Prince Lichnowsky's Mission to London, Memoirs
My Mission to London, 1912-14
by Prince Lichnowsky
In September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had only been at his post in London for a few months.His appointment, which no doubt was principally due to his age and the desire of his junior officer to go to London, was one of the many mistakes of our policy.
In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, he was too
old and too tired to adjust himself to the Anglo-Saxon world, which was
completely alien to him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a
diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he was at great pains to
convince the English of the harmlessness of our fleet, and naturally this
only produced the contrary effect.
Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. I had retired
to the country as a "Personalreferent" after many years of activity, there
being then no suitable post available for me. I passed my time between flax
and turnips, among horses and meadows, read extensively, and occasionally
published political essays.
Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen since I had left the
Embassy at Vienna with the rank of Envoy. That had been my last real
sphere of political activity, as in those days such activity was impossible
unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy chief in drafting his crotchety
orders with their crabbed instructions.
I do not know who was responsible for my being appointed to London.
It was certainly not due to H.M.alone. I was not one of his intimates, though
he was at all times gracious to me. I also know by experience that his
nominees generally met with successful opposition. Herr von Kiderlen had
really wanted to send Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately manifested
unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured to intimidate me by his
incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at that time kindly disposed
towards me, and had paid me a visit at Gratz only a short time before. I am
therefore inclined to think that they all agreed on me because no other
candidate as available at the moment. But for Baron Marschall's unexpected
death, I should no more have been called out of retirement then than at any
other time during all those previous years.
It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish better
relations with England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy had repeatedly shaken
confidence in our pacific intentions. At the very least, it had given rise to
the suspicion that we did not quite know what we wanted, or that it was our
object to keep Europe on the qui vive, and, when opportunity offered, to
humiliate France. An Austrian colleague, who had been in Paris for a long
time, said to me: "Whenever the French begin to forget about revanche, you
always remind them of it with a jack-boot."
After we had repulsed M. Delcasse's efforts to arrive at an
understanding with us about Morocco, and prior to that had formally
declared that we had no political interests there which conformed to the
traditions of the Bismarckian policy we suddenly discovered a second
Kruger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also, like the Boers, of the protection
of the mighty German Empire, with the same display and the same result;
both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as they were bound to do,
if we had not already made up our minds to embark on the world-war. The
distressing congress at Algeciras could not change this in any way, still less
the fall of M. Delcasse.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later the Anglo-
Japanese rapprochement.. In face of "the German Peril" all other differences
faded into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had
become apparent, and such a war could not, as in 1870, leave either Russia
or England unaffected.
The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown at Algeciras,
while that of the agreements arrived at there was demonstrated shortly
afterwards by the collapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not be
prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief gained ground
that our foreign policy was feeble and was giving way before the
"Encirclement" that high-sounding phrases were succeeded by
It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated as
a statesman, that he wound up our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as
they were the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, indeed, it was
necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir incident I will leave others to
say. It was jubilantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused all the more
disquiet in England because the Government were kept waiting for three
weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Lloyd George's speech, which
was meant as a warning to us, was the consequence. Before Delcasse's fall,
and before Algeciras, we might have had a harbour and territory on the
West Coast, but after those events it was impossible.
Sir Edward Grey's Programme
When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement over
Morocco had subsided, as an agreement with France had been reached in
Berlin. It is true that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required the
assurance of neutrality, instead of being content with a treaty securing us
against British attacks and attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward
Grey had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement with us, and
in the first place tried to do this in colonial and economic questions.
Conversations were in progress with the capable and business-like Envoy
von Kuhlmann concerning the renewal of the Portuguese colonial agreement
and Mesopotamia (Bagdad Railway), the unavowed object of which was to
divide both the colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence.
The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of
difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with
us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make
us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming
Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his
best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a network of treaties, which
would in the end no doubt have led to an agreement about the troublesome
question of naval armaments, to ensure the peace of the world, after our
previous policy had led to an association the Entente which represented a
mutual insurance against the risk of war.
This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering
with our existing friendship with France and Russia, which has no
aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to
arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany, "to
bring the two groups nearer."
As with us, there were two parties in England at that time the Optimists, who believed in an understanding, and the Pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war was inevitable.
The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane, and most
of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; also the leading Liberal papers,
such as the Westminster Gazette, Manchester Guardian, Daily Chronicle.
The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who
repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading Army men, like Lord Roberts,
who pointed out the necessity of universal military service ("The Writing on
the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe Press and the eminent English journalist
Mr. Garvin, of The Observer. During my period of office, however, they
abstained from all attacks, and maintained both personally and politically a
friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and
1911 had aroused in them the conviction that after all it would some day come
to war. Just as it is with us, the former are now being accused in England of
short-sightedness and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as the
The Albanian Question
The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey and thus to a defeat
for our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for a number of
years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there were two
ways in which we could deal with the inheritance: either we could declare
our complete disinterestedness with regard to the frontier delimitations and
leave the Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could support our "Allies" and
carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East, thus giving up the role of
From the very beginning I advocated the former course, but the
Foreign Office emphatically favoured the latter.
