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<br><br>THE United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany
on February 3, 1917. The occasion was a memorable one in the American
Embassy in London, not unrelieved by a touch of the ridiculous.
All day long a nervous and rather weary company had waited in
the Ambassador's room for the decisive word from Washington. Mr.
and Mrs. Page, Mr. and Mrs. Laughlin, Mr. Shoecraft, the Ambassador's
secretary, sat there hour after hour, hardly speaking to one another
in their tense excitement, waiting for the news that would inform
them that Bernstorff's course had been run and that their country
had taken its decision on the side of the Allies. Finally, at
nine o'clock in the evening, the front door bell rang. Mr. Shoecraft
excitedly left the room; half way downstairs he met Admiral William
Reginald Hall, the head of the British Naval Intelligence, who
was hurrying up to the Ambassador. Admiral Hall, as he spied Mr.
Shoecraft, stopped abruptly and uttered just two words:
<br><br>&quot;Thank God!&quot;
<br><br>He then went into the Ambassador's room and read a secret code
message which he had just received from Captain Gaunt, the British
naval attach&eacute; at Washington. It was as follows:
<br><br>&quot;Bernstorff has just been given his passports. I shall
probably get drunk to-night!&quot;
<br><br>It was in this way that Page first learned that the long tension
had passed.
<br><br>Page well understood that the dismissal of Bernstorff at that
time meant war with the Central Empires. Had this dismissal taken
place in 1915, after the sinking of the <I>Lusitania, </I>or in
1916, after the sinking of the Sussex, Page believed that a simple
break in relations would in itself have brought the war to an
early end. But by February, 1917, things had gone too far. For
Germany had now decided to stake everything upon the chance of
winning a quick victory with the submarine. Our policy had persuaded
the Kaiser's advisers that America would not intervene; and the
likelihood of rapidly starving Great Britain was so great---indeed
the Germans had reduced the situation to a mathematical calculation
of success---that an American declaration of war seemed to Berlin
to be a matter of no particular importance. The American Ambassador
in London regarded Bernstorff's dismissal much more seriously.
It justified the interpretations of events which he had been sending
to Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and others for nearly three years.
If Page had been inclined to take satisfaction in the fulfilment
of his own prophecies, Germany's disregard of her promises and
the American declaration of war would have seemed an ample justification
of his course as ambassador.
    <TD WIDTH="31%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page19tn.jpg" WIDTH="96"
      HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
    <TD WIDTH="69%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page20tn.jpg" WIDTH="112"
      HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
    <TD WIDTH="31%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
      19.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> Walter
      H. Page, at the time of America's entry into the war, April,
    <TD WIDTH="69%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
      20.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> Resolution
      passed by the two Houses of Parliament, April 18, 1917, on America's
      entry into the war</FONT></TD>
<br><br><FONT FACE="Times">But Page had little time for such vain communings.
&quot;All that water,&quot; as he now wrote, &quot;has flowed
over the dam.&quot; Occasionally his mind would revert to the
dreadful period of &quot;neutrality,&quot; but in the main his
activities, mental and physical, were devoted to the future. A
letter addressed to his son Arthur shows how quickly and how sympathetically
he was adjusting himself to the new prospect. His mind was now
occupied with ships, food, armies, warfare on submarines, and
the approaching resettlement of the world. How completely he foresaw
the part that the United States must play in the actual waging
of hostilities, and to what an extent he himself was responsible
for the policies that ultimately prevailed, appears in this letter:</FONT>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Arthur W. Page</FONT></I>
  <br><br>25 March, 1917, London.
  <br><br>DEAR ARTHUR:
  <br><br>It's very hard, not to say impossible, to write in these swiftly
  moving days. Anything written to-day is out of date to-morrow---even
  if it be not wrong to start with. The impression becomes stronger
  here every day that we shall go into the war &quot;with both
  feet&quot;---that the people have pushed the President over in
  spite of his vision of the Great Peacemaker, and that, being
  pushed over, his idea now will be to show how he led them into
  a glorious war in defense of democracy. That's my reading of
  the situation, and I hope I am not wrong. At any rate, ever since
  the call of Congress for April 2nd, I have been telegraphing
  tons of information and plans that can be of use only if we go
  to war. Habitually they never acknowledge the receipt of anything
  at Washington. I don't know, therefore, whether they like these
  pieces of information or not. I have my staff of twenty-five
  good men getting all sorts of warlike information; and I have
  just organized twenty-five or thirty more---the best business
  Americans in London---who are also at work. I am trying to get
  the Government at Washington to send over a committee of conference---a
  General, an Admiral, a Reserve Board man, etc., etc. If they
  do half the things that I recommend we'll be in at the final
  lickin' big, and will save our souls yet.
  <br><br>There's lots of human nature in this world. A note is now
  sometimes heard here in undertone (Northcliffe strikes it)---that
  they don't want the Americans in the war. This means that if
  we come in just as the Allies finish the job we'll get credit,
  in part, for the victory, which we did little to win! But that's
  a minor note. The great mass of people do want us in, quick,
  hard, and strong---our money and our guns and our ships.
  <br><br>A gift of a billion dollars(<A NAME="n165"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#165">165</A>)
  to France will fix Franco-American history all right for several
  centuries. Push it through. Such a gift could come to this Kingdom
  also but for the British stupidity about the Irish for three
  hundred years. A big loan to Great Britain at a low rate of interest
  will do the work here.
  <br><br>My mind keeps constantly on the effect of the war and especially
  of our action on our own country. Of course that is the most
  important end of the thing for us. I hope that
  <br><br>1. It will break up and tear away our isolation;
  <br><br>2. It will unhorse our cranks and soft-brains.
  <br><br>3. It will make us less promiscuously hospitable to every
  kind of immigrant;
  <br><br>4. It will reestablish in our minds and conscience and policy
  our true historic genesis, background, kindred, and destiny---i.
  e., kill the Irish and the German influence.
  <br><br>5. It will revive our real manhood---put the mollycoddles
  in disgrace, as idiots and dandies are;
  <br><br>6. It will make our politics frank and manly by restoring
  our true nationality;
  <br><br>7. It will make us again a great sea-faring people. It is
  this that has given Great Britain its long lead in the world;
  <br><br>8. Break up our feminized education---make a boy a vigorous
  animal and make our education rest on a wholesome physical basis;
  <br><br>9. Bring men of a higher type into our political life.
  <br><br>We need waking up and shaking up and invigorating as much
  as the Germans need taking down.
  <br><br>There is no danger of &quot;militarism&quot; in any harmful
  sense among any English race or in any democracy.
  <br><br>By George! all these things open an interesting outlook and
  series of tasks---don't they?
  <br><br>My staff and I are asking everybody what the Americans can
  best do to help the cause along. The views are not startling,
  but they are interesting.
  <br><br><I>Jellicoe: </I>More ships, merchant ships, any kind of ships,
  and take over the patrol of the American side of the Atlantic
  and release the British cruisers there.
  <br><br><I>Balfour: </I>American credits in the United States, big
  enough to keep up the rate of exchange.
  <br><br><I>Bonar Law: </I>Same thing.
  <br><br><I>The military men: </I>An expeditionary force, no matter
  how small, for the effect of the American Flag in Europe., If
  one regiment marched through London and Paris and took the Flag
  to the front, that would be worth the winning of a battle.
  <br><br>Think of the vast increase of territory and power Great Britain
  will have---her colonies drawn closer than ever, the German colonies,
  or most of them, taken over by her, Bagdad hers---what a way
  Germany chose to lessen the British Empire! And these gains of
  territory will be made, as most of her gains have been, not by
  any prearranged, set plan, but as by-products of action for some
  other purpose. The only people who have made a deliberate plan
  to conquer the earth---now living---are the Germans. And from
  first to last the additions to the British Empire have been made
  because she has been a first-class maritime power.
  <br><br>And that's the way she has made her trade and her money, too.
  <br><br>On top of this the President speculates about the danger of
  the white man losing his supremacy because a few million men
  get killed! The truth is every country that is playing a big
  part in the war was overpopulated. There will be a considerable
  productive loss because the killed men were, as a rule, the best
  men; but the white man's control of the world hasn't depended
  on any few million of males. This speculation is far up in the
  clouds. If Russia and Germany really be liberated from social
  and political and industrial autocracy, this liberation will
  bring into play far more power than all the men killed in the
  war could have had under the pre-war r&eacute;gime. I observe
  this with every year of my observation---there's no substitute
  for common-sense.
  <br><br>The big results of the war will, after all, be the freedom
  and the stimulation of men in these weary Old-World lands---in
  Russia, Germany itself, and in England. In five or ten years
  (or sooner, alas!) the dead will be forgotten.
  <br><br>If you wish to make a picture of the world as it will be when
  the war ends, you must conjure up such scenes as these---human
  bones along the Russian highways where the great retreat took
  place and all that such a sight denotes; Poland literally starved;
  Serbia, blasted and burned and starved; Armenia butchered; the
  horrible tragedy of Gallipoli, where the best soldiers in the
  world were sacrificed to politicians' policies; Austria and Germany
  starved and whipped but liberalized---perhaps no king in either
  country; Belgium---belgiumized; northern France the same and
  worse; more productive Frenchmen killed in proportion to the
  population perhaps than any other country will have lost; Great
  Britain---most of her best men gone or maimed; colossal debts;
  several Teutonic countries bankrupt; every atrocity conceivable
  committed somewhere---a hell-swept great continent having endured
  more suffering in three years than in the preceding three hundred.
  Then, ten years later, most of this suffering a mere memory;
  governments reorganized and liberalized; men made more efficient
  by this strenuous three years' work; the fields got back their
  bloom, and life going on much as it did before---with this chief
  difference---some kings have gone and many privileges have been
