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<P ALIGN=CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">CHAPTER XIII</FONT>

<P ALIGN=CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">GERMANY'S FIRST PEACE DRIVES</FONT>

<br><br>THE Declaration of London was not the only problem that distracted
Page in these early months of the war. Washington's apparent determination
to make peace also added to his daily anxieties. That any attempt
to end hostilities should have distressed so peace-loving and
humanitarian a statesman as Page may seem surprising; it was,
however, for the very reason that he was a man of peace that these
Washington endeavours caused him endless worry. In Page's opinion
they indicated that President Wilson did not have an accurate
understanding of the war. The inspiring force back of them, as
the Ambassador well understood, was a panic-stricken Germany.
The real purpose was not a peace, but a truce; and the cause which
was to be advanced was not democracy but Prussian absolutism.
Between the Battle of the Marne and the sinking of the <I>Lusitania
</I>four attempts were made to end the war; all four were set
afoot by Germany. President Wilson was the man to whom the Germans
appealed to rescue them from their dilemma. It is no longer a
secret that the Germans at this time regarded their situation
as a tragic one; the success that they had anticipated for forty
years had proved to be a disaster. The attempt to repeat the great
episodes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, when Prussia had overwhelmed
Denmark, Austria, and France in three brief campaigns, had ignominiously
failed. Instead of beholding a conquered Europe at her feet, Germany
awoke from her illusion to find herself encompassed by a ring
of resolute and powerful foes. The fact that the British Empire,
with its immense resources, naval, military, and economic, was
now leading the alliance against them, convinced the most intelligent
Germans that the Fatherland was face to face with the greatest
crisis in its history.

<br><br>Peace now became the underground Germanic programme. Yet the
Germans did not have that inexorable respect for facts which would
have persuaded them to accept terms to which the Allies could
consent. The military oligarchy were thinking not so much of saving
the Fatherland as of saying themselves; a settlement which would
have been satisfactory to their enemies would have demanded concessions
which the German people, trained for forty years to expect an
unparalleled victory, would have regarded as a defeat. The collapse
of the militarists and of Hohenzollernism would have ensued. What
the German oligarchy desired was a peace which they could picture
to their deluded people as a triumph, one that would enable them
to extricate themselves at the smallest possible cost from what
seemed a desperate position, to escape the penalties of their
crimes, to emerge from their failure with a Germany still powerful,
both in economic resources and in arms, and to set to work again
industriously preparing for a renewal of the struggle at a more
favourable time. If negotiations resulted in such a truce, the
German purpose would be splendidly served; even if they failed,
however, the gain for Germany would still be great. Germany could
appear as the belligerent which desired peace and the Entente
could perhaps be manoeuvred into the position of the side responsible
for continuing the war. The consideration which was chiefly at
stake in these tortuous proceedings was public opinion in the
United States. Americans do not yet understand the extent to which
their country was regarded as the determining power. Both the
German and the British Foreign Offices clearly understood, in
August, 1914, that the United States, by throwing its support,
especially its economic support, to one side or the other, could
settle the result. Probably Germany grasped this point even more
clearly than did Great Britain, for, from the beginning, she constantly
nourished the hope that she could embroil the United States and
Great Britain---a calamity which would have given victory to the
German arms. In every German move there were thus several motives,
and one of the chief purposes of the subterranean campaigns which
she now started for peace was the desire of putting Britain in
the false light of prolonging the war for aggressive purposes,
and thus turning to herself that public opinion in this country
which was so outspoken on the side of the Allies. Such public
opinion, if it could be brought to regard Germany in a tolerant
spirit, could easily be fanned into a flame by the disputes over
blockades and shipping, and the power of the United States might
thus be used for the advancement of the Fatherland. On the other
hand, if Germany could obtain a peace which would show a profit
for her tremendous effort, then the negotiations would have accomplished
their purpose.

<br><br>Conditions at Washington favoured operations of this kind.
Secretary Bryan was an ultra-pacifist; like men of one idea, he
saw only the fact of a hideous war, and he was prepared to welcome
anything that would end hostilities. The cessation of bloodshed
was to him the great purpose to be attained: in the mind of Secretary
Bryan it was more important that the war should be stopped than
that the Allies should win. To President Wilson the European disaster
appeared to be merely a selfish struggle for power, in which both
sides were almost equally to blame. He never accepted Page's obvious
interpretation that the single cause was Germany's determination
to embark upon a war of world conquest. From the beginning, therefore,
Page saw that he would have great difficulty in preventing intervention
from Washington in the interest of Germany, yet this was another
great service to which he now unhesitatingly directed his efforts.

<br><br>The Ambassador was especially apprehensive of these peace moves
in the early days of September, when the victorious German armies
were marching on Paris. In London, as in most parts of the world,
the capture of the French capital was then regarded as inevitable.
September 3, 1914, was one of the darkest days in modern times.
The population of Paris was fleeing southward; the Government
had moved its headquarters to Bordeaux; and the moment seemed
to be at hand when the German Emperor would make his long anticipated
entry into the capital of France. It was under these circumstances
that the American Ambassador to Great Britain sent the following
message directly to the President:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To the President</FONT></I>
  <br><br>American Embassy, London,<BR>
  Sep. 3, 4 A. M.
  <br><br>Everybody in this city confidently believes that the Germans,
  if they capture Paris, will make a proposal for peace, and that
  the German Emperor will send you a message declaring that he
  is unwilling to shed another drop of blood. Any proposal that
  the Kaiser makes will be simply the proposal of a conqueror.
  His real purpose will be to preserve the Hohenzollern dynasty
  and the imperial bureaucracy. The prevailing English judgment
  is that, if Germany be permitted to stop hostilities, the war
  will have accomplished nothing. There is a determination here
  to destroy utterly the German bureaucracy, and Englishmen are
  prepared to sacrifice themselves to any extent in men and money.
  The preparations that are being made here are for a long war;
  as I read the disposition and the character of Englishmen they
  will not stop until they have accomplished their purpose. There
  is a general expression of hope in this country that neither
  the American Government nor the public opinion of our country
  will look upon any suggestion for peace as a serious one which
  does not aim, first of all, at the absolute destruction of the
  German bureaucracy.
  <br><br>From such facts as I can obtain, it seems clear to me that
  the opinion of Europe excluding of course, Germany---is rapidly
  solidifying into a severe condemnation of the German Empire.
  The profoundest moral judgment of the world is taking the strongest
  stand against Germany and German methods. Such incidents as the
  burning of Louvain and other places, the slaughter of civilian
  populations, the outrages against women and children---outrages
  of such a nature that they cannot be printed, but which form
  a matter of common conversation everywhere---have had the result
  of arousing Great Britain to a mood of the grimmest determination.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>PAGE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>This message had hardly reached Washington when the peace effort
of which it warned the President began to take practical form.
In properly estimating these manoeuvres it must be borne in mind
that German diplomacy always worked underground and that it approached
its negotiations in a way that would make the other side appear
as taking the initiative. This was a phase of German diplomatic
technique with which every European Foreign Office had long been
familiar. Count Bernstorff arrived in the United States from Germany
in the latter part of August, evidently with instructions from
his government to secure the intercession of the United States.
There were two unofficial men in New York who were ideally qualified
to serve the part of intermediaries. Mr. James Speyer had been
born in New York; he had received his education at Frankfort-on-the-Main,
Germany, and had spent his apprenticeship also in the family banking
house in that city. As the head of an American banking house with
important German affiliations, his interests and sympathies were
strong on the side of the Fatherland; indeed, he made no attempt
to conceal his strong pro-Germanism.