The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired the
establishment of an independent Albanian state, as the Austrians did not
want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did not
want the Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. As opposed
to this, Russia, as is known, was backing Serbia's wishes and France those
My advice was to treat this question as outside the scope of the
Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian claims. Without
our aid it would have been impossible to set up an independent Albania,
which, as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving; Serbia would
have extended to the sea, and the present world-war would have been
avoided. France and Italy would have quarrelled over Greece, and if the
Italians had not wanted to fight France unaided they would have been
compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north of Durazzo. The
greater part of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south are entirely so;
and during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations from principal towns
arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece. Even in present-day
Greece there are Albanian elements and the so-called Greek national dress is
of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Albanians, who are principally
Orthodox and Moslem, in the body of the Greek state was therefore the best
and most natural solution, if you left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and
Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons H.M. was also in favour of this
solution. When I supported this view in a letter to the monarch I received
agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of
being "an opponent of Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference
and direct correspondence.
The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance
We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition of pursuing a
Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have recognised our
mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the south with the Turks and
in the north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this policy,
upon which we had entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we had
actively pursued ever since was bound to lead in time to a conflict with
Russia and, to the world-war, more especially if the requisite cleverness
were lacking in high places. Instead of coming to terms with Russia on a
basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom even Petrograd did not wish
to eject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to our economic
interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia Minor into spheres
of influence while renouncing any intention of military or political
interference, it was our political ambition to dominate on the Bosphorus. In
Russia they began to think that the road to Constantinople and the
Mediterranean lay via Berlin. Instead of supporting the active development
of the Balkan States which, once liberated, are anything rather than
Russian, and with which our experiences had been very satisfactory we
took sides with the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.
The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy which
had forced Russia, our natural best friend and neighbour, into the arms of
France and England and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion was the
more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, which was the sole hypothesis
that justified a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of our calculations.
The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. Italy will
want our money and our tourists even after the war, with or without an
alliance. That this latter would fail us in case of war was patent beforehand.
Hence the alliance had no value. Austria needs protection in war, as in
peace, and has no other support. Her dependence on us is based on
political, national, and economic considerations, and is the greater the more
intimate our relations with Russia are. The Bosnian crisis taught us this.
Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted such a self-
confidant attitude towards us as Count Aehrenthal during the later years of
his life. If German policy is conducted on right lines, cultivating relations
with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, even
without an alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly conducted, then we are
dependent on Austria. Hence there was no reason for the alliance.
I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return the policy of
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable
there. Little as the Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to return
to a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine emperor at its head.
They are striving for a federation in Austria on national lines, a state of
things which would have even less chance of being realised within the
German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of Austria,
however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German Might and Culture,
and are well aware that Austria can never again be the leading Power. They
wish for as intimate a connection with the German Empire as possible, not for
an anti-German policy.
Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally changed in
Austria, as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a return to Great German
separatism and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with the former a
resuscitation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not to
be expected. By a federation with Austria, however, which resembles a big
Belgium, since its population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only
about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we
subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest thus espousing
Austria's quarrels ("d'epouser tes querelles d'Autriche").
Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the desires of our
ally; they were not only unnecessary but also dangerous, as they would lead
to a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Austrian
The development of the alliance, from a union formed on a single
hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into a general and unlimited
association, a pooling of interests in all spheres, was the best way of
producing that which diplomacy was designed to prevent war. Such an
"alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies of the
strong, young, rising communities in the Balkans, who were prepared to
turn to us and to open their markets to us.
The difference between the power of a Ruling House and a National
State, between dynastic and democratic ideas of government, had to be
decided, and as usual we were on the wrong side.
King Carol told one of our representatives that he had entered into
the alliance with us on the assumption that we retained the leadership; but if
this passed to Austria, that would alter the foundations of the relationship,
and under such circumstances he would not be able to go on with it.
Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic
interests, we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation.
Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown could
have been foreseen: Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied,
ending the most fatal of all mistakes with the great plunge on the Berchtold
The Conference of Ambassadors
Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir E. Grey
proposed an informal conversation to prevent the Balkan War developing into
a European one, after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak of the
war, to agree to the French proposal of a declaration of disinterestedness.
The British statesman from the very beginning took up the position that
England had no interest in Albania, and had no intention of going to war
over this question He merely wished to mediate between the two groups as an
"honest broker" and smooth over difficulties. He therefore by no means took
sides with the Entente, and during the eight months or so of the
negotiations his goodwill and his authoritative influence contributed in no
small degree to the attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting an
attitude similar to the English one, invariably took up the position which was
prescribed for us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple
Alliance n London; I was his "second." It was my duty to "support his
proposals. That clever and experienced man Count Szegyenyi was
conducting affairs in Berlin. His refrain was "Then the casus foederis will
arise," and when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion I was
severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It was also said that I had an
"hereditary weakness" the allusion being to my father.
On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy about Albania,
a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and also about the delimitation of
the frontiers of Albania while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the French
or Russian claims. He mostly supported our group in order not to give a
pretext like the one a dead Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus with his
assistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of Scutari again.