  abolished. The lessons are two---(1) that no government can successfully
  set out and conquer the world; and (2) that the hold that privilege
  holders acquire costs more to dislodge than any one could ever
  have guessed. That's the sum of it. Kings and privilege mongers,
  of course, have held the parts of the world separate from one
  another. They fatten on provincialism, which is mistaken for
  patriotism.. As they lose their grip, human sympathy has its
  natural play between nations, and civilization has a chance.
  With any Emperor of Germany left the war will have been half
  in vain.
  <br><br>If we (the U. S. A.) cultivate the manly qualities and throw
  off our cranks and read our own history and be true to our traditions
  and blood and get some political vigour; then if we emancipate
  ourselves from the isolation theory and from the landlubber theory---get
  into the world and build ships, ships, ships, ships, and run
  them to the ends of the seas, we can dominate the world in trade
  and in political thought.
  <br><br>You know I have moments when it occurs to me that perhaps
  I'd better give whatever working years I may have to telling
  this story---the story of the larger meaning of the war. There's
  no bigger theme---never was one so big.
    <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<br><br>On April 1st, the day before President Wilson made his great
address before Congress requesting that body to declare the existence
of a state of war with Germany, Page committed to paper a few
paragraphs which summed up his final judgment of President Wilson's
foreign policy for the preceding two and a half years.
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
  April 1, 1917.
  <br><br>In these last days, before the United States is forced into
  war---by the people's insistence---the preceding course of events
  becomes even clearer than it was before; and it has been as clear
  all the time as the nose on a man's face.
  <br><br>The President began by refusing to understand the meaning
  of the war. To him it seemed a quarrel to settle economic rivalries
  between Germany and England. He said to me last September(<A
  NAME="n166"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#166">166</A>) that there
  were many causes why Germany went to war. He showed a great degree
  of toleration for Germany; and he was, during the whole morning
  that I talked with him, complaining of England. The controversies
  we had with England were, of course, mere by-products of the
  conflict. But to him they seemed as important as the controversy
  we had with Germany. In the beginning he had made---as far as
  it was possible---neutrality a positive quality of mind. He would
  not move from that position.
  <br><br>That was his first error of judgment. And by insisting on
  this he soothed the people---sat them down in comfortable chairs
  and said, &quot;Now stay there.&quot; He really suppressed speech
  and thought.
  <br><br>The second error he made was in thinking that he could play
  a great part as peacemaker---come and give a blessing to these
  erring children. This was strong in his hopes and ambitions.
  There was a condescension in this attitude that was offensive.
  <br><br>He shut himself up with these two ideas and engaged in what
  he called &quot;thought.&quot; The air currents of the world
  never ventilated his mind.
  <br><br>This inactive position he has kept as long as public sentiment
  permitted. He seems no longer to regard himself nor to speak
  as a leader---only as the mouthpiece of public opinion after
  opinion has run over him.
  <br><br>He has not breathed a spirit into the people: he has encouraged
  them to supineness. He is <I>not </I>a leader, but rather a stubborn
  <br><br>And now events and the aroused people seem to have brought
  the President to the necessary point of action; and even now
  he may act timidly.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<br><br>&quot;One thing pleases me,&quot; Page wrote to his son Arthur,
I never lost faith in the American people. It is now clear that
I was right in feeling that they would have gladly come in any
time after the <I>Lusitania </I>crime, Middle West in the front,
and that the German hasn't made any real impression on the American
nation. He was made a bug-a-boo and worked for all he was worth
by Bernstorff; and that's the whole story. We are as Anglo-Saxon
as we ever were. If Hughes had had sense and courage enough to
say: 'I'm for war, war to save our honour and to save democracy,'
he would now be President. If Wilson had said that, Hughes would
have carried no important states in the Union. The suppressed
people would have risen to either of them. That's God's truth
as I believe it. The real United States is made up of you and
Frank and the Page boys at Aberdeen and of the 10,000,000 other
young fellows who are ready to do the job and who instinctively
see the whole truth of the situation. But of course what the people
would not have done under certain conditions---that water also
has flowed over the dam; and I mention it only because I have
resolutely kept my faith in the people and there has been nothing
in recent events that has shaken it.&quot;
<br><br>Two letters which Page wrote on this same April 1st are interesting
in that they outline almost completely the war policy that was
finally carried out:
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Frank N. Doubleday</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
  April 1, 1917.
  <br><br>DEAR EFFENDI:
  <br><br>Here's the programme:
  <br><br>(1) Our navy in immediate action in whatever way a conference
  with the British shows we can best help.
  <br><br>(2) A small expeditionary force to France immediately---as
  large as we can quickly make ready, if only 10,000 men---as proof
  that we are ready to do some fighting.
  <br><br>(3) A large expeditionary force as soon as the men can be
  organized and equipped. They can be trained into an effective
  army in France in about one fourth of the time that they could
  be trained anywhere else.
  <br><br>(4) A large loan to the Allies at a low rate of interest.
  <br><br>(5) Ships, ships, ships---troop ships, food ships, munition
  ships, auxiliary ships to the navy, wooden ships, steel ships,
  little ships, big ships, ships, ships, ships without number or
  <br><br>(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue involved in
  the war. Every social and political ideal that we stand for is
  at stake. If we value democracy in the world, this is the chance
  to further it or---to bring it into utter disrepute. After Russia
  must come Germany and Austria; and then the King-business will
  pretty nearly be put out of commission.
  <br><br>(7) We must go to war in dead earnest. We must sign the Allies'
  agreement not to make a separate peace, and we must stay in to
  the end. Then the end will be very greatly hastened.
  <br><br>It's been four years ago to-day since I was first asked to
  come here. God knows I've done my poor best to save our country
  and to help. It'll be four years in the middle of May since I
  sailed. I shall still do my best. I'll not be able to start back
  by May 15th, but I have a feeling, if we do our whole duty in
  the United States, that the end may not be very many months off.
  And how long off it may be may depend to a considerable degree
  on our action.
  <br><br>We are faring very well on army rations. None of us will live
  to see another time when so many big things are at stake nor
  another time when our country can play so large or important
  a part in saying the world. Hold up your end. I'm doing my best
  <br><br>I think of you engaged in the peaceful work of instructing
  the people, and I think of the garden and crocuses and the smell
  of early spring in the air and the earth and push on; I'll be
  with you before we grow much older or get much grayer; and a
  great and prosperous and peaceful time will lie before us. Pity
  me and hold up your end for real American participation. Get
  together? Yes; but the way to get together is to get in!
    <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To David F. Houston</FONT></I>(<A
  NAME="n167"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#167">167</A>)
  <br><br>Embassy of the United States of America, <BR>
  April 1, 1917.
  <br><br>DEAR HOUSTON:
  <br><br>The Administration can save itself from becoming a black blot
  on American history only by vigorous action---acts such as these:
  <br><br>Putting our navy to work---vigorous work---wherever and however
  is wisest. I have received the Government's promise to send an
  Admiral here at once for a conference. We must work out with
  the British Navy a programme whereby we can best help; and we
  must carry it without hesitancy or delay.
  <br><br>Sending over an expeditionary military force immediately---a
  small one, but as large as we can, as an earnest of a larger
  one to come. This immediate small one will have a good moral
  effect; and we need all the moral reinstatement that we can get
  in the estimation of the world; our moral stock is lower than,
  I fear, any of you at home can possibly realize. As for a larger
  expeditionary force later---even that ought to be sent quite
  early. It can and must spend some time in training in France,
  whatever its training beforehand may have been. All the military
  men agree that soldiers in France back of the line can be trained
  in at least half the time that they can be trained anywhere else.
  The officers at once take their turn in the trenches, and the
  progress that they and their men make in close proximity to the
  fighting is one of the remarkable discoveries of the war. The
  British Army was so trained and all the colonial forces. Two
  or three or four hundred thousand Americans could be sent over
  as soon almost as they are organized and equipped---provided
  transports and a continuous supply of food and munition ships
  can be got. They can be trained into fighting men---into an effective
  army---in about one third of the time that would be required
  at home.
  <br><br>I suppose, of course, we shall make at once a large loan to
  the Allies at a low rate of interest. That is most important,
  but that alone will not save us. We must also <I>fight.</I>
  <br><br>All the ships we can get---build, requisition, or confiscate---are
  needed immediately
  <br><br>Navy, army, money, ships---these are the first things, but
  by no means all. We must make some expression of a conviction
  that there is a moral question of right and wrong involved in
  this war---a question of humanity, a question of democracy. So
  far we have (officially) spoken only of the wrongs done to our
  ships and citizens. Deep wrongs have been done to all our moral
  ideas, to our ideals. We have sunk very low in European opinion
  because we do not seem to know even yet that a German victory
  would be less desirable than (say) a Zulu victory of the world.
  <br><br>We must go in with the Allies, not begin a mere single fight
  against submarines. We must sign the pact of London---not make
  a separate peace.
  <br><br>We mustn't longer spin dreams about peace, nor leagues to
  enforce peace, nor the Freedom of the Seas. These things are
  mere intellectual diversions of minds out of contact with realities.
  Every political and social ideal we have is at stake. If we make
  them secure, we'll save Europe from destruction and save ourselves,
  <br><br>I pray for vigour and decision and clear-cut resolute action.
  <br><br>(1) The Navy-full strength, no &quot;grapejuice&quot; action.
  <br><br>(2) An immediate expeditionary force.
  <br><br>(3) A larger expeditionary force very soon.
  <br><br>(4) A large loan at a low interest.
  <br><br>(5) Ships, ships, ships.
  <br><br>(6) A clear-cut expression of the moral issue. Thus (and only
