Terrorism by land and sea <br>
will have proved itself the instrument of victory. Are the victors <br>
likely to abandon it on the appeal of neutrals? If existing treaties <br>
are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us? If <br>
the violations of the most fundamental canons of international law <br>
be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled <br>
nations labour to improve their code? None will profit by their rules <br>
but the criminals who break them. It is those who keep them that <br>
will suffer. <br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the <br>
desire of the President for peace, they do not believe that peace can be<br> 
durable if it be not based on the success of the Allied cause. For a <br>
durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are ful- <br>
filled. The first is that the existing causes of international unrest should <br>
be as far as possible removed or weakened. The second is that the <br>
aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers <br>
should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. The third is that <br>
behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for pre- <br>
venting or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction <br>
should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor. <br>
These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But we believe them <br>
to be in general harmony with the President's ideals, and we are confi- <br>
dent that none of them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace<br> 
be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as Europe is con- <br>
cerned) in the joint note. Therefore it is that this country has made, <br>
is making, and is prepared to make sacrifices of blood and treasure <br>
unparalleled in its history. It bears these heavy burdens, not merely <br>
that it may thus fulfil its treaty obligations, nor yet that it may secure<br> 
a barren triumph of one group of nations over another. It bears <br>
them because it firmly believes that on the success of the Allies depend <br>
the prospects of peaceful civilization and of those international reforms<br> 
which the best thinkers of the New World, as of the Old, dare to <br>
hope may follow on the cessation of our present calamities. <br>
I am, with great truth and respect, Sir, your Excellency's most <br>
obedient, humble servant, <br>

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.<br>

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<sup>1</sup><i>The Times</i>, London, January 18, 1917