Otherwise this question would already have led to a world-war, as we should
certainly not have ventured to induce "our ally" to give way.
Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection; calm,
and tact. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a
formula for agreement which was to the point and was always accepted. His
personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.
As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged from one of
those trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia had been
obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position to
procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established as a vassal
state of Austria and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Hence this
conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in
1878 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although no German
interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate the mistake
of the Congress by the secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg
question; but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous path, upon
which we had once more entered in the Bosnian question, nor did we leave it
in time when it led to the precipice.
The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown
during the conference by attacks in the Russian Press against my Russian
colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his
German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend of
Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and
to me. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count
Benckendorff is endowed with a number of qualifications that distinguish a
good diplomat tact, polished manners, experience, courtesy, and a natural
eye for men and matters. He was always at pains to avoid a brusque
attitude, and was supported in this by England and France.
Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian feeling is very
anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong and influential pro-
German circles, but in general people are anti-Austrian."
It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie … outrance" (friendship for Austria through thick and thin) was hardly calculated to
loosen the Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!
The Balkan Conference
At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London and I
had occasion to come into contact with the leaders of the Balkan States. M.
Venizelos was certainly the most distinguished personality. At that time he
was anything rather than anti-German, and visited me several times; he was
especially fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle he even
wore it at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm and ways of a man
of the world secured him much sympathy. Next to him M. Daneff, at that
time Bulgarian Premier and confidant of Count Berchtold, played a great
part. He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic man, and it is
probably only due to the influence of his Vienna and Budapest friends, of
whose homage he often made fun, that he was induced to commit the folly of
entering upon the second Balkan War and of refusing Russian arbitration.
M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London an then visited me
regularly. I knew him from the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He
was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was endeavouring
to obtain concessions to Rumania from M. Daneff by means of negotiations,
in which he was assisted by the very able Rumanian Ambassador Misu. It is
known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the failure of these
negotiations. Count Berchtold (and we of course with him) was entirely on
Bulgaria's side otherwise by putting pressure on M. Daneff we might have
secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and placed her under an
obligation to us; she was finally estranged from the Central Powers by
Austria's attitude during and after the second Balkan War.
The Second Balkan War
The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War and the victory of
Serbia, with the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted a humiliation for
Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia seems to
have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The Italian revelations prove this,
and it may be assumed that Marquis San Giuliano, who described the
plan most aptly as a pericolosissima aventura, saved us from being involved
in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913.
Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna plan was
doubtless known in Petrograd. In any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at
Constanza as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on Serbia
would be a casus belli for Russia.
When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna in the spring of
1914 he said that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that there would soon
be war. As I, however, was always left in ignorance about important events
I considered this pessimism to be unfounded.
As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since the peace of
Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the treaty by her own
effort and was apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext. Vienna
statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. They were aware of
that, as they had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness. In fact,
Berlin was pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria."
Liman von Sanders
When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave,
the Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations
with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the
excitement there was in Petrograd over it: "I have never seen them so
I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert a
restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the dispute.
Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small
degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his
great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of in similar manner
when we wished to attain anything there, as our representative proved
himself quite useless for such a purpose.
During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "When
you want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I
appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you fail me."
The Colonial Treaty
The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in
establishing, not only with society and the most influential people like Sir E.
Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public at public dinners,
produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two countries. Sir
Edward honestly tried to confirm this rapprochement, and his intentions
were most apparent on two questions the Colonial and the Bagdad Railway
In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a secret agreement
dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic spheres of influence between
us and England. As the Government of Portugal had neither the power nor
the means to open up her extended possessions or to administer them
properly, she had already thought of selling them before and thus relieving
her financial bur dens. An agreement had been come to between us and
England which defined the interests of both parties, and which was of the
greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent on England, as is
On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity and
independence of the Portuguese State, and merely declared the intention of
being of financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Literally,
therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of
the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II and gave a
reciprocal territorial guarantee.
In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis Soveral, who was
presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty the so-
called Treaty of Windsor was concluded between England and Portugal in
1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always remained in force.
The object of negotiations between us and England, which had
commenced before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of
1898, as it had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards
geographical delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the
British Government I succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord
with our wishes and interests. The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of
longitude was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo State
from the south; we also acquired the valuable islands of San Thom‚ and
Principe, which are north of the Equator and therefore really in the French
sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to enter
strong but unavailing protests.
Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango
formed the border.
The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our
interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill
towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole,
as England hoped to divert the German development of strength from the
North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to
grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to
The British Government originally intended to include the Congo State
in the agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and
enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nominally in
view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we wished to be economical of
successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of its real though
unexpressed intention the later actual partition of the Portuguese
colonies the treaty in its new form showed marked improvements and
advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had been specified which
empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in the districts assigned
to us. These were couched in such a manner that it was really left to us to
decide when "vital" interests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely
dependent on England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good
relations with England in order to carry out our joint intentions at a later
date with English assent.
Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire
to respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished to invest
capital and asked for the support of the British Government in the district
assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this was completed and
signed, and by informing them that their enterprise belonged to our sphere
The agreement was practically completed at the time of the King's visit
to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a conference took place in Berlin under
the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I also took
part, and certain further wishes of ours were defined. On my return to
London I succeeded, with the assistance of Councillor of Legation von
Kuhlmann, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker, in having
our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agreement could be
paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by m in August, 1913, before I went on
But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented it being signed, and
I did not obtain the authorisation to' conclude it till a year later that is,
shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, never signed.
Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign if the agreement were published
together with those of 1898 and 1895. England had, as he said, no other
secret treaties beside these, and it was contrary to established principles to
keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not make any agreement
without publishing it. He was, however, willing to accede to our wishes with
regard to the time and manner of publication, provided that such publication
took place within one year from the date of signature.
At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused
increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, who acted
the part of Herr von Holstein, wanted the London post for himself, I was
informed that the publication would endanger our interests in the colonies,
as the Portuguese would then not give us any more concessions.
The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that
the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of Anglo-Portuguese relations,
were most probably just as well aware of the old agreement as of our new
arrangements, and that the influence which England possesses at Lisbon
renders their Government completely impotent in face of an Anglo-German
Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking the treaty. It
was suggested that the publication of the Treaty of Windsor, which had been
concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe though it was only a renewal
of the Treaty of Charles II., which had always remained in force might
endanger the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as a proof of British
hypocrisy and perfidy!
I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same
thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as other similar treaties, namely, that we
would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the inviolability of its
possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated discussions with Sir E. Grey, at
which he made many fresh suggestions for the publication, the Foreign
Office persisted in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen
that matters should be left as they were!
The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of
more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a
public success for me.
When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a dinner at the
Embassy in the spring of 19I4, the Minister for the Colonies told me that he
was placed in a difficult position, and did not know how to act. The present
position was intolerable he wished to safeguard our interests, but was in
doubt whether he should proceed o the terms of the old or the new treaty. It
was therefor urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle the
matter, which had dragged on for such a long time
In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions couched in
terms which showed more emotion than civility, telling me to abstain from
any further interference in the matter.
I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my
post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I had not lost faith in the
possibility of arriving at an understanding with those in authority, a
sinister mistake which was to take its revenge a few months late in such a
However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official
of the Empire, as he feared that I was aspiring to his post, yet I must in
justice to him say that during our last interview before the outbreak of war,
at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, he gave me his assent
for the signature and publication of the treaty. In spite of this it required
repeated applications on my part, which were supported by Herr Dr. Solf in
Berlin, before sanction was finally obtained at the end of July, 1914. As the
Serbian crisis at the time already imperilled the peace of Europe, the
completion of the treaty had to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices
of this war.
The Bagdad Treaty
At the same time I was negotiating in London, with the able support of
Herr von Kuhlmann, about the so-called Bagdad Treaty. The real object of
this was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this
term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey
also repeatedly stated that there were in existence no agreements with
France and Russia about the partition of Asia Minor.
In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all
economic questions concerning German undertakings were settled in the
main according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important
concession Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuation of the
railway as far as Basra. We had dropped this point in favour of the
connection to Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the terminal
point of the railway. An international commission was to regulate navigation
on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the harbour works at
Basra, and received rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto
had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.
By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included
within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to already existing British
navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox irrigation
works), as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway.
The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway were
recognised as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French, and
Armenia as the Russian. If both treaties were executed and published, an
agreement with England would be reached which would preclude all doubts
about the possibility of an "Anglo-German co-operation."
The Question of the Navy
The Naval question was and is the most delicate of all. It is not always
The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea the
development of the greatest military power of the Continent into the greatest
naval power as well was bound to be felt in England as at least
"inconvenient." There can be no doubt about this in any reasonable view. In
order to maintain her advantage and not to become dependent, in order to
secure the rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she is not to
starve, she was compelled to undertake armaments and expenditure which
weighed heavily on the taxpayer. England's international position would be
threatened, however, if our policy created the belief that warlike
developments might ensue a state of affairs which had almost been reached
during the time of the Morocco crises and the Bosnian problem.
Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet within its then
appointed limits, but it was certainly not welcome, and was one of the
causes though not the only cause and perhaps not the most important of her
adhesion to France and Russia; but on account of the fleet alone England
would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade,
which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war.
From the very beginning I maintained that, notwithstanding the fleet,
it would be possible to arrive at a friendly understanding and
rapprochement if we did not introduce a new Navy Bill and our policy were
indubitably pacific. I also avoided mention of the fleet and the word never
passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a
meeting of the Cabinet, "The present German Ambassador has never
mentioned the fleet to me."
During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the
Admiralty, proposed, as is known, the so called "Naval holiday" and
suggested for financial reasons, and probably also to meet the pacific wishes
of his party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially Sir E. Grey did not
support the proposal; he never mentioned it to me, but Mr. Churchill
repeatedly spoke to me about it.