  thus) can we swing into a new era, with a world born again.
    <br><br>Yours in strictest confidence,
    <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<br><br>A memorandum, written on April 3rd, the day after President
Wilson advised Congress to declare a state of war with Germany:
  <br><br>When I went to see Mr. Balfour to-day he shook my hand warmly
  and said: &quot;It's a great day for the world.&quot; And so
  has everybody said, in one way or another, that I have met to-day.
  <br><br>The President's speech did not appear in the morning papers---only
  a very brief summary in one or two of them; but the meaning of
  it was clear. The fact that the House of Representatives organized
  itself in one day and that the President addressed Congress on
  the evening of that day told the story. The noon papers had the
  President's speech in full; and everybody applauds.
  <br><br>My &quot;Cabinet&quot; meeting this morning was unusually
  interesting; and the whole group has never before been so delighted.
  I spoke of the suggestive, constructive work we have already
  done in making reports on various war preparations and activities
  of this kingdom. &quot;Now we have greater need than ever, every
  man to do constructive work---to think of plans to serve. We
  are in this excellent strategical position in the capital of
  the greatest belligerent---a position which I thank my stars,
  the President, and all the powers that be for giving us. We can
  each strive to justify our existence.&quot;
  <br><br>Few visitors called; but enthusiastic letters have begun to
  come in.
  <br><br>Nearly the whole afternoon was spent with Mr. Balfour and
  Lord Robert Cecil. Mr. Balfour had a long list of subjects. Could
  we help in (1)---(2)---(3)?--- Every once m a while he stopped
  his enumeration of subjects long enough to tell me how the action
  of the United States had moved him.
  <br><br>To Lord Robert I said: &quot;I pray you, give the Black List
  a decent burial: It's dead now, but through no act of yours.
  It insulted every American because you did not see that it was
  insulting: that's the discouraging fact to me.&quot; He thanked
  me earnestly. He'll think about that.</BLOCKQUOTE>
<br><br>These jottings give only a faint impression of the change which
the American action wrought in Page. The strain which he had undergone
for twenty-nine months had been intense; it had had the most unfortunate
effect upon his health; and the sudden lifting might have produced
that reaction for the worse which is not unusual after critical
experiences of this kind. But the gratification which Page felt
in the fact that the American spirit had justified his confidence
gave him almost a certain exuberance of contentment. Londoners
who saw him at that time describe him as acting like a man from
whose shoulders a tremendous weight had suddenly been removed.
For more than two years Page had been compelled, officially at
least, to assume a &quot;neutrality&quot; with which he had never
had the slightest sympathy, but the necessity for this mask now
no longer existed. A well-known Englishman happened to meet Page
leaving his house in Grosvenor Square the day after the Declaration
of War. He stopped and shook the Ambassador's hand.
<br><br>&quot;Thank God,&quot; the Englishman said, &quot;that there
is one hypocrite less in London to-day.&quot;
<br><br>&quot;What do you mean?&quot; asked Page.
<br><br>&quot;I mean you. Pretending all this time that you were neutral!
That isn't necessary any longer.&quot;
<br><br>&quot;You are right!&quot; the Ambassador answered as he walked
on with a laugh and a wave of the hand.
<br><br>A few days after the Washington Declaration, the American Luncheon
Club held a feast in honour of the event. This organization had
a membership of representative American business men in London,
but its behaviour during the war had not been based upon Mr. Wilson's
idea of neutrality. Indeed its tables had so constantly rung with
denunciations of the <I>Lusitania </I>notes that all members of
the American Embassy, from Page down, had found it necessary to
refrain from attending its proceedings. When Page arose to address
his compatriots on this occasion, therefore, he began with the
significant words, &quot;I am glad to be back with you<I> again,&quot;
</I>and the mingled laughter and cheers with which this remark
was received indicated that his hearers had caught the point.
<br><br>The change took place not only in Page, but in London and the
whole of Great Britain. An England that had been saying harsh
things of the United States for nearly two years now suddenly
changed its attitude. Both houses of Parliament held commemorative
sessions in honour of America's participation; in the Commons
Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, and other leaders welcomed their
new allies, and in the Upper Chamber Lord Curzon, Lord Bryce,
the Archbishop of Canterbury, and others similarly voiced their
admiration. The Stars and Stripes almost instantaneously broke
out on private dwellings, shops, hotels, and theatres; street
hucksters did a thriving business selling rosettes of the American
colours, which even the most stodgy Englishmen did not disdain
to wear in their buttonholes; wherever there was a band or an
orchestra, the Star Spangled Banner acquired a sudden popularity;
and the day even came when the American and the British flags
flew side by side over the Houses of Parliament---the first occasion
in history that any other than the British standard had received
this honour. The editorial outgivings of the British press on
America's entrance form a literature all their own. The theatres
and the music halls, which had found in &quot;notes&quot; and
&quot;nootrality&quot; an endless theme of entertainment for their
patrons, now sounded Americanism as their most popular refrain.
Churches and cathedrals gave special services in honour of American
intervention, and the King and the President began to figure side
by the side in the prayer book. The estimation in which President
Wilson was held changed overnight. All the phrases that had so
grieved Englishmen were instantaneously forgotten. The President's
address before Congress was praised as one of the most eloquent
and statesmanlike utterances in history. Special editions of this
heartening document had a rapid sale; it was read in school houses,
churches, and at public gatherings, and it became a most influential
force in uplifting the hopes of the Allies and inspiring them
to renewed activities. Americans everywhere, in the streets, at
dinner tables, and in general social intercourse, could feel the
new atmosphere of respect and admiration which had suddenly become
their country's portion. The first American troops that passed
through London---a company of engineers, an especially fine body
of men---aroused a popular enthusiasm which was almost unprecedented
in a capital not celebrated for its emotional displays. Page himself
records one particularly touching indication of the feeling for
Americans which was now universal. &quot;The increasing number
of Americans who come through England,&quot; he wrote, &quot;most
of them on their way to France, but some of them also to serve
in England, give much pleasure to the British public---nurses,
doctors, railway engineers, sawmill units, etc. The sight of every
American uniform pleases London. The other morning a group of
American nurses gathered with the usual crowd in front of Buckingham
Palace while the Guards band played inside the gates. Man after
man as they passed them and saw their uniforms lifted their hats.&quot;
    <TD WIDTH="47%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page21tn.jpg" WIDTH="116"
      HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
    <TD WIDTH="53%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><IMG SRC="thumbnails/Page22tn.jpg" WIDTH="108"
      HEIGHT="144" ALIGN="BOTTOM" BORDER="0" ></TD>
    <TD WIDTH="47%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
      21.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> The
      Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908
      1915, Minister of Munitions, 1915-1916, Prime Minister of Great
      Britain since 1916.</FONT></TD>
    <TD WIDTH="53%" VALIGN="TOP">
      <P ALIGN=CENTER><B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times">Fig.
      22.</FONT></B><FONT COLOR="#0000ff" SIZE="+1" FACE="Times"> The
      Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of Balfour) Secretary
      of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916-1919</FONT></TD>
<br><br><FONT FACE="Times">The Ambassador's mail likewise underwent
a complete transformation. His correspondence of the preceding
two years, enormous in its extent, had contained much that would
have disturbed a man who could easily get excited over trifles,
but this aspect of his work never caused Page the slightest unhappiness.
Almost every crank in England who disliked the American policy
had seemed to feel it his duty to express his opinions to the
American Ambassador. These letters, at times sorrowful, at others
abusive, even occasionally threatening, varying in their style
from cultivated English to the grossest illiteracy, now written
in red ink to emphasize their bitterness, now printed in large
block letters to preserve their anonymity, aroused in Page only
a temporary amusement. But the letters that began to pour in upon
him after our Declaration, many of them from the highest placed
men and women in the Kingdom, brought out more vividly than anything
else the changed position of his country. Sonnets and verses rained
upon the Embassy, most of them pretty bad as poetry, but all of
them commendable for their admiring and friendly spirit. Of all
these letters those that came from the steadfast friends of America
perhaps gave Page the greatest satisfaction. &quot;You will have
been pleased at the universal tribute paid to the spirit as well
as to the lofty and impressive terms of the President's speech,&quot;
wrote Lord Bryce. &quot;Nothing finer in our time, few things
so fine.&quot; But probably the letter which gave Page the greatest
pleasure was that which came from the statesman whose courtesy
and broad outlook had eased the Ambassador's task in the old neutrality
days. In 1916, Sir Edward Grey-now become Viscount Grey of Fallodon---had
resigned office, forced out, Page says in one of his letters,
mainly because he had refused to push the blockade to a point
where it might produce a break with the United States. He had
spent the larger part of the time since that event at his country
place in Northumberland, along the streams and the forests which
had always given him his greatest pleasure, attempting to recover
something of the health that he had lost in the ten years which
he had spent as head of the British Foreign Office and bearing
with characteristic cheerfulness and fortitude the tragedy of
a gradually failing eyesight. The American Declaration of War
now came to Lord Grey as the complete justification of his policy.
The mainspring of that policy, as already explained, had been
a determination to keep the friendship of the United States, and
so shape events that the support of this country would ultimately
be cast on the side of the Allies. And now the great occasion
for which he had prepared had come, and in Grey's mind this signified
more than a help to England in soldiers and ships; it meant bringing
together the two branches of a common race for the promotion of
common ideals.</FONT>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">From Viscount Grey of Fallodon</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Rosehall Post Office,<BR>
  April 8, 1917.
  <br><br>DEAR MR. PAGE:
  <br><br>This is a line that needs no answer to express my congratulations
  on President Wilson's address. I can't express adequately all
  that I feel. Great gratitude and great hope are in my heart.