<br><br>Mr. Oscar S. Straus had been born in Germany; his father had
been a German revolutionist of 'Forty-eight; like Carl Schurz,
Abraham Jacobi, and Franz Sigel, he had come to America to escape
Prussian militarism and the Prussian autocracy, and his children
had been educated in a detestation of the things for which the
German Empire stood. Mr. Oscar Straus was only two years old when
he was brought to this country, and he had given the best evidences
of his Americanism in a distinguished public career. Three times
he had served the United States as Ambassador to Turkey; he had
filled the post of Secretary of Commerce and Labour in President
Roosevelt's cabinet, and had held other important public commissions.
Among his other activities, Mr. Straus had played an important
part in the peace movement of the preceding quarter of a century
and he had been a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague. Mr. Straus was on excellent terms with the German,
the British, and the French ambassadors at Washington. As far
back as 1888, when he was American Minister at Constantinople,
Bernstorff, then a youth, was an attach&eacute; at the German
Embassy; the young German was frequently at the American Legation
and used to remind Mr. Straus, whenever he met him in later years,
how pleasantly he remembered his hospitality. With Sir Cecil Spring
Rice, the British Ambassador, and M. Jules Jusserand, the French
Ambassador, Mr. Straus had also become friendly in Constantinople
and in Washington. This background, and Mr. Straus's well-known
pro-British sentiments, would have made him a desirable man to
act as a liaison agent between the Germans and the Allies, but
there were other reasons why this ex-ambassador would be useful
at this time. Mr. Straus had been in Europe at the outbreak of
the war; he had come into contact with the British statesmen in
those exciting early August days; in particular he had discussed
all phases of the conflict with Sir Edward Grey, and before leaving
England, he had given certain interviews which the British statesmen
declared had greatly helped their cause in the United States.
Of course, the German Government knew all about these activities.

<br><br>On September 4th, Mr. Straus arrived at New York on the <I>Mauretania.
</I>He had hardly reached this country when he was called upon
the telephone by Mr. Speyer, a friend of many years' standing.
Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, Mr. Speyer said, was
a guest at his country home, Waldheim, at Scarboro, on the Hudson;
Mr. Speyer was giving a small, informal dinner the next evening,
Saturday, September 5th, and he asked Mr. and Mrs. Straus to come.
The other important guests were Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, president
of the National City Bank, and Mrs. Vanderlip. Mr. Straus accepted
the invitation, mentally resolving that he would not discuss the
war himself, but merely listen. It would certainly have been a
difficult task for any man to avoid this subject on this particular
evening; the date was September 5th, the day when the German Army
suddenly stopped in its progress toward Paris, and began retreating,
the French and the British forces in pursuit. A few minutes before
Count Bernstorff sat down at Mr. Speyer's table, with Mr. Straus
opposite, he had learned that the magnificent enterprise which
Germany had planned for forty years had failed, and that his country
was facing a monstrous disaster. The Battle of the Marne was raging
in all its fury while this pacific conversation at Mr. Speyer's
house was taking place.

<br><br>Of course the war became the immediate topic of discussion.
Count Bernstorff at once plunged into the usual German point of
view---that Germany did not want war in the first place, that
the Entente had forced the issue, and the like.

<br><br>&quot;The Emperor and the German Government stood for peace,&quot;
he said.

<br><br>Naturally, a man who had spent a considerable part of his life
promoting the peace cause pricked up his ears at this statement.

<br><br>&quot;Does that sentiment still prevail in Germany?&quot; asked
Mr. Straus.

<br><br>&quot;Yes,&quot; replied the German Ambassador.

<br><br>&quot;Would your government entertain a proposal for mediation
now?&quot; asked Mr. Straus.

<br><br>&quot;Certainly,&quot; Bernstorff promptly replied. He hastened
to add, however, that he was speaking unofficially. He had had
no telegraphic communication from Berlin for five days, and therefore
could not definitely give the attitude of his government. But
he was quite sure that the Kaiser would be glad to have President
Wilson take steps to end the war.

<br><br>The possibility that he might play a part in bringing hostilities
to a close now occurred to Mr. Straus. He had come to the dinner
determined to avoid the subject altogether, but Count Bernstorff
had precipitated the issue in a way that left the American no
option. Certainly Mr. Straus would have been derelict if he had
not reported this conversation to the high quarters for which
Count Bernstorff had evidently intended it.

<br><br>&quot;That is a very important statement you have made, Mr.
Ambassador,&quot; said Mr. Straus, measuring every word. &quot;May
I make use of it?&quot;

<br><br>&quot; Yes.&quot;

<br><br>&quot;May I use it in any way I choose?&quot;

<br><br>&quot;You may,&quot; replied Bernstorff.

<br><br>Mr. Straus saw in this acquiescent mood a chance to appeal
directly to President Wilson.

<br><br>&quot;Do you object to my laying this matter before our government?&quot;

<br><br>&quot;No, I do not.&quot;

<br><br>Mr. Straus glanced at his watch; it was 10:15 o'clock.

<br><br>&quot;I think I shall go to Washington at once---this very
night. I can get the midnight train.&quot;

<br><br>Mr. Speyer, who has always maintained that this proceeding
was casual and in no way promoted by himself and Bernstorff, put
in a word of caution.

<br><br>&quot;I would sleep on it,&quot; he suggested.

<br><br>But, in a few moments, Mr. Straus was speeding in his automobile
through Westchester County in the direction of the Pennsylvania
Station. He caught the express, and, the next morning, which was
Sunday the sixth, he was laying the whole matter before Secretary
Bryan at the latter's house. Naturally, Mr. Bryan was overjoyed
at the news; he at once summoned Bernstorff from New York to Washington,
and went over the suggestion personally. The German Ambassador
repeated the statements which he had made to Mr. Straus---always
guardedly qualifying his remarks by saying that the proposal had
not come originally from him but from his American friend. Meanwhile
Mr. Bryan asked Mr. Straus to discuss the matter with the British
and French ambassadors.

<br><br>The meeting took place at the British Embassy. The two representatives
of the Entente, though only too glad to talk the matter over,
were more skeptical about the attitude of Bernstorff than Mr.
Bryan had been.

<br><br>&quot;Of course, Mr. Straus,&quot; said Sir Cecil Spring Rice,
&quot;you know that this dinner was arranged purposely so that
the German Ambassador could meet you?&quot;

<br><br>Mr. Straus demurred at this statement, but the Englishman smiled.