I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication is
altogether foreign to English nature. It would have been a great success for
Mr. Churchill if he could have come before the country with reductions of
expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of armaments that weighed on
I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to agree to his
plan. What was to become of the workmen who were engaged for this
purpose, and what of the technical staff? Our Naval programme had been
decided on, and it would be difficult to alter it in any way. On the other
hand we had no intention of exceeding it. But he reverted to it again and
pointed out that the sums used for enormous armaments might better be
employed for other and useful purposes. I replied that this expenditure too
benefited our home industries.
Through interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal
private secretary, I managed to have the question removed from the agenda
without causing any ill feeling, although it was again referred to in
Parliament, and to prevent any official proposal being made. It was,
however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's and the Government's, and I think
that by entering upon his plan and the formula 16:10 for battleships we
might have given tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and
encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the Government) to
enter into closer relations with us.
But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding in
spite of the fleet and without a "Naval holiday." I had always regarded my
mission from this point of view, and I had also succeeded in realising my
plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I had achieved.
The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so much, is based on
a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a
commercial power after the war of 1870 and during the following decades
was a menace to British commercial circles which, with their industries and
export-houses, had held a virtual monopoly of trade. The increasing
commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as
regards British exports a fact to which I invariably referred in my public
speeches had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly
relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all
other considerations into the background.
The Briton is matter-of-fact he takes things as they are and does not
tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial circles I encountered the most
friendly spirit and the endeavour to further our common economic interests.
As a matter of fact nobody in them took any interest in the Russian, Italian,
Austrian, or even in the French representative, in spite of his striking
personality and his political successes. Only the German and American
Ambassadors attracted public attention.
In order to get into touch with important commercial circles, I
accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce, and from the
London and Bradford Chamber, and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle
and Liverpool. I was well received everywhere; Manchester, Glasgow. and
Edinburgh had also invited me, and I intended to go there later.
People who did not understand British conditions and did not realise
the importance of "public dinners," also people to whom my successes were
unwelcome, reproached me with having done harm with my speeches. I
believe on the contrary that by appearing in public and emphasising common
commercial interests I contributed in no small measure to the improvement of
relations, quite apart from the fact that it would have been clumsy and
churlish to refuse all invitations.
In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and
hearty co-operation at Court, in society, and from the Government.
The Court and Society
The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning man
with sound common sense; he demonstrated his goodwill towards me and was
frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although the British Constitution
leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the monarch, in virtue of
his position, can exercise a considerable influence on opinion both in society
and in the Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyramid; it sets
the fashion. Society, which is principally Unionist (Conservative), has
always taken an active interest in politics, a habit which the ladies share. It
is represented in the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and hence also
in the Cabinet. An Englishman either is a member of society, or he would
like to be one. It is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," and even
people of undistinguished origin, like Mr. Asquith, delight to mingle in
society and the company of beautiful and fashionable women.
The British gentlemen of both parties have the same education, go to
the same colleges and universities, have the same recreations golf, cricket,
lawn-tennis, or polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth;
they have the same habits of life, and spend the week-end in the country.
There is no social cleavage between the parties, but only a political one; in
recent years it has so far developed into a social cleavage that the politicians
of the two camps avoid social intercourse with or another. Even on the
neutral territory of an Embassy one did not venture to mingle the two
parties, as since the Veto and Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostracised
the Radicals. When the King and Queen dined with us a few months after my
arrival, Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner, as he did not wish to
remain together with Sir E. Grey. It is not a difference of caste or education
as in France; they are not two separate worlds, but the same world, and the
opinion about a foreigner is a common one, and not without influence on his
political position, whether Mr. Asquith be governing or Lord Lansdowne.
There has been no difference of caste in England since the time of the
Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig oligarchy, in contrast to the Tory
landed gentry encouraged the rise of an urban middle-class. It is rather a
difference of political opinions about questions of constitutional law and
taxation. Especially aristocrats like Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who
joined the people's party the Radicals were most hated by the Unionist
aristocracy; one never met any of these gentlemen at any of the great
aristocratic houses, except those of a few party friends.
We were received in London with open arms and both parties rivalled
one another in courtesy towards us. In view of the close relationship
between politics and society in England, it would be wrong to undervalue
social relations, even when the majority of the upper ten thousand are in
opposition to the Government.
There is not the same unbridgable gulf between Mr Asquith and the
Duke of Devonshire that there is between, say, M. Briand and the Duc de
Doudeauville. Certainly they do not consort together in times of great
tension; they belong to two separate social groups, but these are parts of
the same society, though of different grades, the centre of which is the
Court. They have common friends and habits of life; mostly they have
known each other from their youth up and also are frequently related to one
another either by blood or marriage.
Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George the man of the people, petty
attorney, and self-made man are the exception. Even Mr. Burns, the
Socialist Labour leader and self-educated man, sought contact with society.
In view of the prevailing attempt to rank as a gentleman, whose unattained
prototype is still the great aristocrat the value of the verdict of society and
its attitude must not be underestimated.