  I hope now that some great and abiding good to the world will
  yet be wrought out of all this welter of evil. Recent events
  in Russia, too, stimulate this hope: they are a good in themselves,
  but not the power for good in this war that a great and firmly
  established free country like the United States can be. The President's
  address and the way it has been followed up in your country is
  a splendid instance of great action finely inspired. I glow with
    <br><br>Yours sincerely,
<br><br>One Englishman who was especially touched by the action of
the United States was His Majesty the King. Few men had watched
the course of America during the war with more intelligent interest
than the head of the British royal house. Page had had many interviews
with King George at Buckingham Palace and at Windsor, and his
notes contain many appreciative remarks on the King's high character
and conscientious devotion to his duties. That Page in general
did not believe in kings and emperors as institutions his letters
reveal; yet even so profound a Republican as he recognized sterling
character, whether in a crowned head or in a humble citizen, and
he had seen enough of King George to respect him.. Moreover, the
peculiar limitations of the British monarchy certainly gave it
an unusual position and even saved it from much of the criticism
that was fairly lavished upon such nations as Germany and Austria.
Page especially admired King George's frankness in recognizing
these limitations and his readiness to accommodate himself to
the British Constitution. On most occasions, when these two men
met, their intercourse was certainly friendly or at least not
formidable. After all formalities had been exchanged, the King
would frequently draw the Ambassador aside; the two would retire
to the smoking room, and there, over their cigars, discuss a variety
of matters---submarines, international politics, the Irish question
and the like. His Majesty was not averse even to bringing up the
advantages of the democratic and the monarchical system. The King
and Ambassador would chat, as Page himself would say, like &quot;two
human beings&quot;; King George is an emphatic and vivacious talker,
fond of emphasizing his remarks by pounding the table; he has
the liveliest sense of humour, and enjoys nothing quite so much
as a good story. Page found that, on the subject of the Germans,
the King entertained especially robust views. &quot;They are my
kinsmen,&quot; he would say, &quot;but I am ashamed of them.&quot;
<br><br>Probably most Englishmen, in the early days of the war, preferred
that the United States should not engage in hostilities; even
after the <I>Lusitania, </I>the majority in all likelihood held
this view. There are indications, however, that King George favoured
American participation. A few days after the <I>Lusitania </I>sinking,
Page had an audience for the purpose of presenting a medal sent
by certain societies in New Orleans. Neither man was thinking
much about medals that morning. The thoughts uppermost in their
minds, as in the minds of most Americans and Englishmen, were
the <I>Lusitania </I>and the action that the United States was
likely to take concerning it. After the formalities of presentation,
the King asked Page to sit down and talked with him for more than
half an hour. &quot;He said that Germany was evidently trying
to force the United States into the war; that he had no doubt
we would soon be in it and that, for his part, he would welcome
us heartily. The King also said he had reliable information from
Germany, that the Emperor had wished to return a conciliatory
answer to our <I>Lusitania </I>note, but that Admiral von Tirpitz
had prevented it, even going so far as to 'threaten' the Kaiser.
It appears that the Admiral insisted that the submarine was the
only weapon the Germans could use with effect against England
and that they could not afford to give it up. He was violent and
the Kaiser finally yielded.&quot;(<A NAME="n168"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#168">168</A>)
<br><br>The statement from the King at that crisis, that he would &quot;heartily
welcome the United States into the war,&quot; was interpreted
by the Ambassador as amounting practically to an invitation---and
certainly as expressing a wish that such an intervention should
take place.
<br><br>That the American participation would rejoice King George could
therefore be taken for granted. Soon after this event, the Ambassador
and Mrs. Page were invited to spend the night at Windsor.
<br><br>&quot;I arrived during the middle of the afternoon,&quot; writes
Page, &quot;and he sent for me to talk with him in his office.
<br><br>&quot;'I've a good story on you,' said he. 'You Americans have
a queer use of the word &quot;some,&quot; to express mere bigness
or emphasis. We are taking that use of the word from you over
here. Well, an American and an Englishman were riding in the same
railway compartment. The American read his paper diligently---all
the details of a big battle. When he got done, he put the paper
down and said:
<br><br>&quot;'Some fight!' 'And some don't!' said the Englishman.
<br><br>&quot;And the King roared. 'A good one on you!'
<br><br>&quot;'The trouble with that joke, sir,' I ventured to reply,
'is that it's out of date.'
<br><br>&quot;He was in a very gay mood, surely because of our entry
into the war. After the dinner---there were no guests except Mrs.
Page and me, the members of his household, of course, being present---he
became even familiar in the smoking room. He talked about himself
and his position as king. 'Knowing the difficulties of a limited
monarch, I thank heaven I am spared being an absolute one.'
<br><br>&quot;He went on to enumerate the large number of things he
was obliged to do, for example, to sign the death warrant of every
condemned man---and the little real power that he had---not at
all in a tone of complaint, but as a merely impersonal explanation.
<br><br>&quot;Just how much power---perhaps 'influence' is a better,
word---the King has, depends on his personality. The influence
of the throne---and of him on the throne, being a wholly thoughtful,
industrious, and conscientious man---is very great---greatest
of all in keeping the vested interests of the aristocratic social
structure secure.
<br><br>&quot;Earlier than this visit to Windsor he sent for me to
go to Buckingham Palace very soon after we declared war. He went
over the whole course of events---and asked me many questions.
After I had risen and said 'good-bye' and was about to bow myself
out the door, he ran toward me and waving his hand cried out,
'Ah!---Ah!---we knew where you stood all the time.'
<br><br>&quot;When General Pershing came along on his way to France,
the King summoned us to luncheon. The luncheon was eaten (here,
as everywhere, strict war rations are observed) to a flow of general
talk, with the Queen, Princess Mary, and one of the young Princes.
When they had gone from the luncheon room, the King, General Pershing,
and I stood smoking by the window; and the King at once launched
into talk about guns, rifles, ammunition, and the American place
in the battle line. Would our place be with the British or with
the French or between the two?
<br><br>&quot;General Pershing made a diplomatic reply. So far as he
knew the President hadn't yet made a final decision, but there
was a feeling that, since we were helping the British at sea,
perhaps we ought to help the French on land.
<br><br>&quot;Then the King expressed the earnest hope that our guns
and ammunition would match either the British or the French. Else
if we happened to run out of ammunition we could not borrow from
anybody. He thought it most unfortunate that the British and French
guns and rifles were of different calibres.&quot;
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Arthur W. Page</FONT></I>
  <br><br>Brighton, England,<BR>
  April 28, 1917.
  <br><br>DEAR ARTHUR:
  <br><br>. . . Well, the British have given us a very good welcome
  into the war. They are not very skillful at such a task: they
  do not know how to say &quot;Welcome&quot; very vociferously.
  But they have said it to the very best of their ability. My speeches
  (which I send you, with some comment) were very well received
  indeed. Simple and obvious as they were, they meant a good deal
  of work.
  <br><br>I cannot conceal nor can I express my gratification that we
  are in the war. I shall always wonder but never find out what
  influence I had in driving the President over. All I know is
  that my letters and telegrams for nearly two years---especially
  for the last twelve months---have put before him every reason
  that anybody has expressed why we should come in---in season
  and out of season. And there is no new reason---only more reason
  of the same old sort---why we should have come in now than there
  was why we should have come in a year ago. I suspect that the
  pressure of the press and of public opinion really became too
  strong for him. And, of course, the Peace-Dream blew up---was
  torpedoed, mined, shot, captured, and killed. I trust, too, much
  enlightenment will be furnished by the two Commissions now in
  Washington.(<A NAME="n169"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#169">169</A>)
  Yet it's comical to think of the attitude of the poor old Department
  last September and its attitude now. But thank God for it! Every
  day now brings a confession of the blank idiocy of its former
  course and its long argument! Never mind that, so long as we
  are now right.
  <br><br>I have such a sense of relief that I almost feel that my job
  is now done. Yet, I dare say, my most important work is still
  to come.
  <br><br>The more I try to reach some sort of rational judgment about
  the war, the more I find myself at sea. It does look as if the
  very crisis is near. And there can be no doubt now---not even,
  I hope, in the United States---about the necessity of a clear
  and decisive victory, nor about punishment. All the devastation
  of Northern France, which outbarbarizes barbarism, all the ships
  sunk, including hospital ships, must be paid for; that's all.
  There'll be famine in Europe whenever it end. Not only must these
  destructions be paid for, but the Hohenzollerns and all they
  stand for must go. Trust your Frenchman for that, if nobody else!
  <br><br>If Europe had the food wasted in the United States, it would
  make the difference between sustenance and famine. By the way,
  the submarine has made every nation a danger zone except those
  few that have self-feeding continents, such as ours. It can bring
  famine to any other kind of a country.
  <br><br>You are now out in the country again---good. Give Mollie my
  love and help her with the garden. I envy you the fresh green
  things to eat. Little Mollie, kiss her for granddaddy. The Ambassador,
  I suppose, waxes even sturdier, and I'm glad to hear that A.
  W. P., Jr., is picking up. Get him fed right at all costs. If
  Frank stays at home and Ralph and his family come up, you'll
  all have a fine summer. We've the very first hint of summer we've
  had, and it's cheerful to see the sky and to feel the sunshine.
    <br><br>W. H. P.</BLOCKQUOTE>
  <P ALIGN=CENTER><I><FONT SIZE="+1">To Frank N. Doubleday</FONT></I>
  <br><br>American Embassy,<BR>
  London, May 3, 1917.
  <br><br>DEAR EFFENDI:
  <br><br>I aim this at you. It may hit a German submarine. But we've
  got to take our chances in these days of risk. Your letter from
  the tropics---a letter from you from any place is as scarce as
  peace !---gave me a pleasant thrill and reminder of a previous
  state of existence, a long way back in the past. I wonder if,
  on your side the ocean you are living at the rate of a century
  a year, as we are here? Here in bountiful England we are living
  on rations. I spent a night with the King a fortnight ago, and
  he gave us only so much bread, one egg apiece, and---lemonade.