<br><br>&quot;Do you suppose,&quot; Sir Cecil asked, &quot;that any
ambassador would make such a statement as Bernstorff made to you
without instructions from his government?&quot;

<br><br>&quot;You and M.Jusserand, replied the American, &quot;have
devoted your whole lives to diplomacy with distinguished ability
and you can therefore answer that question better than I.&quot;

<br><br>&quot;I can assure you,&quot; replied M. Jusserand, &quot;that
no ambassador under the German system would dare for a moment
to make such a statement without being authorized to do so.&quot;

<br><br>&quot;The Germans,&quot; added Sir Cecil, &quot;have a way
of making such statements unofficially and then denying that they
have ever made them.&quot;

<br><br>Both the British and French ambassadors, however, thought that
the proposal should be seriously considered.

<br><br>&quot;If it holds out one chance in a hundred of lessening
the length of the war, we should entertain it,&quot; said Ambassador
Jusserand.

<br><br>&quot; I certainly hope that you will entertain it cordially,
&quot; said Mr. Straus.

<br><br>&quot;Not cordially---that is a little too strong.&quot;

<br><br>&quot;Well, sympathetically?&quot;

<br><br>&quot;Yes, sympathetically,&quot; said M. Jusserand, with a
smile.

<br><br>These facts were at once cabled to Page, who took the matter
up with Sir Edward Grey. A despatch from the latter to the British
Ambassador in Washington gives a splendid summary of the British
attitude on such approaches at this time.

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">Sir Edward Grey to Sir Cecil
  Spring Rice</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Foreign Office,<BR>
  September 9, 1914.
  <br><br>SIR:
  <br><br>The American Ambassador showed me to-day a communication that
  he had from Mr. Bryan. It was to the effect that Mr. Straus and
  Mr. Speyer had been talking with the German Ambassador, who had
  said that, though he was without instructions, he thought that
  Germany might be disposed to end the war by mediation. This had
  been repeated to Mr. Bryan, who had spoken to the German Ambassador,
  and had heard the same from him. Mr. Bryan had taken the matter
  up, and was asking direct whether the German Emperor would accept
  mediation if the other parties who were at war would do the same.
  <br><br>The American Ambassador said to me that this information gave
  him a little concern. He feared that, coming after the declaration
  that we had signed last week with France and Russia about carrying
  on the war in common,(<A NAME="n100"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#100">100</A>)
  the peace parties in the United States might be given the impression
  that Germany was in favour of peace, and that the responsibility
  for continuing the war was on others.
  <br><br>I said that the agreement that we had made with France and
  Russia was an obvious one; when three countries were at war on
  the same side, one of them could not honourably make special
  terms for itself and leave the others in the lurch. As to mediation,
  I was favourable to it in principle, but the real question was:
  On what terms could the war be ended? If the United States could
  devise anything that would bring this war to an end and prevent
  another such war being forced on Europe I should welcome the
  proposal.
  <br><br>The Ambassador said that before the war began I had made suggestions
  for avoiding it, and that these suggestions had been refused.
  <br><br>I said that this was so, but since the war began there were
  two further considerations to be borne in mind: We were fighting
  to save the west of Europe from being dominated by Prussian militarism;
  Germany had prepared to the day for this war, and we could not
  again have a great military power in the middle of Europe preparing
  war in this way and forcing it upon us; and the second thing
  was that cruel wrong had been done to Belgium, for which there
  should be some compensation. I had no indication whatever that
  Germany was prepared to make any reparation to Belgium, and,
  while repeating that in principle I was favourable to mediation,
  I could see nothing to do but to wait for the reply of the German
  Emperor to the question that Mr. Bryan had put to him and for
  the United States to ascertain on what terms Germany would make
  peace if the Emperor's reply was favourable to mediation.
  <br><br>The Ambassador made it quite clear that he regarded what the
  German Ambassador had said as a move in the game. He agreed with
  what I had said respecting terms of peace, and that there seemed
  no prospect at present of Germany being prepared to accept them.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>I am, &amp;c.,
    <br><br>E. GREY.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>A letter from Page to Colonel House gives Page's interpretation
of this negotiation:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>London, September 10, 1914.
  <br><br>MY DEAR HOUSE:
  <br><br>A rather serious situation has arisen: The Germans of course
  thought that they would take Paris. They were then going to propose
  a conqueror's terms of peace, which they knew would not be accepted.
  But they would use their so-called offer of peace purely for
  publicity purposes. They would say, &quot; See, men of the world,
  we want peace; we offer peace; the continuance of this awful
  war is not our doing.&quot; They are using Hearst for this purpose.
  I fear they are trying to use so good a man as Oscar Straus.
  They are fooling the Secretary.
  <br><br>Every nation was willing to accept Sir Edward Grey's proposals
  but Germany. She was bent on a war of conquest. Now she's likely
  to get licked---lock, stock and barrel. She is carrying on a
  propaganda and a publicity campaign all over the world. The Allies
  can't and won't accept any peace except on the condition that
  German militarism be uprooted. They are not going to live again
  under that awful shadow and fear. They say truly that life on
  such terms is not worth living. Moreover, if Germany should win
  the military control of Europe, she would soon---that same war-party---attack
  the United States. The war will not end until this condition
  can be imposed---that there shall be no more militarism.
  <br><br>But in the meantime, such men as Straus (a good fellow) may
  be able to let (by helping) the Germans appear to the Peace people
  as really desiring peace. Of course, what they want is to save
  their mutton.
  <br><br>And if we begin mediation talk now on that basis, we shall
  not be wanted when a real chance for mediation comes. If we are
  so silly as to play into the hands of the German-Hearst publicity
  bureau, our chance for real usefulness will be thrown away.
  <br><br>Put the President on his guard.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>In the latter part of the month came Germany's reply. One would
never suspect, when reading it, that Germany had played any part
in instigating the negotiation. The Kaiser repeated the old charges
that the Entente had forced the war on the Fatherland, that it
was now determined to annihilate the Central Powers and that consequently
there was no hope that the warring countries could agree upon
acceptable terms for ending the struggle.