Hence the social adaptability of a representative nowhere plays a
greater role than in England. A hospitable house with pleasant hosts is
worth more than the most profound scientific knowledge; a savant with
provincial manners and small means would gain no influence, in spite of all
The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; he likes a good
Sir Edward Grey
Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign policy was almost
unlimited. On important occasions he used indeed to say, "I must first bring
it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed to his views. His authority
was undisputed. Although he does not know foreign countries at all, and
had never left England except for a short visit to Paris, he was fully
conversant with all the important questions owing to his long parliamentary
experience and his natural insight. He understands French, but does not
speak it. He was returned to Parliament as a young man, and soon began to
interest himself in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery he was Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and became Secretary of State in
1906, under Mr. Campbell Bannerman; he has now held the post for some ten
The scion of an old north country family, which had already furnished
Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the left wing of his party and
sympathised with Socialists and pacifists. You may call him a Socialist in the
ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his private life and lives very
simply and unpretentiously, although he has extensive means. Ostentation
is foreign to him. In London he only had a small house, and never gave
dinners, except the one official dinner at the Foreign Office on the King's
Birthday. On the few occasions when he entertained guests it was at a
simple dinner or lunch with maidservants to wait. Also he avoided large
functions and banquets.
Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends in the
country, but not with large or fashionable parties. He is mostly by himself
in his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks to study birds
and their ways, as he is a passionate lover of nature and an ornithologist.
Or sometimes he goes to his estate in the north, where he feeds the
squirrels that come in at the windows, and breeds different species of water
He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes to watch in their
breeding season the rare kinds of herons, which nest only there.
In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet player; now his
favourite pastime is salmon and trout fishing in Scottish rivers in company
with his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. "All the
rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has published a book on
On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him alone at Lord
Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle and returned to his
cottage about thirty miles distant in the same way.
The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the esteem even of
his opponents, who were to be found rather in the sphere of home affairs
than of foreign policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him.
His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and from whom he was
inseparable, died in consequence of being thrown from a trap she was
driving. As is generally known, one of his brothers was killed by a lion.
Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could quote much of his
The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a sense of
humour. Once when he was lunching with us and the children, and heard
them talking German, he said, "I can't help thinking how clever these
children are to talk German so well," and was pleased with his joke.
This is a true picture of the man who is decried as "Liar-Grey" and
instigator of the world-war.
Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. A jovial bon-
vivant, fond of the ladies, especially the young and pretty ones, he is
partial to cheerful society and good cooking; and his zest for enjoyment is
shared by his wife. Formerly a well-known barrister with a large income,
and for a number of years in Parliament, then a Minister under Mr.
Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and favouring an understanding
with Germany, he treated all questions with the cheery calm and assurance
of an experienced man of business, whose good health and excellent nerves
were steeled by devotion to the game of golf.
His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke German fluently.
In a short time we got on friendly terms with him and his family, and were
his guests in his small country house on the Thames.
Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign politics,
when important questions arose; then of course his decision was final.
During the critical day of July, Mrs. Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn
us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the tragic turn of events.
Mr. Asquith also, when I called on him on the 2nd August to make a last
effort in the direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, though
absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks.
Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two most influential men at
the Foreign Office after the Minister. The former was no friend of ours, but
his attitude towards me was absolutely correct and courteous. Our personal
relations were excellent. He too did not want war; but when we advanced
against France, he no doubt worked in the direction of an immediate
intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, with whom he
was in constant touch; also he wished to relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.
Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, had concluded
the treaty of 1907, which had enabled Russia again to turn her attention to
the West and to the Near East.
Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed far greater
influence than the Permanent Under Secretary. This highly intelligent man
had been at school in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but had
only been abroad for a short time. At first he favoured the anti-German
policy, which was then in fashion amongst the younger British diplomatists,
but later he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. He
influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he was very intimate, in this direction.
Since the outbreak of war he has left the Office and found a place in the
Home Office, probably because of the criticisms passed on him for his
Attitude of the German Foreign Office
Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London
successes and the position which I had managed to make for myself in a
short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render my office more
difficult. I was left in complete ignorance of the most important matters, and
was restricted to the communication of dull and unimportant reports. Secret
agents' reports on matters about which I could not learn without espionage
and the necessary funds, were never available to me; and it was not till the
last days of July, 1914, that I learnt, quite by chance, from the Naval
Attach‚ of the secret Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation
of the two fleets in case of war. The knowledge of other important events
which had been known to the Office for a long time, like the correspondence
between Grey and Cambon, was kept from me.
In Case of War
Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under no
circumstances had we to fear a British attack or British support for any
foreign attack, but that under any circumstances England would protect the
French. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, with minute proof andgreat emphasis, but did not obtain any credence, although Lord Haldane's
refusal to assent to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during the
Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications. In addition there were
the secret agreements which I have referred to, and which were known to
I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European
Powers, England as a commercial state would suffer enormously, and would
therefore do her best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she
would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France; because of the
necessity of maintaining the European balance of power and of preventing a
German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this shortly after my
arrival, and all the leading people had expressed themselves in the same
The Serbian Crisis
At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of the Emperor. A few
weeks prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an
honour which had not been conferred on any German Ambassador since Herr
von Bunsen. On board the Meteor we learned of the death of the Archduke.