  We are to begin bread tickets next week. All this is perfectly
  healthful and wholesome and as much as I ever eat. But the hard
  part of it is that it's necessary. We haven't more than six weeks'
  food supply and the submarines sunk eighty-eight ships---237,000
  tons-last week. These English do not publish these harrowing
  facts, and nobody knows them but a few official people. And they
  are destroying the submarines at a most beggarly slow rate. They
  work far out at sea---100 to 200 miles---and it's as hard to
  find them as it would be to find whales. The simple truth is
  we are in a dangerous plight. If they could stop this submarine
  warfare, the war would pretty quickly be won, for the Germans
  are in a far worse plight for food and materials and they are
  getting much the worst of it on land. The war would be won this
  summer or autumn if the submarine could be put out of business.
  If it isn't, the Germans may use this success to keep their spirits
  up and go on till next year.
  <br><br>We (the United States) have about 40 destroyers. We are sending
  over 6! I'm doing my best to persuade the Government at Washington
  to send every one we have. But, since the British conceal the
  facts from their own press and the people and from all the world,
  the full pressure of the situation is hard to exert on Washington.
  Our Admiral (Sims) and I are trying our best, and we are spending
  enough on cables to build a destroyer. All this, you must, of
  course, regard as a dark secret; but it's a devilish black secret.
  <br><br>I don't mean that there's any danger of losing the war. Even
  if the British armies have to have their food cut down and people
  here go hungry, they'll win; but the winning may be a long time
  off. Nothing but their continued success can keep the Germans
  going. Their people are war-weary and hungry. Austria is knocked
  out and is starving. Turkey is done up but can go on living on
  nothing, but not fighting much more. When peace comes, there'll
  be a general famine, on the continent at least, and no ships
  to haul food. This side of the world will have to start life
  all over again---with insufficient men to carry things on and
  innumerable maimed men who'll have (more or less) to be cared
  for. The horror of the whole thing nobody realizes. We've all
  got used to it here; and nobody clearly remembers just what the
  world was like in peace times; those times were so far away.
  All this I write not to fill you with horrors but to prove that
  I speak the literal truth when I say that it seems a hundred
  years since I had before heard from you.
  <br><br>Just how all this affects a man, no man can accurately tell.
  Of how much use I'll be when I can get home, I don't know. Sometimes
  I think that I shall be of vastly greater use than ever. Plans
  and publishing ambitions pop up in my mind at times which look
  good and promising. I see books and series of books. I see most
  useful magazine stuff. Then, before I can think anything out
  to a clear plan or conclusion, the ever-increasing official duties
  and responsibilities here knock everything else out of my head,
  perhaps for a whole month. It's a literal fact that many a month
  I do not have an hour to do with as I please nor to think about
  what I please, from the time I wake up till I go to bed. In spite
  of twenty-four secretaries (the best fellows that ever were and
  the best staff that my Embassy ever had in the world) more and
  more work comes to me. I thank Heaven we no longer have the interests
  of Germany, Austria, and Turkey to look after; but with our coming
  into the war, work in general has increased enormously. I have
  to spend very much more time with the different departments of
  the British Government on war plans and such like things. They
  have welcomed us in very handsomely; and one form of their welcome
  is consulting with me about---navy plans, war plans, loans of
  billions, ships, censorship, secret service---everything you
  ever heard of. At first it seemed a little comical for the admirals
  and generals and the Governor of the Bank of England to come
  and ask for advice. But when I gave it and it worked out well,
  I went on and, after all, the thing's easier than it looks. With
  a little practice you can give these fellows several points in
  the game and play a pretty good hand. They don't know half as
  much as you might suppose they'd know. All these years of lecturing
  the State Department and the President got my hand in! The whole
  game is far easier than any small business. You always play with
  blue chips better than you play with white ones.
  <br><br>This country and these people are not the country and the
  people they were three years ago. They are very different. They
  are much more democratic, far less cocksure, far less haughty,
  far humbler. The man at the head of the army rose from the ranks.
  The Prime Minister is a poor Welsh schoolteacher's son, without
  early education. The man who controls all British shipping began
  life as a shipping &quot;clark,&quot; at ten shillings a week.
  Yet the Lords and Ladies, too, have shown that they were made
  of the real stuff. This experience is making England over again.
  There never was a more interesting thing to watch and to be part
  <br><br>There are about twenty American organizations here---big,
  little, rag-tag, and bobtail. When we declared war, every one
  of 'em proceeded to prepare for some sort of celebration. There
  would have been an epidemic of Fourth-of-July oratory all over
  the town-before we'd done anything---Americans spouting over
  the edges and killing Kruger with their mouths. I got representatives
  of 'em all together and proposed that we hold our tongues till
  we'd won the war---then we can take London. And to give one occasion
  when we might all assemble and dedicate ourselves to this present
  grim business, I arranged for an American Dedicatory Service
  at St. Paul's Cathedral. The royal family came, the Government
  came, the Allied diplomats came, my Lords and Ladies came, one
  hundred wounded American (Canadian) soldiers came---the pick
  of the Kingdom; my Navy and Army staff went in full uniform,
  the Stars and Stripes hung before the altar, a double brass band
  played the Star Spangled Banner and the Battle Hymn of the Republic,
  and an American bishop (Brent) preached a red-hot American sermon,
  the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered the benediction; and (for
  the first time in English history) a foreign flag (the Stars
  and Stripes) flew over the Houses of Parliament. It was the biggest
  occasion, so they say, that St. Paul's ever had. And there's
  been no spilling of American oratory since! If you had published
  a shilling edition of the words and music of the Star Spangled
  Banner and the Battle Hymn you could have sent a cargo of 'em
  here and sold them. There isn't paper enough in this Kingdom
  to get out an edition here.
  <br><br>Give my love to all the Doubledays and to all the fellows
  in the shop, and (I wonder if you will) try your hand at another
  letter. You write very legibly these days!
    <br><br>Sincerely yours,
<br><br>&quot;Curiously enough,&quot; Page wrote about this time, &quot;these
most exciting days of the war are among the most barren of exciting
topics for private correspondence. The 'atmosphere' here is unchanging---to
us---and the British are turning their best side to us continuously.
They are increasingly appreciative, and they see more and more
clearly that our coming into the war is all that saved them from
a virtual defeat---I mean the public sees this more and more clearly,
for, of course, the Government has known it from the beginning.
I even find a sort of morbid fear lest they do not sufficiently
show their appreciation. The Archbishop last night asked me in
an apprehensive tone whether the American Government and public
felt that the British did not sufficiently show their gratitude.
I told him that we did not come into the war to win compliments
but to whip the enemy, and that we wanted all the help the British
can give: that's the main thing; and that thereafter of course
we liked appreciation, but that expressions of appreciation had
not been lacking. Mr. Balfour and Sir Edward Carson also spoke
to me yesterday much in the same tone as the Archbishop of Canterbury.
<br><br>&quot;Try to think out any line of action that one will, or
any future sequence or events or any plan touching the war, one
runs into the question whether the British are doing the best
that could be done or are merely plugging away. They are, as a
people, slow and unimaginative, given to over-much self-criticism;
but they eternally hold on to a task or to a policy. Yet the question
forever arises whether they show imagination, to say nothing of
genius, and whether the waste of a slow, plodding policy is the
necessary price of victory.
<br><br>&quot;Of course such a question is easy to ask and it is easy
to give dogmatic answers. But it isn't easy to give an answer
based on facts. Our General Lassiter,(<A NAME="n170"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#170">170</A>)
for instance---a man of sound judgment---has in general been less
hopeful of the military situation in France than most of the British
officers. But he is just now returned from the front, much cheered
and encouraged. 'Lassiter,' I asked, 'have the British in France
or has any man among them what we call genius, or even wide vision;
or are they merely plodding along at a mechanical task?' His answer
was, 'We don't see genius till it has done its job. It is a mechanical
task---yes, that's the nature of the struggle---and they surely
do it with intelligence and spirit. There is waste. There is waste
in all wars. But I come back much more encouraged.'
<br><br>&quot;The same sort of questions and answers are asked and
given continuously about naval action. Every discussion of the
possibility of attacking the German naval bases ends without a
plan. So also with preventing the submarines from coming out.
These subjects have been continuously under discussion by a long
series of men who have studied them; and the total effect so far
has been to leave them among the impossible tasks. So far as I
can ascertain all naval men among the Allies agree that these
things can't be done.
<br><br>&quot;Here again---Is this a merely routine professional opinion---a
merely traditional opinion---or is it a lack of imagination? The
question will not down. Yet it is impossible to get facts to combat
it. What are the limits of the practicable?
<br><br>&quot;Mr. Balfour told me yesterday his personal conviction
about the German colonies, which, he said, he had not discussed
with his associates in the Cabinet. His firm opinion is that they
ought not to be returned to the Germans, first for the sake of
humanity. 'The natives---the Africans especially---have been so
barbarously treated and so immorally that it would be inhuman
to permit the Germans to rule and degrade them further. But Heaven
forbid that we should still further enlarge the British Empire.
As a practical matter I do not care to do that. Besides, we should
incur the criticism of fighting in order to get more territory,
and that was not and is not our aim. If the United States will
help us, my wish is that these German Colonies that we have taken,
especially in Africa, should be &quot;internationalized.&quot;
There are great difficulties in such a plan, but they are not
insuperable if the great Powers of the Allies will agree upon
it.' And much more to the same effect. The parts of Asiatic Turkey
that the British have taken, he thought, might be treated in the
same way.&quot;
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 <TITLE>Burton J. Hendrick. The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. 1922. Chapters 20-21.</TITLE>