<br><br>So ended Germany's first peace drive, and in the only possible
way that it could end. But the Washington administration continued
to be most friendly to mediation. A letter of Colonel House's,
dated October 4, 1914, possesses great historical importance.
It was written after a detailed discussion with President Wilson,
and it indicates not only the President's desire to bring the
struggle to a close, but it describes in some detail the principles
which the President then regarded as essential to a permanent
peace. It furnishes the central idea of the presidential policy
for the next four years; indeed, it contains the first statement
of that famous &quot;Article X&quot; of the Covenant of the League
of Nations which was Mr. Wilson's most important contribution
to that contentious document. This was the article which pledges
the League &quot;to respect and preserve as against external aggression
the territorial integrity and existing political independence&quot;
of all its members; it was the article which, more than any other,
made the League obnoxious to Americans, who interpreted it as
an attempt to involve them perpetually in the quarrels of Europe;
and it was the one section of the Treaty of Versailles which was
most responsible for the rejection of that document by the United
States Senate. There are other suggestions in Colonel House's
letter which apparently bore fruit in the League Covenant. It
is somewhat astonishing that a letter of Colonel House's, written
as far back as October 3, 1914, two months after the outbreak
of the war, should contain &quot;Article X&quot; as one of the
essential terms of peace, as well as other ideas afterward incorporated
in that document, accompanied by an injunction that Page should
present the suggestion to Sir Edward Grey:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>115 East 53rd Street,<BR>
  New York City.<BR>
  October 3rd, 1914.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>Frank [the Ambassador's son] has just come in and has given
  me your letter of September 22nd(<A NAME="n101"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#101">101</A>)
  which is of absorbing interest. You have never done anything
  better than this letter, and some day, when you give the word,
  it must be published. But in the meantime, it will repose in
  the safe deposit box along with your others and with those of
  our great President.
  <br><br>I have just returned from Washington where I was with the
  President for nearly four days. He is looking well and is well.
  Sometimes his spirits droop, but then again, he is his normal
  self.
  <br><br>Before I came from Prides(<A NAME="n102"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#102">102</A>)
  I was fearful lest Straus, Bernstorff, and others would drive
  the President into doing something unwise. I have always counselled
  him to remain quiet for the moment and let matters unfold themselves
  further. In the meantime, I have been conferring with Bernstorff,
  with Dumba,(<A NAME="n103"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#103">103</A>)
  and, of course, Spring Rice. The President now wants me to keep
  in touch with the situation, and I do not think there is any
  danger of any one on the outside injecting himself into it unless
  Mr. Bryan does something on his own initiative.
  <br><br>Both Bernstorff and Dumba say that their countries are ready
  for peace talks, but the difficulty is with England. Sir Cecil
  says their statements are made merely to place England in a false
  position.
  <br><br>The attitude, I think, for England to maintain is the one
  which she so ably put forth to the world. That is, peace must
  come only upon condition of disarmament and must be permanent.
  I have a feeling that Germany will soon be willing to discuss
  terms. I do not agree that Germany has to be completely crushed
  and that terms must be made either in Berlin or London. It is
  manifestly against England's interest and the interest of Europe
  generally for Russia to become the dominating military force
  in Europe, just as Germany was. The dislike which England has
  for Germany should not blind her to actual conditions. If Germany
  is crushed, England cannot solely write the terms of peace, but
  Russia's wishes must also largely prevail.
  <br><br>With Russia strong in militarism, there is no way by which
  she could be reached. Her government is so constituted that friendly
  conversations could not be had with her as they might be had
  even with such a power as Germany, and the world would look forward
  to another cataclysm and in the not too distant future.
  <br><br>When peace conversations begin, at best, they will probably
  continue many months before anything tangible comes from them.
  England and the Allies could readily stand on the general proposition
  that only enduring peace will satisfy them and I can see no insuperable
  obstacle in the way.
  <br><br>The Kaiser did not want war and was not responsible for it
  further than his lack of foresight which led him to build up
  a formidable engine of war which later dominated him. Peace cannot
  be made until the war party in Germany find that their ambitions
  cannot be realized, and this, I think, they are beginning to
  know.
  <br><br>When the war is ended and the necessary territorial alignments
  made, it seems to me, the best guaranty of peace could be brought
  by every nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity
  of every other nation.(<A NAME="n104"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#104">104</A>)
  By confining the manufacture of arms to the governments themselves
  and by permitting representatives of all nations to inspect,
  at any time, the works.(<A NAME="n105"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#105">105</A>)
  <br><br>Then, too, all sources of national irritation should be removed
  so what at first may be a sore spot cannot grow into a malignant
  disease.(<A NAME="n106"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#106">106</A>)
  It will not be too difficult, I think, to bring about an agreement
  that will insure permanent peace, provided all the nations of
  Europe are honest in their desire for it.
  <br><br>I am writing this to you with the President's knowledge and
  consent and with the thought that it will be conveyed to Sir
  Edward. There is a growing impatience in this country because
  of this war and there is constant pressure upon the President
  to use his influence to bring about normal conditions. He does
  not wish to do anything to irritate or offend any one of the
  belligerent nations, but he has an abiding faith in the efficacy
  of open and frank discussion between those that are now at war.
  <br><br>As far as I can see, no harm can be done by a dispassionate
  discussion at this stage, even though nothing comes of it. In
  a way, it is perhaps better that informal and unofficial conversations
  are begun and later the principals can take it up themselves.
  <br><br>I am sure that Sir Edward is too great a man to let any prejudices
  deter him from ending, as soon as possible, the infinite suffering
  that each day of war entails.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>It is apparent that the failure of this first attempt at mediation
discouraged neither Bernstorff nor the Washington administration.
Colonel House was constantly meeting the German and the British
Ambassadors; he was also, as his correspondence shows, in touch
with Zimmermann, the German Under Foreign Secretary. The German
desire for peace grew stronger in the autumn and winter of 1914-1915,
as the fact became more and more clear that Great Britain was
summoning all her resources for the greatest effort in her history,
as the stalemate on the Aisne more and more impressed upon the
German chieftains the impossibility of obtaining any decision
against the French Army, and as the Russians showed signs of great
recuperation after the disaster of Tannenberg. By December 4th
Washington had evidently made up its mind to move again.

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>115 East 53rd Street,<BR>
  New York City.<BR>
  December 4th, 1914.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>The President desires to start peace parleys at the very earliest
  moment, but he does not wish to offend the sensibilities of either
  side by making a proposal before the time is opportune. He is
  counting upon being given a hint, possibly through me, in an
  unofficial way, as to when a proffer from him will be acceptable.
  <br><br>Pressure is being brought upon him to offer his services again,
  for this country is suffering, like the rest of the neutral world,
  from the effects of the war, and our people are becoming restless.
  <br><br>Would you mind conveying this thought delicately to Sir Edward
  Grey and letting me know what he thinks?
  <br><br>Would the Allies consider parleys upon a basis of indemnity
  for Belgium and a cessation of militarism? If so, then something
  may be begun with the Dual Alliance.
  <br><br>I have been told that negotiations between Russia and Japan
  were carried on several months before they agreed to meet at
  Portsmouth. The havoc that is being wrought in human lives and
  treasure is too great to permit racial feeling or revenge to
  enter into the thoughts of those who govern the nations at war.
  <br><br>I stand ready to go to Germany at any moment in order to sound
  the temper of that government, and I would then go to England
  as I did last June.
  <br><br>This nation would not look with favour upon a policy that
  held nothing but the complete annihilation of the enemy.
  <br><br>Something must be done sometime, by somebody, to initiate
  a peace movement, and I can think of no way, at the moment, than
  the one suggested.
  <br><br>I will greatly appreciate your writing me fully and freely
  in regard to this phase of the situation.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>To this Page immediately replied:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>December 12th, 1914.
  <br><br>MY DEAR HOUSE:
  <br><br>The English rulers have no feeling of vengeance. I have never
  seen the slightest traces of that. But they are determined to
  secure future safety. They will not have this experience repeated
  if they can help it. They realize now that they have been living
  under a sort of fear---or dread---for ten years: they sometimes
  felt that it was bound to come some time and then at other times
  they could hardly believe it. And they will spend all the men
  and all the money they have rather than suffer that fear again
  or have that danger. Now, if anybody could fix a basis for the
  complete restoration of Belgium, so far as restoration is possible,
  and for the elimination of militarism, I am sure the <I>English
  </I>would talk on that basis.
  <br><br>But there are two difficulties---Russia wouldn't talk till
  she has Constantinople, and I haven't found anybody who can say
  exactly what you mean by the &quot;elimination of militarism.&quot;
  Disarmament? England will have her navy to protect her incoming
  bread and meat. How, then, can she say to Germany, &quot;You
  can't have an army&quot; ?
  <br><br>You say the Americans are becoming &quot;restless.&quot; The
  plain fact is that the English people, and especially the English
  military and naval people, don't care a fig what the Americans
  think and feel. They say, &quot;We're fighting their battle,
  too---the battle of democracy and freedom from bureaucracy---why
  don't they come and help us in our life-and-death struggle?&quot;
  I have a drawer full of letters saying this, not one of which
  I have ever answered. The official people never say that of course---nor
  the really responsible people, but a vast multitude of the public
  do. This feeling comes out even in the present military and naval
  rulers of this Kingdom---comes indirectly to me. A part of the
  public, then, and the military part of the Cabinet, don't longer
  care for American opinion and they resent even such a reference
  to peace as the President made in his Message to Congress.(<A
  NAME="n107"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#107">107</A>) But the
  civil part of the Cabinet and the responsible and better part
  of the public do care very much. The President's intimation about
  peace, however, got no real response here. They think he doesn't
  understand the meaning of the war. They don't want war; they
  are not a warlike people. They don't hate the Germans. There
  is no feeling of vengeance. They constantly say: &quot;Why do
  the Germans hate us? We don't hate them.&quot; But, since Germany
  set out to rule the world and to conquer Great Britain, they
  say, &quot;We'll all die first.&quot; That's &quot;all there
  is to it.&quot; And they will all die unless they can so fix
  things that this war cannot be repeated. Lady K------, as kindly
  an old lady as ever lived, said to me the other day: &quot;A
  great honour has come to us. Our son has been killed in battle,
  fighting for the safety of England.&quot;
  <br><br>Now, the question which nobody seems to be able to answer
  is this: How can the military party and the military spirit of
  Germany be prevented from continuing to prepare for the conquest
  of Great Britain and from going to work to try it again? That
  implies a change in the form, spirit, and control of the German
  Empire. If they keep up a great army, they will keep it up with
  that end more or less in view. If the military party keeps in
  power, they will try it again in twenty-five or forty years.
  This is all that the English care about or think about.
  <br><br>They don't see how it is to be done themselves. All they see
  yet is that they must show the Germans that they can't whip Great
  Britain. If England wins decisively the English hope that somehow
  the military party will be overthrown in Germany and that the
  Germans, under peaceful leadership, will go about their business---industrial,
  political, educational, etc.---and quit dreaming of and planning
  for universal empire and quit maintaining a great war-machine,
  which at some time, for some reason, must attack somebody to
  justify its existence. This makes it difficult for the English
  to make overtures to or to receive overtures from this military
  war-party which now is Germany. But, if it be possible so completely
  to whip the war party that it will somehow be thrown out of power
  at home---that's the only way they now see out of it. To patch
  up a peace, leaving the German war party in power, they think,
  would be only to invite another war.
  <br><br>If you can get over this point, you can bring the English
  around in ten minutes. But they are not going to take any chances
  on it. Read English history and English literature about the
  Spanish Armada or about Napoleon. They are acting those same
  scenes over again, having the same emotions, the same purpose:
  nobody must invade or threaten England. &quot;If they do, we'll
  spend the last man and the last shilling. We value,&quot; they
  say truly, &quot;the good-will and the friendship of the United
  States more than we value anything except our own freedom, but
  we'll risk even that rather than admit copper to Germany, because
  every pound of copper prolongs the war.&quot;
  <br><br>There you are. I've blinked myself blind and talked myself
  hoarse to men in authority---from Grey down---to see a way out---without
  keeping this intolerable slaughter up to the end. But they stand
  just where I tell you.
  <br><br>And the horror of it no man knows. The news is suppressed.
  Even those who see it and know it do not realize it. Four of
  the crack regiments of this kingdom ---regiments that contained
  the flower of the land and to which it was a distinction to belong---have
  been practically annihilated, one or two of them annihilated
  twice. Yet their ranks are filled up and you never hear a murmur.
  Presently it'll be true that hardly a title or an estate in England
  will go to its natural heir---the heir has been killed. Yet,
  not a murmur; for England is threatened with invasion. They'll
  all die first. It will presently be true that more men will have
  been killed in this war than were killed before in all the organized
  wars since the Christian era began. The English are willing and
  eager to stop it if things can be so fixed that there will be
  no military power in Europe that wishes or prepares to attack
  and invade England.
  <br><br>I've had many one-hour, two-hour, three-hour talks with Sir
  Edward Grey. He sees nothing further than I have written. He
  says to me often that if the United States could see its way
  to cease to protest against stopping war materials from getting
  into Germany, they could end the war more quickly---all this,
  of course, informally; and I say to him that the United States
  will consider any proposal you will make that does not infringe
  on a strict neutrality. Violate a rigid neutrality we will not
  do. And, of course, he does not ask that. I give him more trouble
  than all the other neutral Powers combined; they all say this.
  And, on the other side, his war-lord associates in the Cabinet
  make his way hard.
  <br><br>So it goes---God bless us, it's awful. I never get away from
  it---war, war, war every waking minute, and the worry of it;
  and I see no near end of it. I've had only one thoroughly satisfactory
  experience in a coon's age, and this was this: Two American ships
  were stopped the other day at Falmouth. I telegraphed the captains
  to come here to see me. I got the facts from them---all the facts.
  I telephoned Sir Edward that I wished to see him at once. I had
  him call in one of his ship-detaining committee. I put the facts
  on the table. I said, &quot;By what right, or theory of right,
  or on what excuse, are those ships stopped? They are engaged
  in neutral commerce. They fly the American flag.&quot; One of
  them was released that night---no more questions asked. The other
  was allowed to go after giving bond to return a lot of kerosene
  which was loaded at the bottom of the ship.
  <br><br>If I could get facts, I could do many things. The State Department
  telegraphs me merely what the shipper says----a partial statement.
  The British Government tells me (after infinite delay) another
  set of facts. The British Government says, &quot;We're sorry,
  but the Prize Court must decide.&quot; Our Government wires a
  dissertation on International Law---Protest, protest: (I've done
  nothing else since the world began!) One hour with a sensible
  ship captain does more than a month of cross-wrangling with Government
  Departments.
  <br><br>I am trying my best, God knows, to keep the way as smooth
  as possible; but neither government helps me. Our Government
  merely sends the shipper's ex-parte statement. This Government
  uses the Navy's excuse. . . .
  <br><br>At present, I can't for the life of me see a way to peace,
  for the one reason I have told you. The Germans wish to whip
  England, to invade England. They started with their army toward
  England. Till that happened England didn't have an army. But
  I see no human power that can give the English now what they
  are determined to have--safety for the future---till some radical
  change is made in the German system so that they will no longer
  have a war-party any more than England has a war-party. England
  surely has no wish to make conquest of Germany. If Germany will
  show that she has no wish to make conquest of England, the war
  would end tomorrow.
  <br><br>What impresses me through it all is the backwardness of all
  the Old World in realizing the true aims of government and the
  true methods. I can't see why any man who has hope for the progress
  of mankind should care to live anywhere in Europe. To me it is
  all infinitely sad. This dreadful war is a logical outcome of
  their condition, their thought, their backwardness. I think I
  shall never care to see the continent again, which of course
  is committing suicide and bankruptcy. When my natural term of
  service is done here, I shall go home with more joy than you
  can imagine. That's the only home for a man who wishes his horizon
  to continue to grow wider.
  <br><br>All this for you and me only---nobody else.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Heartily yours,
    <br><br>WALTER H. PAGE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>Probably Page thought that this statement of the case ---and
it was certainly a masterly statement---would end any attempt
to get what he regarded as an unsatisfactory and dangerous peace.
But President Wilson could not be deterred from pressing the issue.
His conviction was firm that this winter of 1914-1915 represented
the most opportune time to bring the warring nations to terms,
and it was a conviction from which he never departed. After the
sinking of the <I>Lusitania </I>the Administration gazed back
regretfully at its frustrated attempts of the preceding winter,
and it was inclined to place the responsibility for this failure
upon Great Britain and France. &quot;The President's judgment,&quot;
wrote Colonel House on August 4, 1915, three months after the
<I>Lusitania </I>went down, &quot;was that last autumn was the
time to discuss peace parleys, and we both saw present possibilities.
War is a great gamble at best, and there was too much at stake
in this one to take chances. I believe if one could have started
peace parleys in November, we could have forced the evacuation
of both France and Belgium, and finally forced a peace which would
have eliminated militarism on land and sea. The wishes of the
Allies were heeded with the result that the war has now fastened
itself upon the vitals of Europe and what the end may be is beyond
the knowledge of man.&quot;

<br><br>This shows that the efforts which the Administration was making
were not casual or faint-hearted, but that they represented a
most serious determination to bring hostilities to an end. This
letter and the correspondence which now took place with Page also
indicate the general terms upon which the Wilson Administration
believed that the mighty differences could be composed. The ideas
which Colonel House now set forth were probably more the President's
than his own; he was merely the intermediary in their transmission.
They emphasized Mr. Wilson's conviction that a decisive victory
on either side would be a misfortune for mankind. As early as
August, 1914, this was clearly the conviction that underlay all
others in the President's interpretation of events. His other
basic idea was that militarism should come to an end &quot;on
land and sea &quot;; this could mean nothing except that Germany
was expected to abandon its army and that Great Britain was to
abandon its navy.

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>115 East 53rd Street,<BR>
  New York City.<BR>
  January 4th, 1915.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>I believe the Dual Alliance is thoroughly ready for peace
  and I believe they would be willing to agree upon terms England
  would accept provided Russia and France could be satisfied.
  <br><br>They would, in my opinion, evacuate both Belgium and France
  and indemnify the former, and they would, I think, be willing
  to begin negotiations upon a basis looking to permanent peace.
  <br><br>It would surprise me if the Germans did not come out in the
  open soon and declare that they have always been for peace, that
  they are for peace now, and that they are willing to enter into
  a compact which would insure peace for all time; that they have
  been misrepresented and maligned and that they leave the entire
  responsibility for the continuation of the war with the Allies.
  <br><br>If they should do this, it would create a profound impression,
  and if it was not met with sympathy by the Allies, the neutral
  sentiment, which is now almost wholly against the Germans, would
  veer toward them.
  <br><br>Will you not convey this thought to Sir Edward and let me
  know what he says?
  <br><br>The President is willing and anxious for me to go to England
  and Germany as soon as there is anything tangible to go on, and
  whenever my presence will be welcome. The Germans have already
  indicated this feeling but I have not been able to get from Spring
  Rice any expression from his Government.
  <br><br>As I told you before, the President does not wish to offend
  the sensibilities of any one by premature action, but he is,
  of course, enormously interested in initiating at least tentative
  conversations.
  <br><br>Will you not advise me in regard to this?
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>.
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>115 East 53rd Street,<BR>
  New York City.<BR>
  January 18, 1915.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>The President has sent me a copy of your confidential dispatch
  No. 1474, January 15th.
  <br><br>The reason you had no information in regard to what General
  French mentioned was because no one knew of it outside of the
  President and myself and there was no safe way to inform you.
  <br><br>As a matter of fact, there has been no direct proposal made
  by anybody. I have had repeated informal talks with the different
  ambassadors and I have had direct communication with Zimmermann,
  which has led the President and me to believe that peace conversations
  may be now initiated in an unofficial way.
  <br><br>This is the purpose of my going over on the <I>Lusitania,
  </I>January 30th. When I reach London I will be guided by circumstances
  as to whether I shall go next to France or Germany.
  <br><br>The President and I find that we are going around in a circle
  in dealing with the representatives in Washington, and he thinks
  it advisable and necessary to reach the principals direct. When
  I explain just what is in the President's mind, I believe they
  will all feel that it was wise for me to come at this time.
  <br><br>I shall not write more fully for the reason I am to see you
  so soon.
  <br><br>I am sending this through the kindness of Sir Horace Plunkett.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>P. S. We shall probably say, for public consumption, that
  I am coming to look into relief measures, and see what further
  can be done. Of course, no one but you and Sir Edward must know
  the real purpose of my visit.</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>Why was Colonel House so confident that the Dual Alliance was
prepared at this time to discuss terms of peace? Colonel House,
as his letter shows, was in communication with Zimmermann, the
German Under Foreign Secretary. But a more important approach
had just been made, though information bearing on this had not
been sent to Page. The Kaiser had asked President Wilson to transmit
to Great Britain a suggestion for making peace on the basis of
surrendering Belgium and of paying for its restoration. It seems
incredible that the Ambassador should not have been told of this,
but Page learned of the proposal from Field Marshal French, then
commanding the British armies in the field, and this accounts
for Colonel House's explanation that, &quot;the reason you had
no information, in regard to what General French mentioned was
because no one knew of it outside of the President and myself
and there was no safe way to inform you.&quot; Page has left a
memorandum which explains the whole strange proceeding---a paper
which is interesting not only for its contents, but as an illustration
of the unofficial way in which diplomacy was conducted in Washington
at this time:

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>Field Marshal Sir John French, secretly at home from his command
  of the English forces in France, invited me to luncheon. There
  were his especially confidential friend Moore, the American who
  lives with him, and Sir John's private secretary. The military
  situation is this: a trench stalemate in France. Neither army
  has made appreciable progress in three months. Neither can advance
  without a great loss of men. Neither is whipped. Neither can
  conquer. It would require a million more men than the Allies
  can command and a very long time to drive the Germans back across
  Belgium. Presently, if the Russians succeed in driving the Germans
  back to German soil, there will be another trench stalemate there.
  Thus the war wears a practically endless outlook so far as military
  operations are concerned. Germany has plenty of men and plenty
  of food for a long struggle yet; and, if she use all the copper
  now in domestic use in the Empire, she will probably have also
  plenty of ammunition for a long struggle. She is not nearly at
  the end of her rope either in a military or an economic sense.
  <br><br>What then? The Allies are still stronger---so long as they
  hold together as one man. But is it reasonable to assume that
  they can? And, even if they can, is it worth while to win a complete
  victory at such a cost as the lives of practically all the able-bodied
  men in Europe? But can the Allies hold together as one man for
  two or three or four years? Well, what are we going to do? And
  here came the news of the lunch. General French informed me that
  the President had sent to England, at the request of the Kaiser,
  a proposal looking toward peace, Germany offering to give up
  Belgium and to pay for its restoration.
  <br><br>&quot;This,&quot; said Sir John, &quot;is their fourth proposal.&quot;
  <br><br>&quot;And,&quot; he went on, &quot;if they will restore Belgium
  and give Alsace-Lorraine to France and Constantinople will go
  to Russia, I can't see how we can refuse it.&quot;
  <br><br>He scouted the popular idea of &quot;crushing out militarism&quot;
  once for all. It would be desirable, even if it were not necessary,
  to leave Germany as a first-class power. We couldn't disarm her
  people forever. We've got to leave her and the rest to do what
  they think they must do; and we must arm ourselves the best we
  can against them.
  <br><br>Now---did General French send for me and tell me this just
  for fun and just because he likes me? He was very eager to know
  my opinion whether this peace offer were genuine or whether it
  was a trick of the Germans to publish it later and thereby to
  throw the blame for continuing the war on England?
  <br><br>It occurs to me as possible that he was directed to tell me
  what he told, trusting to me, in spite of his protestations of
  personal confidence, etc., to get it to the President. Assuming
  that the President sent the Kaiser's message to the King, this
  may be a suggested informal answer---that if the offer be extended
  to give France and Russia what they want, it will be considered,
  etc. This may or may not be true. Alas! the fact that I know
  nothing about the offer has no meaning; for the State Department
  never informs me of anything it takes up with the British Ambassador
  in Washington. Well, I'll see.</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>These were therefore the reasons why Colonel House had decided
to go to Europe and enter into peace negotiations with the warring
powers. Colonel House was wise in taking all possible precautions
to conceal the purpose of this visit. His letter intimates that
the German Government was eager to have him cross the ocean on
this particular mission; it discloses, on the other hand, that
the British Government regarded the proposed negotiations with
no enthusiasm. Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith would have been
glad to end hostilities on terms that would permanently establish
peace and abolish the vices which were responsible for the war,
and they were ready to welcome courteously the President's representative
and discuss the situation with him in a fair-minded spirit. But
they did not believe that such an enterprise could serve a useful
purpose. Possibly the military authorities, as General French's
remarks to Page may indicate, did not believe that either side
could win a decisive victory, but this was not the belief of the
British public itself. The atmosphere in England at that time
was one of confidence in the success of British arms and of suspicion
and distrust of the British Government. A strong expectation prevailed
in the popular mind, that the three great Powers of the Entente
would at an early date destroy the menace which had enshrouded
Europe for forty years, and there was no intention of giving Germany
a breathing spell during which she could regenerate her forces
to resume the onslaught.

<br><br>In the winter of 1915 Great Britain was preparing for the naval
attack on the Dardanelles, and its success was regarded as inevitable.
Page had an opportunity to observe the state of optimism which
prevailed in high British circles. In March of 1915 he was visiting
the Prime Minister at Walmer Castle; one afternoon Mr. Asquith
took him aside, informed him of the Dardanelles preparations and
declared that the Allies would have possession of Constantinople
in two weeks. The Prime Minister's attitude was not one of hope;
it was one of confidence. The capture of Constantinople, of course,
would have brought an early success to the allied army on all
fronts.(<A NAME="n108"></A>1<A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#108">08</A>)
This was the mood that was spurring on the British public to its
utmost exertions, and, with such a determination prevailing everywhere,
a step in the direction of peace was the last thing that the British
desired; such a step could have been interpreted only as an attempt
to deprive the Allies of their victory and as an effort to assist
Germany in escaping the consequences of her crimes. Combined with
this stout popular resolve, however, there was a lack of confidence
in the Asquith ministry. An impression was broadcast that it was
pacifist, even &quot;defeatist,&quot; in its thinking, and that
it harboured a weak humanitarianism which was disposed to look
gently even upon the behaviour of the Prussians. The masses suspected
that the ministry would welcome a peace with Germany which would
mean little more than a cessation of hostilities and which would
leave the great problems of the war unsolved. That this opinion
was unjust, that, on the contrary, the British Foreign Office
was steadily resisting all attempts to end the war on an unsatisfactory
basis, Page's correspondence, already quoted, abundantly proves,
but this unreasoning belief did prevail and it was an important
element in the situation. This is the reason why the British Cabinet
regarded Colonel House's visit at that time with positive alarm.
It feared that, should the purpose become known, the British public
and press would conclude that the Government had invited a peace
discussion. Had any such idea seized the popular mind in February
and March, 1915, a scandal would have developed which would probably
have caused the downfall of the Asquith Ministry. &quot;Don't
fool yourself about peace,&quot; Page writes to his son Arthur,
about this time. &quot;If any one should talk about peace, or
doves, or ploughshares here, they'd shoot him.&quot;

<br><br>Colonel House reached London early in February and was soon
in close consultation with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey.
He made a great personal success; the British statesmen gained
a high regard for his disinterestedness and his general desire
to serve the cause of decency among nations; but he made little
progress in his peace plans, simply because the facts were so
discouraging and so impregnable. Sir Edward repeated to him what
he had already said to Page many times: that Great Britain was
prepared to discuss a peace that would really safeguard the future
of Europe, but was not prepared to discuss one that would merely
reinstate the regime that had existed before 1914. The fact that
the Germans were not ready to accept such a peace made discussion
useless. Disappointed at this failure, Colonel House left for
Berlin. His letters to Page show that the British judgment of
Germany was not unjust and that the warnings which Page had sent
to Washington were based on facts:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America,<BR>
  Berlin, Germany,<BR>
  March 20, 1915.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>I arrived yesterday morning and I saw Zimmermann(<A NAME="n109"></A><A
  HREF="Pagenotes.htm#109">109</A>) almost immediately. He was
  very cordial and talked to me frankly and sensibly.
  <br><br>I tried to bring about a better feeling toward England, and
  told him how closely their interests touched at certain points.
  I also told him of the broad way in which Sir Edward was looking
  at the difficult problems that confronted Europe, and I expressed
  the hope that this view would be reciprocated elsewhere, so that,
  when the final settlement came, it could be made in a way that
  would be to the advantage of mankind.
  <br><br>The Chancellor is out of town for a few days and I shall see
  him when he returns. I shall also see Ballin, Von Gwinner, and
  many others. I had lunch yesterday with Baron von Wimpsch who
  is a very close friend of the Emperor.
  <br><br>Zimmermann said that it was impossible for them to make any
  peace overtures, and he gave me to understand that, for the moment,
  even what England would perhaps consent to now, could not be
  accepted by Germany, to say nothing of what France had in mind.
  <br><br>I shall hope to establish good relations here and then go
  somewhere and await further developments. I even doubt whether
  more can be done until some decisive military result is obtained
  by one or other of the belligerents.
  <br><br>I will write further if there is any change in the situation.
  I shall probably be here until at least the 27th.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>.
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America,<BR>
  Berlin, Germany.<BR>
  March 26, 1915.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>While I have accomplished here much that is of value, yet
  I leave sadly disappointed that no direct move can be made toward
  peace.
  <br><br>The Civil Government are ready, and upon terms that would
  at least make an opening. There is also a large number in military
  and naval circles that I believe would be glad to begin parleys,
  but the trouble is mainly with the people. It is a very dangerous
  thing to permit a people to be misled and their minds inflamed
  either by the press, by speeches, or otherwise.
  <br><br>In my opinion, no government could live here at this time
  if peace was proposed upon terms that would have any chance of
  acceptance. Those in civil authority that I have met are as reasonable
  and fair-minded as their counterparts in England or America,
  but, for the moment, they are impotent.
  <br><br>I hear on every side the old story that all Germany wants
  is a permanent guaranty of peace, so that she may proceed upon
  her industrial career undisturbed.
  <br><br>I have talked of the second convention,(<A NAME="n110"></A><A
  HREF="Pagenotes.htm#110">110</A>) and it has been cordially received,
  and there is a sentiment here, as well as elsewhere, to make
  settlement upon lines broad enough to prevent a recurrence of
  present conditions.
  <br><br>There is much to tell you verbally, which I prefer not to
  write.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>Colonel House's next letter is most important, for it records
the birth of that new idea which afterward became a ruling thought
with President Wilson and the cause of almost endless difficulties
in his dealings with Great Britain. The &quot;new phase of the
situation&quot; to which he refers is &quot;the Freedom of the
Seas&quot; and this brief note to Page, dated March 27, 1915,
contains the first reference to this idea on record. Indeed, it
is evident from the letter itself that Colonel House made this
notation the very day the plan occurred to him.

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Edward M. House</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America,<BR>
  Berlin, Germany.<BR>
  March 27, 1915.
  <br><br>DEAR PAGE:
  <br><br>I have had a most satisfactory talk with the Chancellor. After
  conferring with Stovall,(<A NAME="n111"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#111">111</A>)
  Page,(<A NAME="n112"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#112">112</A>)
  and Willard,(<A NAME="n113"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#113">113</A>)
  I shall return to Paris and then to London to discuss with Sir
  Edward a phase of the situation which promises results.
  <br><br>I did not think of it until to-day and have mentioned it to
  both the Chancellor and Zimmermann, who have received it cordially,
  and who join me in the belief that it may be the first thread
  to bridge the chasm.
  <br><br>I am writing hastily, for the pouch is waiting to be closed.
  <BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>Faithfully yours,
    <br><br>E. M. HOUSE.</BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>The &quot;freedom of the seas&quot; was merely a proposal to
make all merchant shipping, enemy and neutral, free from attack
in time of war. It would automatically have ended all blockades
and all interference with commerce. Germany would have been at
liberty to send all her merchant ships to sea for undisturbed
trade with all parts of the world in war time as in peace, and,
in future, navies would be used simply for fighting. Offensively,
their purpose would be to bombard enemy fortifications, to meet
enemy ships in battle, and to convoy ships which were transporting
troops for the invasion of enemy soil; defensively, their usefulness
would consist in protecting the homeland from such attacks and
such invasions. Perhaps an argument can be made for this new rule
of warfare, but it is at once apparent that it is the most startling
proposal brought forth in modern times in the direction of disarmament.
It meant that Great Britain should abandon that agency of warfare
with which she had destroyed Napoleon, and with which she expected
to destroy Germany in the prevailing struggle---the blockade.
From a defensive standpoint, Colonel House's proposed reform would
have been a great advantage to Britain, for an honourable observance
of the rule would have insured the British people its food supply
in wartime. With Great Britain, however, the blockade has been
historically an offensive measure: it is the way in which England
has always made war. Just what reception this idea would have
had with official London, in April, 1915, had Colonel House been
able to present it as his own proposal, is not clear, but the
Germans, with characteristic stupidity, prevented the American
from having a fair chance. The Berlin Foreign Office at once cabled
to Count Bernstorff and Bernhard Dernburg ---the latter a bovine
publicity agent who was then promoting the German cause in the
American press---with instructions to start a &quot;propaganda&quot;
in behalf of the &quot;freedom of the seas.&quot; By the time
Colonel House reached London, therefore, these four words had
been adorned with the Germanic label. British statesmen regarded
the suggestion as coming from Germany and not from America, and
the reception was worse than cold.

<br><br>And another horror now roughly interrupted President Wilson's
attempts at mediation. Page's letters have disclosed that he possessed
almost a clairvoyant faculty of foreseeing approaching events.
The letters of the latter part of April and of early May contain
many forebodings of tragedy. &quot;Peace? Lord knows when!&quot;
he writes to his son Arthur on May 2nd. &quot;The blowing up of
a liner with American passengers may be the prelude. I almost
expect such a thing.&quot; And again on the same date: &quot;If
a British liner full of American passengers be blown up, what
will Uncle Sam do? That's what's going to happen.&quot;

<br><br>&quot;We all have the feeling here,&quot; the Ambassador writes
on May 6th, &quot;that more and more frightful things are about
to happen.&quot;

<br><br>The ink on those words was scarcely dry when a message from
Queenstown was handed to the American Ambassador. A German submarine
had torpedoed and sunk the <I>Lusitania </I>off<I> </I>the Old
Head of Kinsale, and one hundred and twenty-four American men,
women, and children had been drowned.

<P ALIGN=CENTER><HR>

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br><FONT SIZE="+1"><IMG SRC="thumbnails/2b.gif" WIDTH="25" HEIGHT="24"
  ALIGN="MIDDLE" BORDER="0" ><A HREF="Page09.htm">Chapter
  Fourteen</A></FONT>
  <br><br><FONT SIZE="+1"><IMG SRC="thumbnails/2b.gif" WIDTH="25" HEIGHT="24"
  ALIGN="MIDDLE" BORDER="0" ><A HREF="PageTC.htm#TC">Table
  of Contents</A></FONT>
</BLOCKQUOTE>

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