H.M. regretted that his efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had
thus been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan of an active policy
against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt.
As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not
attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later on I could only
remark that amongst Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other
sentiments. On board the Meteor there was also an Austrian guest of the
Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He had remained in his cabin all the time
suffering from sea sickness, in spite of the splendid weather; but on
receiving the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured him.
On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told him that I
considered the state of our foreign relations very satisfactory, as we were
on better terms with England than we had been for a long time, whilst in
France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist Ministry.
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and
complained about Russian armaments. I sought to reassure him, emphasising
the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack
would never receive Anglo-French support, as both countries wanted peace.
Thereupon I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow,
and he told me that Russia was about to raise 9000,000 additional troops. His
language betrayed unmistakable annoyance with Russia, which was
"everywhere in our way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. Of
course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war; but I
learned that Herr von Tschirschky had been reprimanded because he
reported that he had counselled moderation towards Serbia in Vienna.
On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in
Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia in
order to put an end to an impossible situation.
I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance of the
news. I thought that nothing would come of it this time either, and that
matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now
regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I would not co-
operate in a policy of this kind.
Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference at
Potsdam on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry received the unqualified assent
of all the leading people, and with the rider that no harm would be done if a
war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the
Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Soon
afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about
all these matters.
At that time I received instructions to induce the British Press to
adopt a friendly attitude should Austria administer the coup de grace to the
"Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence to prevent
public opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If on remembered
England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed
sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent
furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi,
the probability that she would support the intended punitive expedition
against the murderers of the prince happened so remote, that I found myself
obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also warned them against the
whole plan, which I characterised as adventurous and dangerous, and
advised them to counsel the Austrians to moderation, as I did not believe
that the conflict could be localised.
Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready; there would
probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria the
more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness
and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia,
on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we must
just risk it.
In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports
from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under any circumstances,
and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I
hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E. Grey's
great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I
therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request
him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria, as seemed
likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria,
because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more
voices were heard insisting emphatically that, however much the crime
merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be
justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation.
When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception
of the Standard the ever-necessitous, which had apparently been bought by
Austria were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting
Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war indeed, "the world-war." The
British Fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review, was not
My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as
conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of the
Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the
Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, M. Pasitch had
really agreed to everything, except two points, about which, however, he
declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted the
war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and
the unprecedented Note would not have been answered.
Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed out
the conciliatory attitude of the Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we
discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula
acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal was
that a committee, consisting of Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself,
should semble under his presidency, and it would have been easy matter for
us to find an acceptable formula for points at issue, which mainly concerned
the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in
Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled at one or two
sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have
brought about relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved
our relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the
ground that otherwise there was danger of the world-war, through which we
stood to gain nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the
dignity of Austria we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters we left
these to our ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."
Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count
Berchtold to content himself with diplomatic success, and to accept the
Serbian reply. The hint was not given; on the contrary they urged in the
direction of war. It would have been such a splendid success.
After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We
insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown an
exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of
Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of
territory it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of vassalage, and that
Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer it.
The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under
any circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude, on a question
which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent requests
and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Czar's positively
humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings o the
Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were of no
avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be massacred.
The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only
that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with Sir
Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I
replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with
English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister
said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world
has ever seen."
After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count
Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the strong
man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after
Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in vain, with the
ultimatum and the declaration of war.
The English Declaration of War
Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe.
Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st August to tell me that
his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if France
did? I understood that we should then agree to spare France, but he had
meant that we should remain altogether neutral towards Russia also. That
was the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked me to call in
the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the
telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In the afternoon
however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and the possibility that we
and France might face one another in arms without attacking.
Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any
guarantee, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take
place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview,
made this report the foundation for far-reaching measures. Then there came
M. Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's telegram. The
waverers in the Cabinet excepting three members who resigned were
Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a
waiting attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I
heard from a private source. Even on the 1st August the King had give the
President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an
opponent in the telegram from Berlin announcing the imminent danger of
war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.
Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his
house. I had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he
would always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany."
Unfortunately this confidential interview was made public, and Herr von
Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last chance of gaining peace through
The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified and
calm. The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to
express his regrets at my departure and that he could not see me himself.
Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we were
leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to take leave.
A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was
drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing Sovereign. Such was the
end of my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British,
but by the wiles of our policy.
Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station in London. He
was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain
there, but he told the English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the
Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion that I realised
too late that there was no room for me in a system that for years had lived on
routine and traditions alone, and that only tolerated representatives who
reported what their superiors wished to read. Absence of prejudice and an
independent judgment are resented. Lack of ability and want of character
are praised and esteemed, while successes meet with disfavour and excite
I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, as I
realised that it was useless, and that my warnings were attributed to
"Austrophobia," to my id‚e fixe. In politics, which are neither acrobatics
nor a game, but the main business of the firm, there is no "phil" or
"phobe," but only the interest of the community. A policy, however, that is
based only on Austrians, Magyars and Turks must come into conflict with
Russia, and finally lead to a catastrophe.