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OF ONE thing I am sure," Page wrote to his wife from Washington, while waiting to see President Wilson. "We wish to come home March 4th at midnight and to go about our proper business. There's nothing here that I would for the world be mixed up with. As soon as I can escape with dignity I shall make my bow and exit. . . . But I am not unhappy or hopeless for the long run. They'll find out the truth some day, paying, I fear, a heavy penalty for delay. But the visit here has confirmed me in our previous conclusions---that if we can carry the load until March 4th, midnight, we shall be grateful that we have pulled through."

Soon after President Wilson's reelection, therefore, Page sent his resignation to Washington. The above quotation shows that he intended this to be more than a "courtesy resignation," a term traditionally applied to the kind of leave-takings which Ambassadors usually send on the formation of a new administration, or at the beginning of a new Presidential term, for the purpose of giving the President the opportunity of reorganizing his official family. Page believed that his work in London had been finished, that he had done everything in his power to make Mr. Wilson see the situation in its true light and that he had not succeeded. He therefore wished to give up his post and come home. This explains the fact that his resignation did not consist of the half dozen perfunctory fines which most diplomatic officers find sufficient on such an occasion, but took the form of a review of the reasons why the United States should align itself on the side of the Allies.


<P ALIGN=CENTER>To the President

London, November 24, 1916.


We have all known for many years that the rich and populous and organized states in which the big cities are do not constitute the political United States. But, I confess, I hardly expected so soon to see this fact proclaimed at the ballot-box. To me that's the surprise of the election. And your popular majority as well as your clear majority in the Electoral College is a great personal triumph for you. And you have remade the ancient and demoralized Democratic party. Four years ago it consisted of a protest and of the wreck wrought by Mr. Bryan's long captaincy. This rebirth, with a popular majority, is an historical achievement---of your own.

You have relaid the foundation and reset the pillars of a party that may enjoy a long supremacy for domestic reasons. Now, if you will permit me to say so, from my somewhat distant view (four years make a long period of absence) the big party task is to build up a clearer and more positive foreign policy. We are in the world and we've got to choose what active part we shall play in it---I fear rather quickly, I have the conviction, as you know, that this whole round globe now hangs as a ripe apple for our plucking, if we use the right ladder while the chance lasts. I do not mean that we want or could get the apple for ourselves, but that we can see to it that it is put to proper uses. What we have to do, in my judgment, is to go back to our political fathers for our clue. If my longtime memory be good, they were sure that their establishment of a great free Republic would soon be imitated by European peoples---that democracies would take the place of autocracies in all so-called civilized countries; for that was the form that the fight took in their day against organized Privilege. But for one reason or another---in our life-time partly because we chose so completely to isolate ourselves---the democratic idea took root in Europe with disappointing slowness. It is, for instance, now perhaps for the first time, in a thorough-going way, within sight in this Kingdom. The dream of the American Fathers, therefore, is not yet come true. They fought against organized Privilege exerted from over the sea. In principle it is the same fight that we have made, in our domestic field, during recent decades. Now the same fight has come on a far larger scale than men ever dreamed of before.

It isn't, therefore, for merely doctrinal reasons that we are concerned for the spread of democracy nor merely because a democracy is the only scheme of organization yet wrought out that keeps the door of opportunity open and invites all men to their fullest development. But we are interested in it because under no other system can the world be made an even reasonably safe place to live in. For only autocracies wage aggressive wars. Aggressive autocracies, especially military autocracies, must be softened down by peace (and they have never been so softened) or destroyed by war. The All-Highest doctrine of Germany to-day is the same as the Taxation-without-Representation of George III---only more virulent, stronger, and farther-reaching. Only by its end can the German people recover and build up their character and take the permanent place in the world that they---thus changed---will be entitled to. They will either reduce Europe to the vassalage of a military autocracy, which may then overrun the whole world or drench it in blood, or they must through stages of Liberalism work their way toward some approach to a democracy; and there is no doubt which event is impending. The Liberal idea will win this struggle, and Europe will be out of danger of a general assault on free institutions till some other autocracy which has a military caste try the same Napoleonic game. The defeat of Germany, therefore, will make for the spread of the doctrine of our Fathers and our doctrine yet.

An interesting book might be made of concrete evidences of the natural antipathy that the present German autocracy has for successful democracy and hence for us. A new instance has just come to me. My son, Arthur, who succeeded to most of my activities at home, has been over here for a month and he has just come from a visit to France. In Paris he had a long conversation with Delcassé, who told him that the Kaiser himself once made a proposal to him to join in producing "the complete isolation" of the United States. What the Kaiser meant was that if the great Powers of Europe would hold off, he would put the Monroe Doctrine to the test and smash it.

The great tide of the world will, by reason of the war, now flow toward democracy---at present, alas! a tide of blood. For a century democracies and Liberal governments have kept themselves too much isolated, trusting prematurely and too simply to international law and treaties and Hague conventions. These things have never been respected, except as springes to catch woodcock, where the Divine Right held sway. The outgrowing or the overthrow of the Divine Right is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of international law and treaties.

It has seemed to me, looking at the subject only with reference to our country's duty and safety, that somehow and at some early time our championship of democracy must lead us to redeclare our faith and to show that we believe in our historic creed. Then we may escape falling away from the Liberal forces of the Old World and escape the suspicion of indifference to the great scheme of government which was set up by our fathers' giving their blood for it. I see no other way for us to take the best and biggest opportunity that has ever come to prove true to our faith as well as to secure our own safety and the safety of the world. Only some sort of active and open identification with the Allies can put us in effective protest against the assassins of the Armenians and the assassins of Belgium, Poland, and Serbia, and in a friendly attitude to the German people themselves, as distinguished from their military rulers. This is the attitude surely that our fathers would have wished us to take---and would have expected us to take---and that our children will be proud of us for taking; for it is our proper historic attitude, whether looked at from the past or looked back at from the future. There can be no historic approval of neutrality for years, while the world is bleeding to death.

The complete severance of relations, diplomatic at first and later possibly economic as well, with the Turks and the Germans, would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable treasure; for the moral effect of withdrawing even our formal approval of their conduct---at least our passive acquiescence---would be---that the Germans would see that practically all the Liberal world stands against their system, and the war would end before we should need to or could put an army in the field. The Liberal Germans are themselves beginning to see that it is not they, but the German system, that is the object of attack because it is the dangerous thing in the world. Maximilian Harden presents this view, in his Berlin paper. He says in effect that Germany must get rid of its predatory feudalism. That was all that was the matter with George III.

Among the practical results of such action by us would, I believe, be the following:

1. The early ending of the war and the saying of, perhaps, millions of lives and of incalculable treasure;

2. The establishment in Germany of some form of more liberal government;

3. A league to enforce peace, ready-made, under our guidance---i.e., the Allies and ourselves;

4. The sympathetic cooperation and the moral force of every Allied Government in dealing with Mexico:

5. The acceptance---and even documentary approval of every Allied Government of the Monroe Doctrine;

6. The warding off and no doubt the final prevention of danger from Japan, and, most of all, the impressive and memorable spectacle of our Great Democracy thus putting an end to this colossal crime, merely from the impulse and necessity to keep our own ideals and to lead the world right on. We should do for Europe on a large scale essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale and thereby usher in a new era in human history.

I write thus freely, Mr. President, because at no time can I write in any other way and because I am sure that all these things can quickly be brought to pass under your strong leadership. The United States would stand, as no other nation has ever stood in the world-predominant and unselfish---on the highest ideals ever reached in human government. It is a vision as splendid as the Holy Grael. Nor have I a shadow of doubt of the eager and faithful following of our people, who would thereby reestablish once for all our weakened nationality. We are made of the stuff that our Fathers were made of.

And I write this now for the additional reason that I am within sight of the early end of my service here. When you called me I answered, not only because you did me great honour and laid a definite patriotic duty on me, but because also of my personal loyalty to you and my pride in helping forward the great principles in which we both believe. But I understood then (and I am sure the subject lay in your mind in the same way) that my service would be for four years at the most. I made all my arrangements, professional and domestic, on this supposition. I shall, therefore, be ready to lay down my work here on March 4th or as soon thereafter as meets your pleasure.

I am more than proud of the confidence that you have shown in me. To it I am indebted for the opportunity I have had to give such public service to my country as I could, as well as for the most profitable experience of my life. A proper and sympathetic understanding between the two English-speaking worlds seems to me the most important duty of far-seeing men in either country. It has taken such a profound hold on me that I shall, in whatever way I can, work for its complete realization as long as I can work for anything.

I am, Mr. President, most faithfully and gratefully yours,



This letter was written at a time when President Wilson was exerting his best energies to bring about peace. The Presidential campaign had caused him to postpone these efforts, for he believed that neither Germany nor Great Britain could take seriously the activities of a President whose own political position was insecure. At the time Page's letter was received, the President was thinking only of a peace based upon a stalemate; it was then his apparent conviction that both sides to the struggle were about equally in the wrong and that a decisive victory of either would not be a good thing for the world. Yet it is interesting to compare this letter with the famous speech which the President made six months afterward when he asked Congress to declare the existence of a state of war with Germany. Practically all the important reasons which Mr. Wilson then advanced for this declaration are found in Page's letter of the preceding November. That autocracies are a constant menace to world peace, that the United States owes it to its democratic tradition to take up arms against the enemy of free government, that in doing this, it was not making war upon the German people, but upon its imperialistic masters---these were the arguments which Page laid before the President in his letter of resignation, and these were the leading ideas in Mr. Wilson's address of April 2nd. There are even sentences in Page's communication which seem to foreshadow Mr. Wilson's assertion that "The world must be made safe for democracy." It is impossible to read this letter and not conclude that Page's correspondence, irritating in its later phases as it may have been, did not strongly influence Mr. Wilson in his thinking.

On one point, indeed, Colonel House afterward called the Ambassador to account. When America was preparing to raise armies by the millions and to spend its treasure by the billions, he reminded Page of his statement that the severance of diplomatic relations "would probably not cost us a man in battle nor any considerable treasure." Page's statement in this November letter merely reiterated a conviction which for more than a year he had been forcing upon the President and Colonel House---that the dismissal of Bernstorff would not necessarily imply war with Germany, but that it would in itself be enough to bring the war to an end. On this point Page never changed his mind, as is evident from the letter which he wrote to Colonel House when this matter was called to his attention:


<P ALIGN=CENTER>To Edward M. House

London, June 29, 1917.


I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor on anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet I do think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and a half ago when I said that we could then have ended the war without any appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:

If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:

(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.

(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine fleet. She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.

(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she got food and oil; and continues to get it.

(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force and gave her more time, more armies for France and more supplies. Russian guns have been sold to the Germans.

If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would have been over before any of these things happened. This delay is what will cost us billions and billions and men and men.

And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period we were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which were in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are now eager to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend, and who was unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged to, was thrown out of office and his career ended because the blockade, owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough. Our delay caused his fall.

But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were at work on them all the while and according to the best opinion here they continue to build them faster than the British destroy them; and the submarines are destroying more merchant ships than all the shipbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out. This is the most serious aspect of the war---by far the most serious. I am trying to get our Government to send over hundreds of improvised destroyers---armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty have fears that unless such help come the full fruits of the war may never be gathered by the Allies---that some sort of a compromise peace may have to be made.

It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited after the Lusitania will prove to be the most costly year and a half in our history; and for once at least my old prophecy was quite a good guess. But that water has flowed over the dam and it is worth mentioning now only because you challenged me.

. . .


That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had a curious history. It was practically a resignation and therefore called for an immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge its receipt. For two months the Ambassador was left in the dark as to the attitude of Washington. Finally, in the latter part of January, 1917, Page wrote urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him to bring the matter to the President's attention. On February 5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was received. "The President," he said, "under extreme pressure of the present situation, has been unable to consider your communication in regard to your resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes that, at the present time, you will not press to be relieved from service; that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal sacrifice, but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in the crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought of resigning your post for the present."

At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the question. The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was every likelihood that the country would soon be at war. Page would have regarded his retirement at this crisis as little less than the desertion of his post. Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted the policy which the Ambassador had been urging for nearly two years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any logical excuse that may have existed for his resignation existed no longer. Mr. Wilson had now adopted a course which Page could enthusiastically support.

"I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice"---such was his reply to Mr. Lansing---"until after the end of the war, and I am making my arrangements to stay for this period."

The months that intervened between the Presidential election and the declaration of war were especially difficult for the American Embassy in London. Page had informed the President, in the course of his interview of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain regarded his efforts in the direction of peace; he had in fact delivered a message from the Foreign Office that any Presidential attempt to "mediate" would be rejected by the Allies. Yet his earnest representation on this point had produced no effect upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was bringing to bear upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count Bernstorff's memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed the intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most startling fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words, that, unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the German Government "would be forced to regain the freedom of action which it has reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last."(<A NAME="n162"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#162">162</A>) It is unlikely that the annals of diplomacy contain many documents so cool and insolent as this one. It was a notification from the Kaiser to the President that the so-called "Sussex pledge" was not regarded as an unconditional one by the Imperial Government; that it was given merely to furnish Mr. Wilson an opportunity to bring the war to an end; and that unless the Presidential attempt to accomplish this were successful, there would be a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious developments of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly because the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December 6th, and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food supplies, strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany, with her characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own open efforts would lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions. At any rate, on December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing to launch his own campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached her enemies with a proposal for a peace conference. A few days afterward Page, as the representative of Germany, called at the Foreign Office to deliver the large white envelope which contained the Kaiser's "peace proposal." In delivering this to Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the fact that the American Government entirely disassociated itself from its contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of "German Ambassador." Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador at Washington, tell the story and also reveal that it was almost impossible for Page, even when engaged in an official proceeding, to conceal his contempt for the whole enterprise:


<P ALIGN=CENTER>Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice

Foreign Office,
December 18, 1916,


The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented to me the German note containing what is called in it the "offer of peace." He explained that he did so on instructions of his Government as representing the German Government, and not in any way as representing their own opinions. He also explained that the note must be regarded as coming from the four Central Powers, and as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who were represented by the United States.

He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined to leave me a copy of it. The first part of the telegram explained that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate a confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German note and that they would themselves have certain representations to make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged the closest consideration. The telegram went on to explain that the Government of the United States had had it in mind for some time past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations and humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were prompted by the Governments of the Central Powers. They wished us to understand that the note of the Central Powers created a good opportunity for making the American representations, but was not the cause of such representations being made.

I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such an important matter without consulting my colleagues.

I am, etc.,


. <P ALIGN=CENTER>Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice

Foreign Office,
19 December, 1916.


The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.

I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of our response to the German peace note.

He replied that he did not know, but he imagined it was to enable them to frame the representations of which he had spoken to me.

I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply, and that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the German note. I thought it probable that we should express our view that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since it contained no specific proposals.

He said that he quite understood this, and that we should in fact reply that it was an offer "to buy a pig in a poke" which we were not prepared to accept. He added that he thought his Government would fully anticipate a reply in this sense, and he himself obviously approved it.

Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard people in London treating the German offer with derision, but that no doubt the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.

I said that it was certainly a serious thing, and no doubt would be treated seriously.

I asked him if he knew what would be contained in the proposed representations from his government.

He said that he did not; but as he understood that they were to be made to all the belligerents, he did not think that they could be much more than a pious aspiration for peace; since that was the only thing that was equally applicable to the Germans and to us.

As he was leaving he suggested that the German note might be published in our press.

I am, etc.,



This so-called German "peace proposal" began with the statement that the war "had been forced " upon Germany, contained the usual reference to the military might of the Central Powers, and declared that the Fatherland was fighting for "the honour and liberty of national evolution." It is therefore not surprising that Lord Robert received it somewhat sardonically, especially as the communication contained no specific proposals, but merely a vague suggestion of "negotiations." But another spectacular performance now drove the German manoeuvre out of everybody's mind. That President Wilson resented this German interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop them, however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated peace communication to all the warring Powers. His appeal took the form of asking that they state the objects for which they were fighting, the Presidential belief evidently being that, if they did this, a common meeting ground might possibly be found. The suggestion that the Allied war aims were not public property, despite the fact that British statesmen had been broadly proclaiming them for three years, caused a momentary irritation in England, but this was not a serious matter, especially as the British Cabinet quickly saw that this request gave them a position of advantage over Germany, which had always refused to make public the terms on which it would end the war. The main substance in this Presidential approach, therefore, would have produced no ill-feeling; as usual, it was a few parenthetical phrases---phrases which were not essential to the main argument---which set the allied countries seething with indignation. The President, this section of his note ran, "takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war, are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression and denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war." This idea was elaborated in several sentences of a similar strain, the general purport of the whole passage being that there was little to choose between the combatants, inasmuch as both were apparently fighting for about the same things. Mr. Wilson's purpose in this paragraph is not obscure; he was making his long expected appearance as a mediator, and he evidently believed that it was essential to this rôle that he should not seem to be prejudiced in favour of either side, but should hold the balance impartially between them.

It is true that a minute reading indicates that Mr. Wilson was merely quoting, or attempting to paraphrase, the statements of the leaders of both sides, but there is such a thing as quoting with approval, and no explanation could convince the British public that the ruler of the greatest neutral nation had not declared that the Allies and the Central Powers stood morally upon the same level. The popular indignation which this caused in Great Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British authorities. The publication of this note in the British press was withheld for several hours, in order to give the Government an opportunity to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it was feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that relations with the United States might be imperilled. The messages which the London correspondents were permitted to send to the United States were carefully censored for the same reason. The dispatch sent by the Associated Press was the product of a long struggle between the Foreign Office and its London correspondent. The representatives spent half an hour considering whether the American correspondents could cable their country that the note had been received in England with "surprise and irritation." After much discussion it was decided that "irritation" could not be used, and the message of the Associated Press, after undergoing this careful editing by the Foreign Office, was a weak and ridiculous description of the high state of excitement which prevailed in Great Britain. The fact that the British Foreign Office should have given all this trouble over the expressions sent to American newspapers and should even have spent half an hour debating whether a particular word should be used, almost pathetically illustrates the great care taken by the British Government not to influence American opinion against the Allies.

The Government took the same precautions with its own press in England. When the note was finally released the Foreign Office explicitly directed the London newspapers to comment with the utmost caution and in no case to question the President's sincerity. Most of them acquiesced in these instructions by maintaining silence. There was only one London newspaper, the Westminster Gazelle, which made even a faint-hearted attempt to explain away the President's statement. From the first day of the war the British people had declared that President Wilson did not understand the issues at stake; and they now declared that this note confirmed their worst forebodings. The comments of the man-in-the-street were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression which Mr. Wilson's dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen who had always been especially friendly to the United States and who had even defended the President in previous crises. Lord Bryce, who had accepted philosophically the Presidential statement that the United States was not "concerned with the causes" of the war, could not regard so indulgently this latest judgment. of Great Britain and Germany. "Bryce came to see me in a state of great depression," wrote Page. "He has sent Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter." Northcliffe commanded his newspapers, the Times and the Daily Mail, to discuss the note in a judicial spirit, but he himself told Mr. Page that "everybody is as angry as hell." When someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with Mr. Asquith, he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture. "Don't talk to me about it," he said. "It is most disheartening." But the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was King George. A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace on December 21st gave Page a description of the royal distress. The King, expressing his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should think that Englishmen were fighting for the same things in this war as the Germans, broke down.

The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which was opening before Europe at the moment when this Presidential note added a new cause for general despondency. Rumania had collapsed, the first inkling of the Russian revolution had been obtained, the British well knew that the submarine warfare was to be resumed, and British finances were also in a desperate plight. More and more it was becoming evident to the British statesmen that they needed the intervention of the United States. This is the reason why they could not destroy the chances of American help by taking official offense even at what Page, in a communication to the Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call President Wilson's "insulting words"; and hence their determination to silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they felt. Page's interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th, while the Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses the real emotions of Englishmen. Apparently Page's frank cables concerning the reception of this paragraph had caused a certain interest in the State Department; at least the Ambassador was instructed to call at the Foreign Office and explain that the interpretation which had been commonly put upon the President's words was not the one which he had intended. At the same time Page was instructed to request the British Foreign Office, in case its reply were "favourable," not to publish it, but to communicate it secretly to the American Government. The purpose of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the President's plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany likewise to display an acquiescent mood. The object of Page's call was to present this disclaimer.

Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the late Lord Salisbury, ---that same Lord Salisbury whose combats with Secretary Blaine and Secretary Olney form piquant chapters in British-American history---is one of the most able and respected of British statesmen. In his earlier life Lord Salisbury had been somewhat overbearing in his attitude toward the United States; in his later years, however, perhaps owing to the influence of his nephew, Mr. Balfour, his manner had changed. In his attitude toward the United States Lord Robert Cecil reflected only the later phases of his father's career. To this country and to its peaceful ideals he had always been extremely sympathetic, and to Page especially he had never manifested anything but cordiality. Yet it was evident, as Page came into his office this morning, that to Lord Robert, as to every member of the Government, the President's note, with its equivocal phrases, had been a terrible shock. His manner was extremely courteous, as always, but he made no attempt to conceal his feelings. Ordinarily Lord Robert did not wear his emotions on the surface; but he took occasion on this visit to tell Page how greatly the President's communication had grieved him.

"The President," he said, "has seemed to pass judgment on. the allied cause by putting it on the same level as the German. I am deeply hurt."

Page conveyed Mr. Lansing's message that no such inference was justified. But this was not reassuring.

"Moreover," Lord Robert added, "there is one sentence in the note---that in which the President says that the position of neutrals is becoming intolerable---that seems almost a veiled threat."

Page hastened to assure Lord Robert that no threat was intended.

Lord Robert's manner became increasingly serious.

"There is nothing that the American Government or any other human power can do," he remarked slowly and solemnly, which will bring this war to a close before the Allies have spent their utmost force to secure a victory. A failure to secure such a victory will leave the world at the mercy of the most arrogant and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been organized. It is far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny than to perish under its success."

On any occasion Lord Robert is an impressive or at least a striking and unusual figure; he is tall, lank, and ungainly, almost Lincolnesque in the carelessness of his apparel and the exceeding awkwardness of his postures and manners. His angular features, sharp nose, pale face, and dark hair suggest the strain of ascetism, almost of fanaticism, which runs in the present generation of his family. And the deep sincerity and power of his words on this occasion made an impression which Page never forgot; they transformed the British statesman into an eloquent, almost an heroic figure. If we are to understand the full tragedy of this moment we must remember that, incredible as it now seems, there was a fear in British officialdom that the United States might not only not pursue a course favourable to the Allies, but that it might even throw its support to Germany. The fear, of course, was baseless; any suggestion of such a policy in the United States would have destroyed any official who had brought it forward; but Lord Robert knew and Page knew that there were insidious influences at work at that time, both in the United States and in Great Britain, which looked in this direction. A group of Americans, whom Page used to refer to as "peace spies," were associated with English pacifists, for the purpose of bringing about peace on almost any terms. These "peace spies" had worked out a programme all their own. The purpose was to compel Great Britain to accept the German terms for ending the war. Unless she did accept them, then it was intended that the American Government should place an embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs and munitions to the Allies. There is little question that the United States, by taking such action, could have ended the war almost instantaneously. Should the food of her people and the great quantities of munitions which were coming from this country be suddenly cut off, there is little likelihood that Great Britain could have long survived. The possibility that an embargo might shut out these supplies had hung over the heads of British statesmen ever since the war began; they knew that the possession of this mighty power made the United States the potential dictator of events; and the fear that it might be used had never ceased to influence their thoughts or their actions. Even while this interview was taking place, certain anti-British forces in the United States, such as Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, were urging action of this kind.

"I have always been almost a Pacifist," Lord Robert continued. "No man has ever hated war worse than I. No man has ever had a more earnest faith that war can be abolished. But European civilization has been murderously assaulted and there is nothing now to do but to defeat this desperate enemy or to perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United States understood what is at stake."

Lord Robert went on:

" I will go so far as to say that if the United States will come into the war it will decide which will win, freedom or organized tyranny. If the United States shall help the Germans, civilization will perish and it will be necessary to build it up slowly again---if indeed it will ever appear again. If the United States will help the Allies, civilization will triumph."(<A NAME="n163"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#163">163</A>)

As to the proposal that the British terms should be conveyed confidentially to Mr. Wilson, Lord Robert said that that would be a difficult thing to do. The President's note had been published, and it therefore seemed necessary that the reply should also be given to the press. This was the procedure that was ultimately adopted.

Startling as was the sensation caused by the President's December note, it was mild compared with that which was now to come. Page naturally sent prompt reports of all these conversations to the President and likewise kept him completely informed as to the state of public feeling, but his best exertions apparently did not immediately affect the Wilson policy. The overwhelming fact is that the President's mind was fixed on a determination to compel the warring powers to make peace and in this way to keep the United States out of the conflict. Even the disturbance caused by his note of December 18th did not make him pause in this peace campaign. To that note the British sent a manly and definite reply, drafted by Mr. Balfour, giving in detail precisely the terms upon which the Allies would compose their differences with the Central Powers. The Germans sent a reply consisting of ten or a dozen lines, which did not give their terms, but merely asked again for a conference. Events were now moving with the utmost rapidity. On January 9th, a council of German military chieftains was held at Pless; in this it was decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. On January 16th the Zimmermann-Mexico telegram was intercepted; this informed Bernstorff, among other things, that this decision had been made. On January 16th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the American Embassy in London began receiving a long cipher despatch from Washington. The preamble announced that the despatch contained a copy of an address which the President proposed to deliver before the Senate "in a few days." Page was directed to have copies of the address "secretly prepared" and to hand them to the British Foreign Office and to newspapers of the type of the Nation, the Daily News, and the Manchester Guardian---all three newspapers well known for their Pacifist tendencies. As the speech approached its end, this sentence appeared: "It must be a peace without victory." The words greatly puzzled the secretary in charge, for they seemed almost meaningless. Suspecting that an error had been made in transmission, the secretary directed the code room to cable Washington for a verification of the cipher groups. Very soon the answer was received; there had been no mistake; the Presidential words were precisely those which had been first received: "Peace without victory." The slips were then taken to Page, who read the document, especially these fateful syllables, with a consternation which he made no effort to conceal. He immediately wrote a cable to President Wilson, telling him of the deplorable effect this sentence would produce and imploring him to cut it out of his speech---with what success the world now knows.

An astonishing feature of this episode is that Page had recently explained to the Foreign Office, in obedience to instructions from Washington, that Mr. Wilson's December note should not be interpreted as placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the same moral level. Now Mr. Wilson, in this "peace without victory" phrase, had repeated practically the same idea in another form. On the day the speech was received at the Embassy, about a week before it was delivered in the Senate, Page made the following memorandum:


The President's address to the Senate, which was received to-day (January 16th),(<A NAME="n164"></A><A HREF="Pagenotes.htm#164">164</A>) shows that he thinks he can play peace-maker. He does not at all understand, (or, if he do, so much the worse for him) that the Entente Powers, especially Great Britain and France, cannot make "peace without victory." If they do, they will become vassals of Germany. In a word, the President does not know the Germans; and he is, unconsciously, under their influence in his thought. His speech plays into their hands.

This address will give great offense in England, since it puts each side in the war on the same moral level.

I immediately saw the grave danger to our relations with Great Britain by the Peace-without-Victory plan; and I telegraphed the President, venturing to advise him to omit that phrase---with

no result.


Afterward Page added this to the above:


Compare this Senate speech with his speech in April calling for war: Just when and how did the President come to see the true nature of the German? What made him change from Peace-Maker to War-Maker? The Zimmermann telegram, or the February U-boat renewal of warfare? Had he been so credulous as to believe the German promise? This promise had been continuously and repeatedly broken.

Or was it the pressure of public opinion, the growing impatience of the people that pushed him in?

This distressing peace-move---utterly out of touch with the facts of the origin of the war or of its conduct or of the mood and necessities of Great Britain---a remote, academic deliverance, while Great Britain and France were fighting for their very lives-made a profoundly dejected feeling; and it made my place and work more uncomfortable than ever. "Peace without victory"

brought us to the very depths of European disfavour.