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<center>[[Image: Walter_H._Page_Signature.gif]]</center> <br><br>

<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2" FACE="Times">CHAPTER XX</FONT></center><br><br>

<CENTER><FONT SIZE="+2">&quot;PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY &quot;</FONT></center>

<br><br>OF ONE thing I am sure,&quot; Page wrote to his wife from Washington,
while waiting to see President Wilson. &quot;We wish to come home
March 4th at midnight and to go about our proper business. There's
nothing here that I would for the world be mixed up with. As soon
as I can escape with dignity I shall make my bow and exit. . .
. But I am not unhappy or hopeless for the long run. They'll find
out the truth some day, paying, I fear, a heavy penalty for delay.
But the visit here has confirmed me in our previous conclusions---that
if we can carry the load until March 4th, midnight, we shall be
grateful that we have pulled through.&quot;

<br><br>Soon after President Wilson's reelection, therefore, Page sent
his resignation to Washington. The above quotation shows that
he intended this to be more than a &quot;courtesy resignation,&quot;
a term traditionally applied to the kind of leave-takings which
Ambassadors usually send on the formation of a new administration,
or at the beginning of a new Presidential term, for the purpose
of giving the President the opportunity of reorganizing his official
family. Page believed that his work in London had been finished,
that he had done everything in his power to make Mr. Wilson see
the situation in its true light and that he had not succeeded.
He therefore wished to give up his post and come home. This explains
the fact that his resignation did not consist of the half dozen
perfunctory fines which most diplomatic officers find sufficient
on such an occasion, but took the form of a review of the reasons
why the United States should align itself on the side of the Allies.

<br><br>.


<CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To the President</FONT></I></center>
<BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>London, November 24, 1916.
  <br><br>DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
  <br><br>We have all known for many years that the rich and populous
  and organized states in which the big cities are do not constitute
  the political United States. But, I confess, I hardly expected
  so soon to see this fact proclaimed at the ballot-box. To me
  that's the surprise of the election. And your popular majority
  as well as your clear majority in the Electoral College is a
  great personal triumph for you. And you have remade the ancient
  and demoralized Democratic party. Four years ago it consisted
  of a protest and of the wreck wrought by Mr. Bryan's long captaincy.
  This rebirth, with a popular majority, is an historical achievement---of
  your own.
  <br><br>You have relaid the foundation and reset the pillars of a
  party that may enjoy a long supremacy for domestic reasons. Now,
  if you will permit me to say so, from my somewhat distant view
  (four years make a long period of absence) the big party task
  is to build up a clearer and more positive foreign policy. We
  are in the world and we've got to choose what active part we
  shall play in it---I fear rather quickly, I have the conviction,
  as you know, that this whole round globe now hangs as a ripe
  apple for our plucking, if we use the right ladder while the
  chance lasts. I do not mean that we want or could get the apple
  for ourselves, but that we can see to it that it is put to proper
  uses. What we have to do, in my judgment, is to go back to our
  political fathers for our clue. If my longtime memory be good,
  they were sure that their establishment of a great free Republic
  would soon be imitated by European peoples---that democracies
  would take the place of autocracies in all so-called civilized
  countries; for that was the form that the fight took in their
  day against organized Privilege. But for one reason or another---in
  our life-time partly because we chose so completely to isolate
  ourselves---the democratic idea took root in Europe with disappointing
  slowness. It is, for instance, now perhaps for the first time,
  in a thorough-going way, within sight in this Kingdom. The dream
  of the American Fathers, therefore, is not yet come true. They
  fought against organized Privilege exerted from over the sea.
  In principle it is the same fight that we have made, in our domestic
  field, during recent decades. Now the same fight has come on
  a far larger scale than men ever dreamed of before.
  <br><br>It isn't, therefore, for merely doctrinal reasons that we
  are concerned for the spread of democracy nor merely because
  a democracy is the only scheme of organization yet wrought out
  that keeps the door of opportunity open and invites all men to
  their fullest development. But we are interested in it because
  under no other system can the world be made an even reasonably
  safe place to live in. For only autocracies wage aggressive wars.
  Aggressive autocracies, especially military autocracies, must
  be softened down by peace (and they have never been so softened)
  or destroyed by war. The All-Highest doctrine of Germany to-day
  is the same as the Taxation-without-Representation of George
  III---only more virulent, stronger, and farther-reaching. Only
  by its end can the German people recover and build up their character
  and take the permanent place in the world that they---thus changed---will
  be entitled to. They will either reduce Europe to the vassalage
  of a military autocracy, which may then overrun the whole world
  or drench it in blood, or they must through stages of Liberalism
  work their way toward some approach to a democracy; and there
  is no doubt which event is impending. The Liberal idea will win
  this struggle, and Europe will be out of danger of a general
  assault on free institutions till some other autocracy which
  has a military caste try the same Napoleonic game. The defeat
  of Germany, therefore, will make for the spread of the doctrine
  of our Fathers and our doctrine yet.
  <br><br>An interesting book might be made of concrete evidences of
  the natural antipathy that the present German autocracy has for
  successful democracy and hence for us. A new instance has just
  come to me. My son, Arthur, who succeeded to most of my activities
  at home, has been over here for a month and he has just come
  from a visit to France. In Paris he had a long conversation with
  Delcass&eacute;, who told him that the Kaiser himself once made
  a proposal to him to join in producing &quot;the complete isolation&quot;
  of the United States. What the Kaiser meant was that if the great
  Powers of Europe would hold off, he would put the Monroe Doctrine
  to the test and smash it.
  <br><br>The great tide of the world will, by reason of the war, now
  flow toward democracy---at present, alas! a tide of blood. For
  a century democracies and Liberal governments have kept themselves
  too much isolated, trusting prematurely and too simply to international
  law and treaties and Hague conventions. These things have never
  been respected, except as springes to catch woodcock, where the
  Divine Right held sway. The outgrowing or the overthrow of the
  Divine Right is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of
  international law and treaties.
  <br><br>It has seemed to me, looking at the subject only with reference
  to our country's duty and safety, that somehow and at some early
  time our championship of democracy must lead us to redeclare
  our faith and to show that we believe in our historic creed.
  Then we may escape falling away from the Liberal forces of the
  Old World and escape the suspicion of indifference to the great
  scheme of government which was set up by our fathers' giving
  their blood for it. I see no other way for us to take the best
  and biggest opportunity that has ever come to prove true to our
  faith as well as to secure our own safety and the safety of the
  world. Only some sort of active and open identification with
  the Allies can put us in effective protest against the assassins
  of the Armenians and the assassins of Belgium, Poland, and Serbia,
  and in a friendly attitude to the German people themselves, as
  distinguished from their military rulers. This is the attitude
  surely that our fathers would have wished us to take---and would
  have expected us to take---and that our children will be proud
  of us for taking; for it is our proper historic attitude, whether
  looked at from the past or looked back at from the future. There
  can be no historic approval of neutrality for years, while the
  world is bleeding to death.
  <br><br>The complete severance of relations, diplomatic at first and
  later possibly economic as well, with the Turks and the Germans,
  would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable
  treasure; for the moral effect of withdrawing even our formal
  approval of their conduct---at least our passive acquiescence---would
  be---that the Germans would see that practically all the Liberal
  world stands against their system, and the war would end before
  we should need to or could put an army in the field. The Liberal
  Germans are themselves beginning to see that it is not they,
  but the German system, that is the object of attack because it
  is <I>the </I>dangerous thing in the world. Maximilian Harden
  presents this view, in his Berlin paper. He says in effect that
  Germany must get rid of its predatory feudalism. That was all
  that was the matter with George III.
  <br><br>Among the practical results of such action by us would, I
  believe, be the following:
  <br><br>1. The early ending of the war and the saying of, perhaps,
  millions of lives and of incalculable treasure;
  <br><br>2. The establishment in Germany of some form of more liberal
  government;
  <br><br>3. A league to enforce peace, ready-made, under our guidance---i.e.,
  the Allies and ourselves;
  <br><br>4. The sympathetic cooperation and the moral force of every
  Allied Government in dealing with Mexico:
  <br><br>5. The acceptance---and even documentary approval of every
  Allied Government of the Monroe Doctrine;
  <br><br>6. The warding off and no doubt the final prevention of danger
  from Japan, and, most of all, the impressive and memorable spectacle
  of our Great Democracy thus putting an end to this colossal crime,
  merely from the impulse and necessity to keep our own ideals
  and to lead the world right on. We should do for Europe on a
  large scale essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale
  and thereby usher in a new era in human history.
  <br><br>I write thus freely, Mr. President, because at no time can
  I write in any other way and because I am sure that all these
  things can quickly be brought to pass under your strong leadership.
  The United States would stand, as no other nation has ever stood
  in the world-predominant and unselfish---on the highest ideals
  ever reached in human government. It is a vision as splendid
  as the Holy Grael. Nor have I a shadow of doubt of the eager
  and faithful following of our people, who would thereby reestablish
  once for all our weakened nationality. We are made of the stuff
  that our Fathers were made of.
  <br><br>And I write this now for the additional reason that I am within
  sight of the early end of my service here. When you called me
  I answered, not only because you did me great honour and laid
  a definite patriotic duty on me, but because also of my personal
  loyalty to you and my pride in helping forward the great principles
  in which we both believe. But I understood then (and I am sure
  the subject lay in your mind in the same way) that my service
  would be for four years at the most. I made all my arrangements,
  professional and domestic, on this supposition. I shall, therefore,
  be ready to lay down my work here on March 4th or as soon thereafter
  as meets your pleasure.
  <br><br>I am more than proud of the confidence that you have shown
  in me. To it I am indebted for the opportunity I have had to
  give such public service to my country as I could, as well as
  for the most profitable experience of my life. A proper and sympathetic
  understanding between the two English-speaking worlds seems to
  me the most important duty of far-seeing men in either country.
  It has taken such a profound hold on me that I shall, in whatever
  way I can, work for its complete realization as long as I can
  work for anything.</BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>I am, Mr. President, most faithfully and gratefully yours,
    <br><br>WALTER H. PAGE.</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>This letter was written at a time when President Wilson was
exerting his best energies to bring about peace. The Presidential
campaign had caused him to postpone these efforts, for he believed
that neither Germany nor Great Britain could take seriously the
activities of a President whose own political position was insecure.
At the time Page's letter was received, the President was thinking
only of a peace based upon a stalemate; it was then his apparent
conviction that both sides to the struggle were about equally
in the wrong and that a decisive victory of either would not be
a good thing for the world. Yet it is interesting to compare this
letter with the famous speech which the President made six months
afterward when he asked Congress to declare the existence of a
state of war with Germany. Practically all the important reasons
which Mr. Wilson then advanced for this declaration are found
in Page's letter of the preceding November. That autocracies are
a constant menace to world peace, that the United States owes
it to its democratic tradition to take up arms against the enemy
of free government, that in doing this, it was not making war
upon the German people, but upon its imperialistic masters---these
were the arguments which Page laid before the President in his
letter of resignation, and these were the leading ideas in Mr.
Wilson's address of April 2nd. There are even sentences in Page's
communication which seem to foreshadow Mr. Wilson's assertion
that &quot;The world must be made safe for democracy.&quot; It
is impossible to read this letter and not conclude that Page's
correspondence, irritating in its later phases as it may have
been, did not strongly influence Mr. Wilson in his thinking.

<br><br>On one point, indeed, Colonel House afterward called the Ambassador
to account. When America was preparing to raise armies by the
millions and to spend its treasure by the billions, he reminded
Page of his statement that the severance of diplomatic relations
&quot;would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable
treasure.&quot; Page's statement in this November letter merely
reiterated a conviction which for more than a year he had been
forcing upon the President and Colonel House---that the dismissal
of Bernstorff would not necessarily imply war with Germany, but
that it would in itself be enough to bring the war to an end.
On this point Page never changed his mind, as is evident from
the letter which he wrote to Colonel House when this matter was
called to his attention:

<br><br>.


<CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Edward M. House</FONT></I></center>
<BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>London, June 29, 1917.
  <br><br>MY DEAR HOUSE:
  <br><br>I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor
  on anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet
  I do think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and
  a half ago when I said that we could then have ended the war
  without any appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:
  <br><br>If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from
  reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then
  have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:
  <br><br>(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.
  <br><br>(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine
  fleet. She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.
  <br><br>(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she
  got food and oil; and continues to get it.
  <br><br>(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force
  and gave her more time, more armies for France and more supplies.
  Russian guns have been sold to the Germans.
  <br><br>If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would
  have been over before any of these things happened. This delay
  is what will cost us billions and billions and men and men.
  <br><br>And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period
  we were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which
  were in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are
  now eager to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend,
  and who was unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged
  to, was thrown out of office and his career ended because the
  blockade, owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough.
  Our delay caused his fall.
  <br><br>But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent
  material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were
  at work on them all the while and according to the best opinion
  here they continue to build them faster than the British destroy
  them; and the submarines are destroying more merchant ships than
  all the shipbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out.
  This is the most serious aspect of the war---by far the most
  serious. I am trying to get our Government to send over hundreds
  of improvised destroyers---armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral
  Sims and the British Admiralty have fears that unless such help
  come the full fruits of the war may never be gathered by the
  Allies---that some sort of a compromise peace may have to be
  made.
  <br><br>It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited
  after the <I>Lusitania </I>will prove to be the most costly year
  and a half in our history; and for once at least my old prophecy
  was quite a good guess. But that water has flowed over the dam
  and it is worth mentioning now only because you challenged me.
  . . .</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had
a curious history. It was practically a resignation and therefore
called for an immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge
its receipt. For two months the Ambassador was left in the dark
as to the attitude of Washington. Finally, in the latter part
of January, 1917, Page wrote urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him
to bring the matter to the President's attention. On February
5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was received. &quot;The President,&quot;
he said, &quot;under extreme pressure of the present situation,
has been unable to consider your communication in regard to your
resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes that, at
the present time, you will not press to be relieved from service;
that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal sacrifice,
but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in the
crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly
need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought
of resigning your post for the present.&quot;

<br><br>At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the
question. The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was
every likelihood that the country would soon be at war. Page would
have regarded his retirement at this crisis as little less than
the desertion of his post. Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted
the policy which the Ambassador had been urging for nearly two
years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any logical excuse that may
have existed for his resignation existed no longer. Mr. Wilson
had now adopted a course which Page could enthusiastically support.

<br><br>&quot;I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice&quot;---such
was his reply to Mr. Lansing---&quot;until after the end of the
war, and I am making my arrangements to stay for this period.&quot;

<br><br>The months that intervened between the Presidential election
and the declaration of war were especially difficult for the American
Embassy in London. Page had informed the President, in the course
of his interview of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain
regarded his efforts in the direction of peace; he had in fact
delivered a message from the Foreign Office that any Presidential
attempt to &quot;mediate&quot; would be rejected by the Allies.
Yet his earnest representation on this point had produced no effect
upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was bringing to bear
upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count Bernstorff's
memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed the
intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most startling
fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on
October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words,
that, unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the
German Government &quot;would be forced to regain the freedom
of action which it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th
last.&quot;<ref>"My Three Years in America," by Count Bernstorff, p. 294.</ref>
It is unlikely that the annals of diplomacy contain many documents
so cool and insolent as this one. It was a notification from the
Kaiser to the President that the so-called &quot;Sussex pledge&quot;
was not regarded as an unconditional one by the Imperial Government;
that it was given merely to furnish Mr. Wilson an opportunity
to bring the war to an end; and that unless the Presidential attempt
to accomplish this were successful, there would be a resumption
of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious developments
of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly because
the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his
proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously
and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign
against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December
6th, and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food
supplies, strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany,
with her characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own
open efforts would lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions.
At any rate, on December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing
to launch his own campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached
her enemies with a proposal for a peace conference. A few days
afterward Page, as the representative of Germany, called at the
Foreign Office to deliver the large white envelope which contained
the Kaiser's &quot;peace proposal.&quot; In delivering this to
Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign Secretary in the
temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the fact that
the American Government entirely disassociated itself from its
contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of &quot;German
Ambassador.&quot; Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil
Spring Rice, British Ambassador at Washington, tell the story
and also reveal that it was almost impossible for Page, even when
engaged in an official proceeding, to conceal his contempt for
the whole enterprise:

<br><br>.


<CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice</FONT></I></center>
<BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Foreign Office,<BR>
  December 18, 1916,
  <br><br>SIR:
  <br><br>The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented
  to me the German note containing what is called in it the &quot;offer
  of peace.&quot; He explained that he did so on instructions of
  his Government as representing the German Government, and not
  in any way as representing their own opinions. He also explained
  that the note must be regarded as coming from the four Central
  Powers, and as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who
  were represented by the United States.
  <br><br>He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined
  to leave me a copy of it. The first part of the telegram explained
  that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate
  a confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German
  note and that they would themselves have certain representations
  to make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged
  the closest consideration. The telegram went on to explain that
  the Government of the United States had had it in mind for some
  time past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations
  and humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were
  prompted by the Governments of the Central Powers. They wished
  us to understand that the note of the Central Powers created
  a good opportunity for making the American representations, but
  was not the cause of such representations being made.
  <br><br>I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such
  an important matter without consulting my colleagues.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  
<BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>I am, etc.,
    <br><br>ROBERT CECIL.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<br><br>.

<CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice</FONT></I></center>
<BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Foreign Office,<BR>
  19 December, 1916.
  <br><br>SIR:
  <br><br>The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.
  <br><br>I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were
  anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of
  our response to the German peace note.
  <br><br>He replied that he did not know, but he imagined it was to
  enable them to frame the representations of which he had spoken
  to me.
  <br><br>I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply,
  and that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all
  probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the
  German note. I thought it probable that we should express our
  view that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since
  it contained no specific proposals.
  <br><br>He said that he quite understood this, and that we should
  in fact reply that it was an offer &quot;to buy a pig in a poke&quot;
  which we were not prepared to accept. He added that he thought
  his Government would fully anticipate a reply in this sense,
  and he himself obviously approved it.
  <br><br>Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard
  people in London treating the German offer with derision, but
  that no doubt the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.
  <br><br>I said that it was certainly a serious thing, and no doubt
  would be treated seriously.
  <br><br>I asked him if he knew what would be contained in the proposed
  representations from his government.
  <br><br>He said that he did not; but as he understood that they were
  to be made to all the belligerents, he did not think that they
  could be much more than a pious aspiration for peace; since that
  was the only thing that was equally applicable to the Germans
  and to us.
  <br><br>As he was leaving he suggested that the German note might
  be published in our press.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  
<BLOCKQUOTE>
    <br><br>I am, etc.,
    <br><br>ROBERT CECIL.</BLOCKQUOTE>


<br><br>.

<br><br>This so-called German &quot;peace proposal&quot; began with
the statement that the war &quot;had been forced &quot; upon Germany,
contained the usual reference to the military might of the Central
Powers, and declared that the Fatherland was fighting for &quot;the
honour and liberty of national evolution.&quot; It is therefore
not surprising that Lord Robert received it somewhat sardonically,
especially as the communication contained no specific proposals,
but merely a vague suggestion of &quot;negotiations.&quot; But
another spectacular performance now drove the German manoeuvre
out of everybody's mind. That President Wilson resented this German
interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop
them, however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated
peace communication to all the warring Powers. His appeal took
the form of asking that they state the objects for which they
were fighting, the Presidential belief evidently being that, if
they did this, a common meeting ground might possibly be found.
The suggestion that the Allied war aims were not public property,
despite the fact that British statesmen had been broadly proclaiming
them for three years, caused a momentary irritation in England,
but this was not a serious matter, especially as the British Cabinet
quickly saw that this request gave them a position of advantage
over Germany, which had always refused to make public the terms
on which it would end the war. The main substance in this Presidential
approach, therefore, would have produced no ill-feeling; as usual,
it was a few parenthetical phrases---phrases which were not essential
to the main argument---which set the allied countries seething
with indignation. The President, this section of his note ran,
&quot;takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that
the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides
have in mind in this war, are virtually the same, as stated in
general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side
desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and
small states as secure against aggression and denial in the future
as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states
now at war.&quot; This idea was elaborated in several sentences
of a similar strain, the general purport of the whole passage
being that there was little to choose between the combatants,
inasmuch as both were apparently fighting for about the same things.
Mr. Wilson's purpose in this paragraph is not obscure; he was
making his long expected appearance as a mediator, and he evidently
believed that it was essential to this r&ocirc;le that he should
not seem to be prejudiced in favour of either side, but should
hold the balance impartially between them.

<br><br>It is true that a minute reading indicates that Mr. Wilson
was merely quoting, or attempting to paraphrase, the statements
of the leaders of both sides, but there is such a thing as quoting
with approval, and no explanation could convince the British public
that the ruler of the greatest neutral nation had not declared
that the Allies and the Central Powers stood morally upon the
same level. The popular indignation which this caused in Great
Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British authorities.
The publication of this note in the British press was withheld
for several hours, in order to give the Government an opportunity
to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it was
feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that
relations with the United States might be imperilled. The messages
which the London correspondents were permitted to send to the
United States were carefully censored for the same reason. The
dispatch sent by the Associated Press was the product of a long
struggle between the Foreign Office and its London correspondent.
The representatives spent half an hour considering whether the
American correspondents could cable their country that the note
had been received in England with &quot;surprise and irritation.&quot;
After much discussion it was decided that &quot;irritation&quot;
could not be used, and the message of the Associated Press, after
undergoing this careful editing by the Foreign Office, was a weak
and ridiculous description of the high state of excitement which
prevailed in Great Britain. The fact that the British Foreign
Office should have given all this trouble over the expressions
sent to American newspapers and should even have spent half an
hour debating whether a particular word should be used, almost
pathetically illustrates the great care taken by the British Government
not to influence American opinion against the Allies.

<br><br>The Government took the same precautions with its own press
in England. When the note was finally released the Foreign Office
explicitly directed the London newspapers to comment with the
utmost caution and in no case to question the President's sincerity.
Most of them acquiesced in these instructions by maintaining silence.
There was only one London newspaper, the <I>Westminster Gazelle,
</I>which made even a faint-hearted attempt to explain away the
President's statement. From the first day of the war the British
people had declared that President Wilson did not understand the
issues at stake; and they now declared that this note confirmed
their worst forebodings. The comments of the man-in-the-street
were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression
which Mr. Wilson's dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen
who had always been especially friendly to the United States and
who had even defended the President in previous crises. Lord Bryce,
who had accepted philosophically the Presidential statement that
the United States was not &quot;concerned with the causes&quot;
of the war, could not regard so indulgently this latest judgment.
of Great Britain and Germany. &quot;Bryce came to see me in a
state of great depression,&quot; wrote Page. &quot;He has sent
Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter.&quot; Northcliffe
commanded his newspapers, the <I>Times </I>and the <I>Daily Mail,
</I>to discuss the note in a judicial spirit, but he himself told
Mr. Page that &quot;everybody is as angry as hell.&quot; When
someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with Mr. Asquith,
he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture. &quot;Don't
talk to me about it,&quot; he said. &quot;It is most disheartening.&quot;
But the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was
King George. A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace
on December 21st gave Page a description of the royal distress.
The King, expressing his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should
think that Englishmen were fighting for the same things in this
war as the Germans, broke down.

<br><br>The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which
was opening before Europe at the moment when this Presidential
note added a new cause for general despondency. Rumania had collapsed,
the first inkling of the Russian revolution had been obtained,
the British well knew that the submarine warfare was to be resumed,
and British finances were also in a desperate plight. More and
more it was becoming evident to the British statesmen that they
needed the intervention of the United States. This is the reason
why they could not destroy the chances of American help by taking
official offense even at what Page, in a communication to the
Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call President Wilson's
&quot;insulting words&quot;; and hence their determination to
silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they
felt. Page's interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th,
while the Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses
the real emotions of Englishmen. Apparently Page's frank cables
concerning the reception of this paragraph had caused a certain
interest in the State Department; at least the Ambassador was
instructed to call at the Foreign Office and explain that the
interpretation which had been commonly put upon the President's
words was not the one which he had intended. At the same time
Page was instructed to request the British Foreign Office, in
case its reply were &quot;favourable,&quot; not to publish it,
but to communicate it secretly to the American Government. The
purpose of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the
President's plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany
likewise to display an acquiescent mood. The object of Page's
call was to present this disclaimer.

<br><br>Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the late Lord Salisbury, ---that
same Lord Salisbury whose combats with Secretary Blaine and Secretary
Olney form piquant chapters in British-American history---is one
of the most able and respected of British statesmen. In his earlier
life Lord Salisbury had been somewhat overbearing in his attitude
toward the United States; in his later years, however, perhaps
owing to the influence of his nephew, Mr. Balfour, his manner
had changed. In his attitude toward the United States Lord Robert
Cecil reflected only the later phases of his father's career.
To this country and to its peaceful ideals he had always been
extremely sympathetic, and to Page especially he had never manifested
anything but cordiality. Yet it was evident, as Page came into
his office this morning, that to Lord Robert, as to every member
of the Government, the President's note, with its equivocal phrases,
had been a terrible shock. His manner was extremely courteous,
as always, but he made no attempt to conceal his feelings. Ordinarily
Lord Robert did not wear his emotions on the surface; but he took
occasion on this visit to tell Page how greatly the President's
communication had grieved him.

<br><br>&quot;The President,&quot; he said, &quot;has seemed to pass
judgment on. the allied cause by putting it on the same level
as the German. I am deeply hurt.&quot;

<br><br>Page conveyed Mr. Lansing's message that no such inference
was justified. But this was not reassuring.

<br><br>&quot;Moreover,&quot; Lord Robert added, &quot;there is one
sentence in the note---that in which the President says that the
position of neutrals is becoming intolerable---that seems almost
a veiled threat.&quot;

<br><br>Page hastened to assure Lord Robert that no threat was intended.

<br><br>Lord Robert's manner became increasingly serious.

<br><br>&quot;There is nothing that the American Government or any
other human power can do,&quot; he remarked slowly and solemnly,
which will bring this war to a close before the Allies have spent
their utmost force to secure a victory. A failure to secure such
a victory will leave the world at the mercy of the most arrogant
and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been organized. It is
far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny than to
perish under its success.&quot;

<br><br>On any occasion Lord Robert is an impressive or at least a
striking and unusual figure; he is tall, lank, and ungainly, almost
Lincolnesque in the carelessness of his apparel and the exceeding
awkwardness of his postures and manners. His angular features,
sharp nose, pale face, and dark hair suggest the strain of ascetism,
almost of fanaticism, which runs in the present generation of
his family. And the deep sincerity and power of his words on this
occasion made an impression which Page never forgot; they transformed
the British statesman into an eloquent, almost an heroic figure.
If we are to understand the full tragedy of this moment we must
remember that, incredible as it now seems, there was a fear in
British officialdom that the United States might not only not
pursue a course favourable to the Allies, but that it might even
throw its support to Germany. The fear, of course, was baseless;
any suggestion of such a policy in the United States would have
destroyed any official who had brought it forward; but Lord Robert
knew and Page knew that there were insidious influences at work
at that time, both in the United States and in Great Britain,
which looked in this direction. A group of Americans, whom Page
used to refer to as &quot;peace spies,&quot; were associated with
English pacifists, for the purpose of bringing about peace on
almost any terms. These &quot;peace spies&quot; had worked out
a programme all their own. The purpose was to compel Great Britain
to accept the German terms for ending the war. Unless she did
accept them, then it was intended that the American Government
should place an embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs and munitions
to the Allies. There is little question that the United States,
by taking such action, could have ended the war almost instantaneously.
Should the food of her people and the great quantities of munitions
which were coming from this country be suddenly cut off, there
is little likelihood that Great Britain could have long survived.
The possibility that an embargo might shut out these supplies
had hung over the heads of British statesmen ever since the war
began; they knew that the possession of this mighty power made
the United States the potential dictator of events; and the fear
that it might be used had never ceased to influence their thoughts
or their actions. Even while this interview was taking place,
certain anti-British forces in the United States, such as Senator
Hoke Smith of Georgia, were urging action of this kind.

<br><br>&quot;I have always been almost a Pacifist,&quot; Lord Robert
continued. &quot;No man has ever hated war worse than I. No man
has ever had a more earnest faith that war can be abolished. But
European civilization has been murderously assaulted and there
is nothing now to do but to defeat this desperate enemy or to
perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United States understood
what is at stake.&quot;

<br><br>Lord Robert went on:

<br><br>&quot; I will go so far as to say that if the United States
will come into the war it will decide which will win, freedom
or organized tyranny. If the United States shall help the Germans,
civilization will perish and it will be necessary to build it
up slowly again---if indeed it will ever appear again. If the
United States will help the Allies, civilization will triumph.&quot;<ref>This narrative is based upon memoranda made by Page.</ref>
<br><br>As to the proposal that the British terms should be conveyed
confidentially to Mr. Wilson, Lord Robert said that that would
be a difficult thing to do. The President's note had been published,
and it therefore seemed necessary that the reply should also be
given to the press. This was the procedure that was ultimately
adopted.

<br><br>Startling as was the sensation caused by the President's December
note, it was mild compared with that which was now to come. Page
naturally sent prompt reports of all these conversations to the
President and likewise kept him completely informed as to the
state of public feeling, but his best exertions apparently did
not immediately affect the Wilson policy. The overwhelming fact
is that the President's mind was fixed on a determination to compel
the warring powers to make peace and in this way to keep the United
States out of the conflict. Even the disturbance caused by his
note of December 18th did not make him pause in this peace campaign.
To that note the British sent a manly and definite reply, drafted
by Mr. Balfour, giving in detail precisely the terms upon which
the Allies would compose their differences with the Central Powers.
The Germans sent a reply consisting of ten or a dozen lines, which
did not give their terms, but merely asked again for a conference.
Events were now moving with the utmost rapidity. On January 9th,
a council of German military chieftains was held at Pless; in
this it was decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.
On January 16th the Zimmermann-Mexico telegram was intercepted;
this informed Bernstorff, among other things, that this decision
had been made. On January 16th, at nine o'clock in the morning,
the American Embassy in London began receiving a long cipher despatch
from Washington. The preamble announced that the despatch contained
a copy of an address which the President proposed to deliver before
the Senate &quot;in a few days.&quot; Page was directed to have
copies of the address &quot;secretly prepared&quot; and to hand
them to the British Foreign Office and to newspapers of the type
of the <I>Nation, </I>the <I>Daily News, </I>and the <I>Manchester
Guardian---</I>all three newspapers well known for their Pacifist
tendencies. As the speech approached its end, this sentence appeared:
&quot;It must be a peace without victory.&quot; The words greatly
puzzled the secretary in charge, for they seemed almost meaningless.
Suspecting that an error had been made in transmission, the secretary
directed the code room to cable Washington for a verification
of the cipher groups. Very soon the answer was received; there
had been no mistake; the Presidential words were precisely those
which had been first received: &quot;Peace without victory.&quot;
The slips were then taken to Page, who read the document, especially
these fateful syllables, with a consternation which he made no
effort to conceal. He immediately wrote a cable to President Wilson,
telling him of the deplorable effect this sentence would produce
and imploring him to cut it out of his speech---with what success
the world now knows.

<br><br>An astonishing feature of this episode is that Page had recently
explained to the Foreign Office, in obedience to instructions
from Washington, that Mr. Wilson's December note should not be
interpreted as placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the
same moral level. Now Mr. Wilson, in this &quot;peace without
victory&quot; phrase, had repeated practically the same idea in
another form. On the day the speech was received at the Embassy,
about a week before it was delivered in the Senate, Page made
the following memorandum:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>The President's address to the Senate, which was received
  to-day (January 16th),<ref>It was delivered and published on January 22nd.</ref>shows that he thinks he can play peace-maker. He does not at
  all understand, (or, if he do, so much the worse for him) that
  the Entente Powers, especially Great Britain and France, cannot
  make &quot;peace without victory.&quot; If they do, they will
  become vassals of Germany. In a word, the President does not
  know the Germans; and he is, unconsciously, under their influence
  in his thought. His speech plays into their hands.
  <br><br>This address will give great offense in England, since it
  puts each side in the war on the same moral level.
  <br><br>I immediately saw the grave danger to our relations with Great
  Britain by the Peace-without-Victory plan; and I telegraphed
  the President, venturing to advise him to omit that phrase---with
  no result.</BLOCKQUOTE>

<br><br>.

<br><br>Afterward Page added this to the above:

<br><br>.

<BLOCKQUOTE>
  <br><br>Compare this Senate speech with his speech in April calling
  for war: Just when and how did the President come to see the
  true nature of the German? What made him change from Peace-Maker
  to War-Maker? The Zimmermann telegram, or the February U-boat
  renewal of warfare? Had he been so credulous as to believe the
  German promise? This promise had been continuously and repeatedly
  broken.
  <br><br>Or was it the pressure of public opinion, the growing impatience
  of the people that pushed him in?
  <br><br>This distressing peace-move---utterly out of touch with the
  facts of the origin of the war or of its conduct or of the mood
  and necessities of Great Britain---a remote, academic deliverance,
  while Great Britain and France were fighting for their very lives-made
  a profoundly dejected feeling; and it made my place and work
  more uncomfortable than ever. &quot;Peace without victory&quot;
  brought us to the very depths of European disfavour.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<hr>

<references/>

<hr>
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[[Main Page | WWI Document Archive]] > [[Diaries, Memorials, Personal Reminiscences]] > [[The_Life_and_Letters_of_Walter_H._Page|Walter H. Page]] > '''Chapter XX'''
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