In spite of former mistakes, all might still have be put right in July,
1914. An agreement with England had been arrived at. We ought to have
sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least of average political
capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither to control the
straits nor to strangle Serbia. "Lechez l'Autriche et nous lecherons les
Français" ("Drop Austria and we will drop the French"), M. Sazonow said
to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "Vous n'avez pas besoin de
suivre l'Autiche partout." ("You need not follow Austria everywhere").
We wanted neither wars nor alliances; we wanted only treaties that
would safeguard us and others, and secure our economic development,
which was without its like history. If Russia had been freed in the West, she
could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would have
been re-established automatically and without our intervention, and not less
certainly also the Russo-Japanese.
We could also have considered the question of the reduction of
armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian
complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of the German
Empire, without any alliance and especially without our seeking her good
graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation of Poland
and the destruction of Serbia although German interest demanded the exact
I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised.
That brought down vengeance on me, because it was a sin against the Holy
As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be made the
scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our Government had made itself
responsible against my advice and warnings.
The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters that I had
allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because, if he had not wanted
war, Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtale, whose reports could
be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account of his relationship.
He had conducted himself "magnificently," he was praised enthusiastically,
and I was blamed the more severely.
"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after
eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a British trick that I
had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told me that war would in any
case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have been ready; therefore it
was better now.
The Question of Responsibility
As is evident from all official publications and this is not refuted by
our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its
omissions, is a gravely self accusing document
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German
interests were not involved and the danger of a world-war must have been
known to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the Ultimatum is
2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 1914, when M.
Sazonow emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any attack on
Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia,
under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the
Ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could
easily have be reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content
himself with the Serbian reply.
3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms,
we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian
mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st July
we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged his word that he
would not order a man to march as long as negotiations were
proceeding thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful
In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole of
the civilised world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for the
world-war upon our shoulders.
The Enemy Point of View
Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will not
rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant menace to our
neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years' time they will
again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun and their
towns and villages destroyed? Have not they proved to be right who
declared that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the German
people that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loath it as an
evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the warrior caste, still rule
and form ideals and value not the civilian gentleman; that the love of the
duel which animates our academic youth still persists in those who control
the destinies of the people? Did not the Zaber incident and the parliamentary
discussions about it clearly demonstrate to foreign countries the value we
place on the rights and liberties of the citizen if these collide with questions
of military power?
That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of
Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of Euphorion:
Dream ye of peace ?
Dream he that will
War is the rallying cry! Victory is the refrain.
Militarism, which by rights is an education for the people and an
instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power
when the patriarchal absolutism of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an
attitude which a democracy, remote from military Junker influence, would
never have permitted.
So think our enemies, and so they must think when they see that, in
spite of capitalistic industrialisation and in spite of socialist organisation,
"the living are still ruled by the dead," as Friedrich Nietzsche says. The
principal war aim of our enemies, the democratisation of Germany, will be
Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he
avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised. He was content with
bloodless battles. After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished Christian,
Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius, and Augusta.
That did not suffice him. Gortschakow, who thought himself the greater,
had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the point of
war even by depriving him of his railway saloon. This gave rise to the
miserable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict with William, in which the
mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished by Alexander.
Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded on a
constitutional basis and not on an international one. They are all the more
questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant the Alliance to
take this form.
He always treated the English with forbearance; he knew that this was
wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old Queen Victoria, despite his
hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned Beaconsfield
and the worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; and even that strange
Gladstone, whom he did not like, really had nothing to complain about.
The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the
Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of London: but there
was yet time to turn back.
We were completely successful in achieving that which above all other
things should have been avoided the breach with Russia and England.
After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an
unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians,
Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear our enemies
down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the
occupied territory, the retention of which would in any event be a burden
and cause of weakness to us, and would involve the menace of further wars.
Therefore everything should be avoided which would make it more difficult
for those enemy groups who might possibly still be won over to the idea of a
peace by compromise to come to terms, viz., the British Radicals and the
Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view alone the Polish scheme is to
be condemned, as is also any infringement of Belgian rights, or the
execution of British citizens to say nothing of the insane U-boat plan.
"Our future lies on the water." Quite right; therefore it is not in
Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a return to the days of
the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and
Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake and
Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the Triple Alliance is a return to
the past, a turning aside from the future, from imperialism and a world
policy. "Middle Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages, Berlin-Bagdad is a
blind alley and not the way into the open country, to unlimited possibilities,
to the world mission of the German nation.
I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any
other state, but only of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to
divert us from our aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Continental
policy. It was not the German policy, but that of the Austrian Imperial
House. The Austrians had come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella under
the shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near East when they
And what must we expect as the result of this war of nations? The
United States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia and
Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will enter
into the same relations with the United Kingdom that their Latin sisters in
America maintain with the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate
them. France. exhausted by the war, will only attach herself still more
closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain continue to resist for long.
And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread and will carry
their customs with their frontiers, and the South will remain to the British.
The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russian and Japanese,
and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be
that of thought and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the soldier.
He made his appearance too late, and hi last chance of making good the past,
that of founding a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world-war.
For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the
plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the
expansion of Britondotm in British Imperialism.
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos